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ABSTRACT 
The political significance of the media coverage of District Six is approached in the following way: the issue is 
approached theoretically by posing the question of the general political significance of news as a communicative form. 
This question is resolved by an examination of the complicated relationship between the tradition of political thought 
and the development of modem political forms, specifically the issue of the importance of communication in modern 
political forms. This is explored by considering the problem of the political outlined by Heller. Arendt 
reconceptua1izes the problem in terms of political judgement, which is discussed in relation to postmodernism and 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, to establish a new conceptualization of political judgement based on Arendt's 
view of narrative and Benjamin's writing on history. This conceptualization is used to formulated a notion of the 
general political significance of news, which is a form of political judgement related to a specific political culture. On 
this basis the media material is analysed in terms of two processes: the representation of District Six in the liberal 
media, and the representation of the political process surrounding its racial zoning and demolition. It is concluded 
that the media coverage of Distract Six during this period is characterized by a political culture termed the politics of 
the ordinary based on a reification of 'Enrope' as part of a ' colonial attitude', and the idealization of specific nrban 
forms, with a special relationship to urban planning. Thus the political significance of the media coverage resides in 
the perpetuation of this political culture, representative of the politics of the white English-speaking ntiddle class, in 
tenus of which an authentic nrban politics is not conceivable. Additional conclusions are also drawn concerning the 
relationship between this political culture and the politics of Apartheid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the title suggests, the main aim of tltis thesis is to detennine the political significance of the coverage of 
District Six by the liberal media during the period 1949-1970. This is actually two aims. The first is properly the 
concern of political philosophy, namely the task of conceiving of the political significance of media coverage as 
such. The second is to employ tltis understanding to make some sense of the multiplicity of fonus, styles and 
political positions represented by the material in question. Thus about half the thesis is devoted to issues of 
political philosophy, and about half to the analysis of the actual media material itself. When I use the word 
'liberal' I mean merely to designate the two newspapers in question. The use of this word has a complex history in 
South African politics that is beyond the scope of tltis thesis. 
In the first section, I have tried to develop a specifically philosophical approach to the question of the media rather 
than a more orthodox sociological one. There are several reasons for tltis. Most sociological approaches begin 
with premises about the stmcture of modem society. I wanted to begin with more basic philosophical categories 
that avoided the problems posed by postmodernism to such premises, especially in South Africa, where the 
question of social categories is complexified by our inunediate and more distant colonial past. The methods of 
philosophy are older, and are more capable of dealing with phenomena on their own tenus, than those of 
sociology, whose categories are limited by the limits of modernity. I have thus not employed the concept of 
ideology, preferring to reconceive the political in tenus of Hannah Arendts work. This is an approach which is 
contrary to most contemporary media studies; whether it will bear fiuit or not is one of the questions that tltis 
tllesis will hopefully demonstrate. 
I have thus developed a political understanding of news in general, characterizing it as a specifically 
contemporary communicative form, the political significance of which is comprehensible in terms of the political 
characteristics of the modem age. This characterization is not rooted in a specific social stmcture or social fonn, 
but in Arendt's understanding of the conditions and problems of contemporary political life. 
For the second section, the source material is derived from the two main english-medium daily newspapers of 
Cape Town, namely the Cape Times and the Argus, collected in the South African Library press cuttings 
collection under "District Six". A reference to District Six is all the articles have in common. In the text, I have 
referenced articles by quoting the title followed by the date of appearance with a prefix to indicate which of the 
two newspapers the article appeared in, CT in the case of the Cape Times and AR in the case of the Argus. For 
purposes of analysis, I have not distinguished between the two newspapers; it would require a more in-depth study 
with broader subject matter to distinguish them politically. I have assumed that on the issue of District Six there is 
little significant political difference between the two; whether tltis is a weakness or not I am not in a position to 
tell. 
The period under consideration is significant in that it is during tlris period that District Six became a 'problem', 
first for the Cape Town municipal authorities and the 'public', and later for the Apartheid state. During the 60's it 
was declared 'White' and then demolished over a period of years. By the late 60's this process had not yet been 
completed, but the initial political battle was over, to be replaced by subsequent ones. Part of the reason for 
stopping at this point was a concern that the amount of material would be too great; my aim was to investigate the 
phenomenon of news rather than to produce a thorough study of the media and urban politics in Cape Town. 
With tlris in mind, the two decades under consideration provide all the necessary material for such an 
investigation. 
The first decade provides a wealth of material that is not yet concerned with the direct issue of the racial wning or 
demolition of the district, and thus one can gain some idea of how District Six was portrayed in the liberal media 
before it became widely known as a symbol of the brutal excesses of Apartheid. The second decade provides 
material that indicates how the political contestation of the future of District Six was represented by the liberal 
media. Together, if analyzed properly, these two aspects provide a thorough picture of the political significance of 
the media coverage in question. 
The approach I have taken is somewhat unusual. Whether it is successful or not, remains to be seen. I have tried 
to think about the political phenomena involved without the help of pre-established theoretical models, hoping 
that in the process new light will be shed on old problems. There is thus a third dimension to this thesis; it is an 
experiment in political thought. Whether it is successful or not, I will attempt to evaluate in the Conclusion. 
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Chapter One 
THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING NEWS IN POLITICAL TERMS 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the problem of understanding new.; in political tenms. I will begin with some 
insights of Carey (1989), who outlines two approaches to understanding the media, the 'transmission' approach 
and the 'ritual ' approach. I will argue in favour of the latter, and then outline the problem of understanding the 
political significance of new.; as a problem of, first, understanding new.; as a specific cultural fonn, and second, 
understanding the problem of 'the political ' in the modem age, informed by the implication of communicative 
forms in the transition from pre-modem to modem political forms. 
CAREY'S CONCEPrION OF NEWS AS CULTURAL FORM 
Carey draVlS a distinction between two views of commwricatio~ which he terms the "transmissionlt and llritual ll 
view.;. (Carey 1989:19-22). Commonly, the products of the media are vie\Wd as carriers of meaning, as a means 
of communication which signify a social and political reality, based on the metaphor of tile messenger, carrying 
meaning as a messenger carried a letter in a leatller pouch. The "transmission" view is rooted in a spatial 
metaphor that evokes the spatial distribution of a coded message across space from one source to a number of 
recipients. Carey compares such a IItransntissionll with a "ritual" view of conunurucation (Carey 1989: 15). He 
correctly asserts that the "transmissionll view is the most common in industrial societies (particularly in the 
American context in which he is writing), having its roots in the 19th century use of the word "communication": 
"In the nineteenth century but to a lesser extent today, the movement of goods or people and the 
movement of infoffilation were seen as essentially identical processes and both were described 
by the common noun "communication", ... Our basic orientation to conununication remains 
grounded, at the deepest roots of our tllinking, in the idea of transmission .. " (Carey 1989:15) 
He considers tins a profoundly inadequate conception of communication, and, in order to create a different 
perspective, resurrects an older use, originating in the concept of "communion", from tile same root as such words 
as community. He compares the two view.; in relation to a new.;paper. 
In the "transmission" approach, a new.;paper will be understood as a means for transmitting information to large 
numbers of people, and perhaps as an institution for g;lthering relevant iofoffilation. The sort of questions that will 
arise will relate to issues such as what effect tltis has, whether reality is faithfully or manipulatively conveyed, 
what effect the existence of the new.;paper has on social integration I conflict and so forth. On the other hand, the 
llritual" approach will 
" .. view reading a new.;paper less as sending or gaining information and more as attending a 
mass, a situation in which notlting new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is 
portrayed and confimled .. 
Under a ritual view. ... new.; is not information but dranla. It does not describe the world but 
portrays an arena of dranlatic forces and action; it exists solely in historical time; and it invites 
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our participation on the basis of our assuming, often vicariously, social roles within it." (Carey 
1989:20-1) 
Within a particular social milieu, conceptions of the media that utilize the "transmission" view emphasize content 
and effect, and have a behavioural undertone, which is usually related to questions of efficiency, power and 
contra!. Thus the transmission view is useful for considering media effects synchronically, the effect of the media 
within a particular context at a particular moment in time. In the context of these considerations, the structure and 
form are given, as ""II as a reified conceptual language in which these structures and forms are expressed. 
Ho""ver, as Carey points out, 
" .. news is a historic reality. It is a form of culture invented by a particular class at a particular 
point of history - in this case by the middle class largely in the eighteenth century. Like any 
invented cultural form, news both forms and reflects a particular "hunger for experience", a 
desire to do away with the epic, heroic, and traditional in favor of the unique, original, novel, 
new- news." (Carey 1989:21) 
The newspaper, with which this thesis is mainly concerned, is, as ""II as an institution, a cultural form with a 
complex history. 
The origins of the form can be finnly tied to the rise of the bourgeoisie in Europe, and in fact, as McQuail notes, 
the dominant notion of a "newspaper" is rooted in the journalistic culture of the late 19th century (McQuail 
1983:21). He considers the late 19th century newspaper to have contributed " .. most to our modern understanding 
ofwhat a newspaper is or should be." (McQuaiI1983:21). He cites a number offactors, including the dominance 
of the liberal-democratic nation-state, developments in communications tecbnology, a progressive capitalist class, 
and the forging of a "business-professional establishment" (McQuail 1983:21). The features of this newspaper 
culture ""re 
" .. formal independence from the state and from open vested interests; an acceptance into the 
structure of society as a Illi\ior institution of political and social life; a highly developed sense of 
social and ethical responsibility, the rise of a journalistic profession dedicated to the objective 
reporting of events; an adoption, at the same time, of the role of opinion-giver or -former; 
frequently a tendency to identify with the 'national interest'." (McQuailI983:21) 
He refers to the late 19th century newspaper as an "elite" newspaper, and contrasts this form with the dominant 
20th century fonn, namely the mass press, with a large proportion of revenue from advertising, concentration on 
entertainment as well as or instead of, Iiserious'l news, mass appeal, and the Ilcommercialization" of the press, with 
newspapers being owned and marketed primarily for profit, usually by large monopolies, but comments that, 
" .. while this may now appear to be the dominant newspaper fornl, it draws its status as a 
newspaper from the 'high bourgeois' form [late 19th century], and is otherwise defined by its 
deviation from tile latter" (McQuaiI1983:22) 
What is evident is that there is a complex relationship between a concrete historical-cultural form and a normative 
notion of what 'news' ought to be, which is intricately related to a specific political context. Thus our criteria for 
news have a very specific cultural-political context; they are not eternal. 
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THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF FORM IN NEWS 
It is thus apparent that the emergence of "news" as a cultural form is connected with the development of the 
modern nation-state and the subsequent diversification of modern political forms. In considering the political 
significance of news coverage of any sort, therefore, there are two approaches that are possible. The one approach 
involves an analysis ofthe actual information that is distributed, who it is distributed to and how, on condition that 
it can be shown that the actual possession or non-possession of certain information is of political importance. This 
approach has been emphasized in South Africa, both in the analysis of censorship as well as more complex 
arguments concerning practices of selection based on ideological criteria (see for instance Tomiselli et al 1987). 
However, the severe disadvantage of this approach is that it proceeds as if communication were the same 
everywhere and at all times. Politically, this view is unable to distinguish between different communicative forms 
and the diversity of language-games that these entail, and thus not able to capture the political essence of a specific 
communicative situation; in one context, it might be the supply of ioformation, in another, the use of parody, in 
another, a manner of speech, and so forth; sometimes the very meaningless of the content of communication is 
politically significant. 
A more satisfactory exploration from the point of view of political thought involves an examination of the news 
form politically, a consideration of the specific political circumstances of media as a historical-cultural form, 
using the word 'news' to describe a specific innovation in specific political contexts. While this approach involves 
more unexplored territory and is thus a risk, at the same time I believe it is an approach that deals more 
thoroughly and more critically with the less-noticed assumptions inherent in our way of thinking about the media 
While it would seem odd to concentrate more on 'form' than 'content' in media practice, I hope to demonstrate 
that firstly, the distinction is overrated, and secondly, that to problematize the occurrence of certain media 'forms' 
instead of regarding their existence as natural (as the ' transmission' view does), is the basic condition for a clear 
view of the relationship between ' the political' and communicative forms. I will attempt to argue that particular 
fonns of communicative activity have particular significance in particular political milieux; these forms comprise 
'perceptual criteria' (literally 'ways of seeing') for the distribution of content which are often not clearly visible 
within a particular milieu (on account of the everyday practices of 'reading' the media), but are of great 
significance in thinking politically about the media. 
CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL CONSIDERATION OF FORM 
The ' pure fonn' of the mass media has frequently provoked images of heaven or hell in the public imagination, 
usually overdeterntined by a technological millenariartism. This is merely an example of the mysticism usually 
enshrouding the notion of 'fonn', which has provoked the messiartic and detenninistic writing of authors such as 
Marshall McLuhan, as well as more apoca1yptic or eschalological attitudes. 
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Approaches to the media emphasizing fonns have usually been incapable of accommodating any political insights 
(Marshall McLuhan's work, with his oentral credo, "the mediwn is the message", is an exemplary case), mainly 
due to the mystical notion that media fonns constitute "the world" as a whole, thus eliminating any possibility of 
conoeptualizing political processes in these tenns, which always occur within the boundaries of the world. Any 
phenomenon which is constitutive of ' the world as a whole' is thus beyond the reach of political thought, and thus 
in the provinoe of the 'unworldly'. The language of the 'unworldly' has always been of religious provenanoe, and 
thus lends to the writing of such theorists a distinctly messianic or eschatological tinge. On the contrary, one of 
my oentral goals below is to illustrate the importanoe of communicative fonns in political thinking. and to employ 
these insights in thinking about the political significanoe of the media coverage of District Six. 
COMMUNICATIVE FORMS IN POLITICAL TIllNKING 
To outline the notion of a conununicative fonn, I wish to use this phrase in a ratller unusual way. It is not 
intended to be a basis for a complete analysis of communication in general, nor the basis for a list of 'forms' or 
'types' for purposes of classification, but as a way of thinking about communication in political tenns, or more 
particularly, specific ways of thinking about the relationship between communicative activity and political activity 
and understanding. The purpose of this expression is not to define a oertain content, but as a means to the 
exploration of oertain phenomena by drawing attention to what is similar in diverse historical-political situations. 
I want to use the phrase in the manner of Wittgenstein's 'language-games' in his Philosophical Investigations, 
both in the sense of it being a ' fumily resemblanoe' term (Wittgenstein 1988:32), and in the sense of the following 
characterization of the limits of'language-ganles' : 
"Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularisation of 
language - as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistanoe. The language-
games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of 
our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities" (Wittgenstein 1988:50) 
This is no more and no less than my aim in using the pluase 'communicative fonns ' ; to allow me to write 
meaningfully about an aspect of political life and understanding which is otherwise not sufficiently defined. Thus 
what one might label a communicative form might include speech, letter writing. writing in general, the notion of 
"text" (both mndern and postrnndern), history, news, the novel, poetry, sculpture, or the Internet. 
Obviously some of these are of more interest from the point of view of political processes than others; for instance, 
one would only be able to make the most general statements about the relevanoe of the communicative form of 
writing as such, whereas letter writing might provide a valuable perspective on the development of the bourgeois 
public sphere in Europe of the 18th oentury (see for instanoe Habermas 1989). 
Communicative fonns which have particular political significance usually exist historically, rather than 
analytically; thus a specific historical-cultural form of letter-writing had significanoe in the development of the 
bourgeois public sphere; ' letter writing' in general poses oertain analytical problems which complicate political 
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understanding (for instance, the problem of criteria~ what is and is not ' letter writing'? How culturally-bound is the 
concept, etc.). It would not be helpful to assert that, for instance, 18th century letter-writing was a 'particular 
instance' ofa 'general form' ~ as I will attempt to make clear below, a certain political context contains the 'truth' 
of a particular communicative form. Thus there is 'photography' , but there is a great age of documentary 
photography; there is the novel, but there are specific forms of the novel. 
To erase the specificity of particular fonns, in for example 'the novel' can erase the specifically political aspects of 
the form (e.g. the 'post-colonial ' Latin American novel vs the 'bourgeois' novel of the 18th and 19th century). 
Subsequent experience of these forms cannot but be mimetic to specific historical constellations that construct and 
extend such forms, but never in the sarne context, and thus never in the sarne sense. Thus a 'general political 
theory of the novel' would simply be blind to the most important political insights that a political examination of 
'the novel' form would nonnally reveal. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of the 'common structure' of novels can 
reveal a valuable framework for pursuing specific ' instances' (and indeed this is usually necessary), however the 
awareness must remain that the notion of the 'general form' is a philosophical device to create a specific 
perspective for understanding rather than an objectifYing analytical concept. This is the case with the cunent 
inquiry into the political significance of news. 
In the case ofMcQuail's reference to the 19th century newspaper as a paradigm case for the newspaper form, it is 
pertinent to note that a specific historical-political constellation, characterized by the modem political fonn of the 
nation-state, has been 'universalized' in nonnative notions of ' news', 'journalism' and so forth. What has moved 
into the collective memory is the experience of 'objectivity' or 'impartiality' and the attendant media forms, styles 
of writing and so forth, as well as the attendant conditions of readership, which together fanned a 'newspaper 
reading public' in a specific political context. In that a lot of these normative notions of ' news' (what news ought 
to be) pattern our basic thinking about media and politics in such notions as 'bias', ' objectivity, and ' responsible 
journalism' , it is necessary to consider the political content of these experiences in the context of a notion of 
political thinking that is appropriate to the context of this study. 
In the case of the 19th century "elite" newspaper, one can say that it represents the realization of a specific 
communicative form, but only in retrospect, only after the event, when the notion of "newspaper" has moved from 
a concrete historical category via modernist/imperial discourse to an abstract reification of aspects of the 19th 
century European nation-state. Subsequent political experience, particularly the emergence of the Third World in 
the wake of the disintegration of European colonial empires, the Cold War, and now the 'New World Order', 
creates a different perspective on this history, which implies that it has a different meaning. Our access to 
'communicative forms' in political thinking is always perspectival, always a project of redeeming historical 
images in the context of the quintessential political dynamic of the present. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN POLITICAL FORMS 
There is an historical period in the transition between pre-modern political fonns and the emergence of the 
modern nation-state where one can glimpse the importance of specific communicative forms in the political 
development of modern states and the related impact on traditional political thought. In classical political thought, 
there was a tradition stretching back to Aristotle conceming the problem of the size of a 'governable' state. In 
Aristotle's Politics, there is an argument concerning the optimal characteristics of the polis that was an integral 
part of the tradition until the American revolution. Aristotle, in the following passage, considers the optimal size 
for a polis, and concludes that such a state camlot be larger than a medium-sized city, without degenerating into 
despotism: 
"Experience shows ns that it is difficult, if not indeed impossible, for a very populous state to 
secure a general habit of obedience to law. . 
.. Order, however, is the one thing which is impossible for an excessive number .. 
.. But we may also note tbat states, like all other things (animals, plants and inanimate 
instruments), have a definite measure of size. Any object will lose its power of performing its 
function if it is either excessively small or of an excessive size. Sometimes it will wholly forfeit 
its nature; sometimes, short of that, it will merely be defective. We may take the example of a 
ship. A ship which is only six inches in length, or is as much as 1200 feet long, will not be a 
ship at all; and even a ship of more moderate size may still cause difficulties of navigation, 
either because it is not large enough or becanse it is unwieldily large. The sarne is true of states. 
A state composed of too few members is a state without self-sufficiency (and the state, by its 
definition, is a self sufficient society). A state composed of too many will indeed be self-
sufficient in the matter of material necessities (as an uncivilised people may equally be); but it 
will not be a true state, for the simple reason that it can hardly have a true constitution. Who 
can be the general of a mass so excessively large? And who can give it orders, unless he has 
Stentor's voice?" (Aristotle, trans.Barker 1948:341-2) 
Barker elucidates the 'having of a constitution' in a footnote as "the attribute of a 'way of life' expressed in a 
constitution" (Aristotle 1948:342). Stentor, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, was a Greek 
warrior in the Trojan War, whose "voice was as J,XJwerful as fifty voices of other men", 
The pre-modem use of the word 'political' is not straightforward. Polis, translated as 'political state', pertained to 
a constitutional city-state, and in early english usage tltis sense survives as a term distinguishing a 'political' state 
from other fonns of government such as monarchy. In addition, one of the criteria for 'state' in Aristotle is a 
constitution, which distinguished what he tenns "an uncivilized people" from a "true state". The latin root of 
"civilization" is the same as the root for tlcity!l~ roughly put. "civilization" in the pre-modern political sense, 
implies, "polis-iiication". The key characteristic of a polis, in the ancient sense, as opposed to other fonns of 
government, was that it did not constitute a "state", in that it functioned "without a division between rulers and 
ruled" (Arendt 1993: 19), it; in the Greek sense, one considered only tile citizens. The characteristic of a pre-
modern state was just such a division, embodied in the traditional fonns of government, namely democracy, 
oligarchy, or monarchy. (Aristotle defined "the state" in a polis as "the sum total of citizens" (see Heller 
1991:525». The modern nation-state, on the other hand, has no clear-cut distinction between rulers and ruled; tltis 
development created a range of problems in modem political thought. 
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The emergence of the American republic raised certain dilemmas for pre-modern political thinkers. Carey notes 
that 
"Until the end of the eighteenth century there was a broad consensus in political philosophy 
stretching from Plato and Aristotle through Roussean and Montesquieu that there were natural 
limits to democracy, limits of both geography and population." (Carey 1989:6) 
Carey's use of the term 'democracy' is problematic here. The traditional notion of democracy rooted in Aristotle 
referred to direct democracy, literally 'rule by the people' , and implied direct rule by majority in public assembly. 
Modern institutionalized representative democracy was not part of the tradition of political thought at this stage. 
The issue was more directly that of founding a state based on legitimacy and consensus; the problem was to create 
a political form outside the canon of traditional political tllOught that made a republic the size of the United States 
possible. What the Founding Fathers had in mind was a political form unprecedented in the tradition of political 
thought, nanlely a 'political state' the size of a continent, the implementation of the ideal of the polis without 
'natural' limits of any sort. 
In teffilS of the specific problems fucing the founders of the American republic, innovations in foffilS of 
commnnications were directly understood by the writers of the Federalist Papers as providing the preconditions for 
the development of a democratic republican state as large as post-revolutionary America: 
"The Federalist Papers, are, among other things, a running argument with Montesquieu and 
inherited political theory: an attempt to resolve the contradictions that the geography and 
population presented to received theory. In two of the most worked-over of the essays .. 
. . Madison argued that improvements in commnnications would efface distance and facilitate 
continental democracy .. " (Carey 1989:6) 
This harnessing of technology was tantamount to the realization of the mythical Stentor in the modern media. A 
printing press, or latterly, and more precisely, a radio or television transmitter, created the possibility that 
individuals or institutions could overcome the age-old physical limitation of the human voice. The possibility of 
any individual having ' StentOl's voice' is significant as a transgression of natural limits in Aristotle; these limits 
had the function philosophically of providing a foundation for the notion of political fornI, which also comprised 
tlle basis of traditional political theory. Once the category of 'nature' (in the ancient Greek sense, the realm of 
necessity) had been superseded, the conditions of political life could no longer be comprehended in teffilS of 
'inherent' limits. For political thought this was a crucial development, as it implied that the habit of traditional 
political thinkers of grounding their thinking in an unchanging natural realm which comprised a limit to hUlllan 
action, was no longer tenable. If there was no 'natural' limit to the size of a state or the capacity for an individual 
to communicate, there was no longer a point outside the political terrain from which to judge crucial aspects of the 
political life of a specific community. This development is the result of a complex dialectical relationship behwen 
technology and social and political foffilS, which I will consider next. 
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INNOVATION IN MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIVE FORMS 
The relationship bet\Mlen technical innovations and the development of new communicative forms is a complex 
and continually shifting one, and there is a straightforward causaJ nexus. The case of books and the development 
of printing is a good paradigm case. McQuail points out (McQuail 198320) that the development of printing led 
initially only to the limited production of existing books. Gradually, a transformation of content took place, 
whereby specific characteristics of the technology developed for the mechanical reproduction of books were 
utilized. Books were written more frequently and more topically, a wider audience was reached, the process of 
production and distribution of knowledge gradually passed from the religious to the secular sphere, and so forth, 
until some of the characteristically modern forms of the book began to emerge, such as the novel. 
The development of printing was also responsible for the dominance of the vernacular over the more widespread 
scholastic latin of the time, and thus tile dominance of specific European languages amongst the intelligentsia, 
over latin. This had the effect of weakening the power of the church, fragmenting what was then a trans-European 
intelligentsia, as well as a pan-European aristocracy (who by and large did not speak the vernacular), and thus 
establishiog the communicative and political conditions for the development ofthe nation-state. On the one hand, 
the ' communicative potential' of the material technology of the printing press was 'realized' in forms such as the 
book and the newspaper. On the other, certain technological forms became dominant while others disappeared 
altogether, according to their social importance. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEWS 
News, as a specific communicative form, has a history rooted in the development of modernity. Early forms of the 
newspaper were initially published as newsletters, mainly for the consumption of merchants, who had a need to 
know which way the wind blew, literally and politically, in locations removed geographical and socially from their 
inunediate surroundings. "News" as a pure abstract form developed most clearly after the development of "news 
agencies ll with the invention of the telegraph, where IInews content" \¥as separated from any notion of form or 
style. Carey expJains how the telegraph and concomitantly the news agency, ushered in a new notion of 
"objective" news (Carey 1989:210). News on the telegraph had to be stripped of any colloquial content, any 
stylistic content, and had to confurm to a notion of transparent objectivity, to be denotative in an unambiguous 
way, so that it could be utilized by a newspaper of any political complexion, in any location, and later, in any 
language (this development also precipitated a radical separation bet\Mlen 'form' and 'content', which actually 
enllanced the significance of the separation directly). 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL 
The developments in forms of communication that posed a challenge to the received tradition of political thought 
in the Federalist Papers, crystallized into several quintessentially modem forms, one of which is news, as outlined 
above. In order to understand the political significance of news as a communicative form, it is necessary to corne 
to terms with what exactly the problems raised for political thought by the modem age are; doing this will throw 
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the conditions of political life in the modem age into relief, in such a way that the political significance of news 
will become apparent. As outlined earlier, one of the central problems in the transition from pre-modem to 
modem political forms is the designation of ' political '. HeUer has outlined this problem as being essential to the 
conditions of modernity, and in the next chapter I will use her concise account as a way of structuring the 
problem. 
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ChapterTwQ 
THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL IN THE MODERN AGE 
INTRODUCfION 
Heller (1991a) has provided a detailed outline of the problem of the political, which J will outline below. There are 
several aspects to this problem, the main ones being the complexity of the designation of concepts such as 
'political' and ' politics' , not least their contestation in political struggles. Coupled with this condition of political 
life is the unprecedented occurrence of political events which are not comprehensible in terms of traditional 
political thought. Both these aspects make the problem of coming to terms with the conditions of political which 
characterize tile modern age particularly difficult and particularly important. After outlining Heller's summary of 
the problem of the political, I will consider two other accounts of 'politics' , before considering the political 
thought of Hannail Arendt in the next chapter. 
HELLER'S DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF 'THE POLITICAL' 
Agnes Heller (Heller 1991a:330-43) outlines some problems of the political in modern political philosophy. She 
begins her essay with some remarks on the work of post-World War One political philosophers (primarily Carl 
Schmitt, Heidegger, Lukacs and Arendt), who sought to delineate the political unambiguously so as to 
reinvigorate political philosophy in tile face of the "fuiled" traditions of Marxism and liberalism of the time. 
This interest in tile problem of the concept of the political is not merely contingent. The designation of ' tile 
political' is a philosophical problem generated specifically by the conditions of modern political life. She explains 
why the political became a 'philosophical device' in terms of the specific social and political conditions of 
modernity by contrasting modern and pre-modern political thought and isolating a crucial development in 
moderrtity that problematizes the notion of the political (Heller 1991a:337). 10 pre-modern thought, 
"Even cultures with the strongest political awareness, for example the Greek and the Roman, 
shared the quasi-naturaJistic and therefore unproblematic view that only acts which have been 
decided upon and performed by the members of the political c1ass(es), can be termed political. 
When members of a political class, be this a caste, an estate or some other grouping, act in their 
capacity as members of this class, their acts are, by definition, political." (HeUer 1991a:331) 
All others, for example slaves, women and other non-citizens, could not engage in politics. With the development 
of moderrtity, the identity of the political with a political class began to disintegrate, and finally, "the birth of 
modern mass democracy finally rendered obsolete the equation of political class with political action" (Heller 
1991a:331). Concomitantly, the notion of the state, from being a "transparent" political class consisting of a "who" 
became a question of "what". 
Two possibilities emerge here; either the political can be conceived of as a realm or domain, in which case 
anytlung entering tlus domain can be said to be political, or tile political can be seen as a 'quality' of certain 
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entities (issues, actions, persons) which are tenned political (Heller 1991a:330). She considers next the attempts 
by Schmitt, Heidegger, Lukacs and Arendt to delineate a clear notion of "the political", and shows each of these 
attempts to have failed, for a number of common reasons, which go to the heart of the dilemma of "the concept of 
the political" (Arendt is an exception; later we will attempt to show that Hellers criticism is misguided here). 
Common to all the attempts to resolve the problem of the political are a number of both initial concerns and 
results; which, briefly, are as follows. 
The first is a contempt for the spiritual state of the age; the lack of greatness, imagination and heroism, and the 
demise of free action in fuvour of lechne and bureaucracy. The second (with the exception of Hannah Arendt) is 
an attachment to political radicalism, and finally, the third fuctor is the result of these attempts to fonnulate the 
concept of the political, namely that each attempt ended in exclusion, either of sigrtificant groups of people or 
sigrtificant issues from the political realm. At this point Heller raises the question as to whether political 
philosophy has any future, given the failure of any attempted resolution of this dilemma. The controversy about 
the political is 
"of a more serious nature than yet another fumily quarrel among paradigms: it is about the 
relevance or irrelevance of political philosophy to our times." (Heller 1991a:336) 
In an attempt to answer the question herself, she sets what she regards as conditions for a delineation of the 
political. First, 
"The fina1 and dialectical unity of normative claims and empirical awareness is the absolute 
precondition of the possibility of political philosophy." (Heller 199Ia:336) 
A concept of the political, must, in other words, generate a certain fonn of political insight that is both able to 
apprehend the phenomena of political life and evaluate these phenomena (provide an account of political 
jUdgement). As it happens, the " .. very essence of the modern condition comprises the contradiction between Is and 
Ought.." (Heller 1991a:337). 
This is also, in Hellers opinion, the essence of philosophy , which 
"has never stopped insisting that what is regarded as truth is not really true, but that something 
else is true; or that what is regarded as just is not just, because something else would be more, 
or even perfectly just." (Heller 1991a: 3 36) 
Philosophy is "realized" in modernity, as people constantly evaluate the Is of their institutions and social lives in 
terms of universalized Oughts; in fuel, 
"What has hitlletto happened only in philosophy, can and does now happen in political practice 
and life." (ibid, 336) 
The political is thus to be derived from "the quintessence of the modem political dynamic" (Heller 1991a:337). 
This is something Heller grants to her opponents; this has always been their starting-point too. The problem, 
however, is to avoid the problem of exclusion, everywhere apparent in attempts to define the political. The 
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problem of exclusion can be framed as follows: it is necessary to have a substantive definition of the political, 
otherwise, the concept "vanishes". All Heller adds, 
"At least the political character of the very relation, value, network, choice, or anything else 
under discussion has to be defined in order to forge such a concept" (Heller 1991a:337) 
lfthis substantive definition is "of political provenance", then one ends up with the problem of exclusion. Having 
outlined these conditions and problems, she draws the following conclusions, namely that 
"To grasp the tension between Is and Ought is a general stipulation, but the concept of the 
political has an additional requirement. 'Is' and 'Ought' as they are contained and made 
manifest by the concept, must be of a kind which is central to the operation and dynamic of 
modem societies" (Heller 1991a:338) 
She then isolates freedom as a basis for the "concept of the political", as freedom is the major "universalised 
value" in IDcxiem societies; no other major "Ought" can be concretized without their cause being I1directly or 
indirectly connected with freedom". "Abstract" values such as freedom are "concretized" in a Itseries of conflicts, 
in contestations about their definitions" (Heller 1991a:338). 
This conflict requires the existence of a public domain. Provided such a domain exists, which issues are contested 
is a matter of the "actors" choosing which issues to bring into the domain. Thus in modem societies with no 
public domain, it is not possible to distinguish between political and non-political contestations. With this in 
mind, Heller delineates the concept of the political as follows: 
"The practical realization of the universal value of freedom in the public domain is the modem 
concept of the political." (Heller 1991a:340) 
Thus, in this sense, lithe political" is a domain, not a "qualityll adhering to "things" which are "political" . In this 
connection, she writes: 
"The substantive aspect of ' the political' is not a concrete political ' thing' at all ; rather, it is the 
main dynamism of modernity itself. " (Heller 1991a: 341) 
In other words, no particular "thing" is "political" in essence, no particular process, choice, value, or action of an 
institution. Any particular issue might become "related to the cause of freedom" (Heller 1991a:342), or become 
unrelated; neither does the mere publicness of an issue cause it to enter the domain of the political, unless it forms 
part of the practical realization of freedom. This concept, theoretically, has no "ethical content", but practically it 
gains a 1I\Wak ethos II in that it "imposes taboos ll on practices such as racism, unjust wars, "self-righteous 
paternalism", "the deliberate exclusion of certain groups from the public sphere" and so forth. 
Finally, she ends with remarks to the effect that radical political philosophies such as the ones she considered 
earlier, "mythologized" politics, by opposing authentic political life to the "allegedly banal concerns of daily life". 
She ends with the comments that 
"Modem political philosophy need not be a dithyramb about the Great Event writ large nor a 
choreography for exceptional political movements. Although politics can be pleasing or 
displeasing, modem political actors and thinkers should not give preference to aesthetic values, 
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such as elegance, sublimity or perfection over freedom in case of conflict. It is time to bid 
fare\Ve1l to the leg;u;y of our aristocratic ancestors." (Heller 1991a:343) 
One of the purposes of my consideration of 'the pclitical' will be to demonstrate that, contra Heller, greatness is 
the pclitical virtue par excellance. 
In conclusion, Heller claims that there is a problem delineating the pclitical which is essential to the modem 
condition. Attempts to delineate the pclitical based on a "substantive pclitical" definition result in exclusion of 
either whole human groups or whole sets of issues from "the pclitical". This raises the question of the viability of 
pclitical philosophy in the 20th centnry. However there is another avenue open: if one understands philosophy and 
modernity in such a way that modernity is the "age where pclitical philosophy comes to pass" (Heller 1991a:336), 
a path to defining the concept of "the pclitical" can be found by beginning with the "quintessence of the modem 
pclitical dynamic". This path leads to a definition of the pclitical in terms of the practical realization of the 
universal value of freedom in the public domain. Substantively, this constitutes "the main dynamism of modernity 
itself' (Heller 1991a:341). 
In order to evaluate some of the issues that emerge from this argument, I will look critically at two other attempts 
to think about the pclitical, namely those of Leftwich and Crick I have chosen these texts as their approaches 
together raise a wide range of issues and represent widely divergent views in the discussion of the pclitical. 
LEFfWICH'S 'REDEFINITION' OF POLITICS 
Leftwich opens his first Chapter, "Redefining pclitics: the argument" with the sentiment that 
"Most people feel that 'pclitics' has very little to do with them." (Leftwich 1983: 11) 
'Ordinary people', he feels, see 'pclitics' as something involving states and government and carried on by 
'pcliticians' who constantly engage in underhand squabbles for pc\Ver v.hich are far removed from the world of 
daily life. This image, he feels, has been exacerbated by the press and the academic profession, who concentrate 
their journalism and their studies on the structures of government and state, i.e. focused on the life of national 
pclitical institutions rather than the processes of pcliticallife that involve ordinary people. 
There is a strong feeling in his book that common people are shut out of pclitics and pclitical processes by a sense 
of alienation and uninterest, which is perpetuated and exacerbated by the behaviour of academics and the media 
He sees his "redefinition" of pclitics as a way to generate a realization amongst ordinary people that 'pclitics' 
involves them too. There is a strong sense here that the "pclitical" nature of "daily life" must be restored to 
"ordinary" people, who are no longer able to "participate" pclitically, on account of this sense of alienation: 
" .. when administrators and pcliticians, for instance, ask us to 'keep pclitics out' of things like 
spcrt (or vice versa), or not to 'mix' pclitics with religion or industrial relations or 'race' 
relations, what they are actually asking is that \Ve do not participate in pclitics, that is in 
decisions about the use and distribution of resources in relation to affairs that are often very 
impcrtant to our lives." (Leftwich 1983: 26) 
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With this democratic sentiment in mind, Leftwich "redefines" politics, as follows: 
"Politics consists of all the activities of cooperation and conflict, within and hel\wen societies, 
whereby the htunan societies go about obtaining, using, producing and distributing resources in 
the course of the production and reproduction of its social and biological life. These activities 
are not isolated from other features of social life. They everywhere influence, and are 
influenced by, the distribution of power and decision-making, the systems of social 
organisation, culture and ideology in a society, as well as its relations with the natural 
envirotunent and other societies. Politics is therefore a defining characteristic of all human 
groups, and a1""ys has been." (Leftwich 1983: 11) 
For Leftwich, there is no question about the lIextent" of politics. Politics is everywhere; it is a characteristic of "all 
human groups", and always has been. It is possible to identify political activity by a set of objective external 
criteria; in fuct, Leftwich's definition is entirely non-substantive. Leftwich's definition is "grounded" in a biological 
conception of humanity. Thus everything in the human condition springs from the place of the htunan animal in 
metabolism with nature: 
"The starting point, therefore, for the analysis of politics in societies must he this conception of 
the htunan species as animals, engaged in these simultaneous natural and social activities of 
production and reproduction." (Leftwich 1983: 13) 
He sees "politics" as having "evolved" at the same time as the htunan species (Leftwich 1983:14). 
The common human situation is thus contained in certain "common and underlying structural features" (Leftwich 
1983: 14) shared by all "societies". These stmctural features, common to "all htunan societies", are as follows: 
• usystem of production II , or how societies prcxiuce resources through work 
• "system of distribution and redistribution", or how people allocate resources 
• IIsystem of PO'Wef and decision-making" - power here is equated with "decision-making", and so an analysis 
of power will centre on who decides, and what characteristics these people have. 
• "system of social organisation", or how people organise marriage, furnilies, social groups etc. 
• "system of culture and ideologyll - included in "culture" here is tla wide network of standardised customs and 
regular hehaviours found in all societies .... customs of courtship and marriage, its basic styles of dress, its 
food habit and taboos, its typical leisure activities, its principle practices of hospitality .. ", and "ideology" 
includes "religious heliefs and practices, myths, values, moral codes, general endorsement of certain ""ys of 
hehaving, and broad outlooks in terms of the ""y that people interpret the world around them" 
• "history", which he defines prosaically as "a whole legpcy of related technological capacities, social 
hehaviours, institutions and ideological outlooks inherited from the past." (Leftwich 1983: 14-16) 
In his conclusion, he emphasises "the primacy a/politics in the affuirs ofhtunan societies" (Leftwich 1983:261), 
and outlines some ""ys in which this strangely neglected primacy could he more reflected in the academic 
pursuits of British universities, and in this regard he emphasizes that 
"Part of the wider objective of the book is to argue tlllll students in Departments of Politics 
should emerge from their studies with analytical and diagnostic skills, which have as their 
purpose and central point of reference the explanation of the politics of historical or modem 
societies, institutions and problems. The study of politics, I would argue, is an intensely 
16 
practical matter, as is the study of medicine, and is no less or more academic or theoretical. It 
is, in my view, much less important for students of politics - as defined here - to be able to 
given an account of what Plato, Rousseau, Mill, Marx or Weber said, for example, than to be 
able to use such theories, if appropriate, to help explain the politics, or resolve problems in their 
own and other societies. For the study of politics is not in the same category as the study of 
political philosophy or the history of ideas, just as it is not synonymous with the study of 
govenunent. . 
.. it is these ['practical matters'] which should form the starting point for students of politics, 
and not wider general theories which are usually taught and studied in abstract, and which 
many students experience as having little relevance for, or connection with, the politics of 
societies past or present." (Leftwich 1983: 266) 
His fina1 point is that the thrust behind his book has been to promote "democratic politics" (Leftwich 1983:267), 
understood here as equality of distribution of power and resources. 
There are two starting points to Leftwich's argument. The first is his intuitive notion of "political alienation", i.e. 
that in contemporary society (we assume here he has in mind the United Kingdom, or even his distant South 
Afiican past), and the second, his solution, is his "grounding" of "the political" in a biological view of humanity. 
His definition is what Heller would term "non-substantive", as 
"At least the political character of the very relation, value, network, choice, or anything else 
under discussion has to be defined in order to forge such a concept" (Heller 1991a:337) 
Heller makes the massively simple point here that there is no clear reason given by Leftwich for the connection 
between "processes of resource distribution" and the political, so the concept is in real danger of "vanishing", as 
Heller succinctly expresses it. The same is true of most of the other concepts that Leftwich uses as a "framework" 
for the analysis of "politics" in diverse "societieslt , Where this fl frameworkll is not 'visible', e.g. in a Itdifferent lt 
cultural milieu, it is rendered visible by recourse to the skills of linguists, anthropologists, sociologists and so forth, 
and from this hermeneutical activity, "the political" can be easily rendered "visible". On page 21 he uses the words 
"analyze" and "understand" interchangeably. This is the key to Leftwich's approach; basically, studying "politics" 
involves rendering the unfamiliar fami1iar~ this is the basis of his notion of "analysislt, "Understanding'\ in any 
sophisticated sense, involves comprehending the essence of something. While there is some possibility that the 
use of images, similes and other rhetorical devices will indeed shed light on something that is "other", Leftwich's 
mode of analysis rules out any possibility of this before he begins. 
Nevertheless, some of Leftwich's approach has a strong intuitive appeal, as it begins with a sentiment that has 
been central to some of the most interesting political thinking of the 20th century, namely the apparent distance 
between "daily life" and political processes in modem societies. Leftwich's "redefinition" ho\Wver, is not 
concerned simply with modern societies, but with all of human history, with all occurrences of human "society". 
Because his definition of politics, and for that matter, culture, history, power, and so forth, is totally non-
substantive, but instead is rooted in the timeless, ahistorical notion of humans as natura1 consuming beings, there 
is no specific content of his theory that deals with the specific dilemmas facing humankind, or even his own social 
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milieu, in the present. One might even suspect Leftwich of harbouring a notion of the human as consumer of 
resources~ the tlpolitical!l animal is thus the eternal consumer. 
To use this example, it is fairly "",!I-established now that the "consumer" is a socio-cultural feature of 20th century 
advanced capitalist socio-economic systems. It would make as little sense to speak without irony about 
"consumers" in Ancient Egypt of the 4th dynasty, as it would to speak of shopping malls of the 4th dynasty. In 
what sense does "politics" exist in all "societies"? Bernard Crick is adamant that it does not; his perspective is the 
opposite of Leftwich's in that he argues that politics is a phenomenon which is specifically not an automatic 
human activity. 
BERNARD CRICK'S DEFENCE OF POLITICS 
The aim of Crick's book is to "characterise and defend political activity" (Crick \962:9), at a time in history where 
he sees a llfairly obvious growth of impatience" with "politics", especially in the '''new nationslll of the world 
(Crick 1962:9); he " .. simply seeks to help in the task of restoring confidence in the virtues of politics as a great 
and civilizing human activity." (Crick 1962: 11). 
Crick begins his book with a chapter called "The Nature of Political Rule" , thereby both characterizing "political 
rule" as one specific type of rule amongst many, and indicating the need to "characterize" politics, or "political 
rule". Crick is opposed to the notion ofa "definition" of the sort employed by Leftwich: 
"Politics is too often regarded as a poor relation, inherently dependent and subsidiary; it is 
rarely praised as something with a life and character of its own. Politics is not religion, ethics, 
law, science, history or economics; it neither solves everything, nor is it present everywhere, 
and it is not anyone political doctrine, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, 
communism or nationalism, though it can contain elements of most of these things. Politics is 
politics, to be valued as itself, not because it is ' like' or 'really is' something else more 
respectable or peculiar. Politics is politics." (Crick 1962: 12) 
He refers to politics as an "activity", in fact a "great and civilising human activity" (Crick 1962: 11), a specific type 
of human activity that cannot be expressed in terms of other, more "basic" social activities. It is an activity that has 
a historical beginrting as a cultural innovation, and thus is not present in every form of human community. 
"Politics" is a form of life, a way of conducting affairs, not a development springing naturally from the universal 
determinants of human life. Crick links two concepts, namely politics and freedom, in the context of European 
history: 
"[Politics] is a very much more precise thing than is commonly supposed; it is essential to 
genuine freedom; it is unknown in any but advanced and complex societies; and it has specific 
origins only found in European experience." (Crick 1962: 13) 
Political activity must then be understood in the context of specific histories, as a specific cultural response to the 
rise of complex societies. 
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Crick traces the origins to the Greek city-state, and identifies the first "political scientist" as Aristotle, who 
" .. characterises and distinguishes what still appears to be a unique invention or discovery of the 
Greek world." (Crick 1962:13) 
The ancient Greeks, according to Crick, "invented" "politics" in order to solve the problem of plurality, i.e. the 
problem of a society of sufficient complexity to require some sort of mediation of interests. For Crick, behind the 
"invention" of politics by the Greeks and its introduction into human culture, there was or is a problem which 
needed to be solved, and that problem was how to govern in conditions of plurality, in conditions where there 
were divergent beliefs and interests. 
Politics is thus one possible solution to the problem of government and order in complex societies, other than 
those consisting of " .. a single tribe, religion, interest or tradition" (Crick 1962: 14). Primarily, it is an approach to 
mediating different value-systems and demands: 
"Politics, then, to Aristotle, was .... simply the 'master science' among men. Politics was the 
master-science not in the sense that it includes or explains all other 'sciences' (all skills, social 
activities and groups interests), but in that it gives them some priority, some order in their rival 
claims on the always scarce resources of any given community. The way of establishing these 
priorities is by allowing the right institutions to develop by which the various ' scienoes' can 
demonstrate their actual importance in the common task of survival. Politics are, as it were, the 
market place and the price mechanism of all social demands." (Crick 1962: 18-19) 
This is necessary because of the problems posed to stability by the size of human communities: 
"[POlitics is] a sociological activity which has the antllfopological function of preserving a 
community grown too complicated for either tradition alone or pure arbitrary rule to preserve it 
without the undue use of coercion. " (Crick 1962:20) 
Put in the form of a definition, 
"Politics, then, can simply be defined as the activity by which differing interests within a given 
unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to 
the welfure and survival of the whole community." (Crick 1962: 16-17) 
Aristotle, in the Politics, used the metaphor of harmony in music to convey the concept of opinion and debate in 
the polis. A tyranny was conceived in this metaphor as one tune drowning out many others, whereas a polity was 
compared to many voices expressing different tunes in a harmony. Since the ancient Greeks, politics has been 
present as an instrument of government to a greater or lesser extent in states, but very seldom as a highly-valued 
and exalted activity. For instance, he distinguishes clearly between a "mere" power strnggle, and a political 
struggle: 
"In trying to understand the many forms of government that there are, of which political rule is 
only one, it is particularly easy to mistake rhetoric for theory. To say that all government 
involves politics is either rhetoric or muddle. Why call, for instance, a strnggle for power 
'politics' when it is simply a strnggle for power?" (Crick 1962: 15) 
TIns is born out by Crick's observation that 
"Allover the world there are men aspiring to power and there are actual rulers who, however 
many different names tlley may go by, have in common a rejection of politics. " (Crick 1962:12) 
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The other significant additional point of Crick's is that "political rule" depends on "some settled order", which he 
refers to as IIGovernment". This in some fonn is a basis for political activity, as order is its precondition. 
Government is a IImechanism for survival n. He in fact defines government as "the organisation of a group of men 
in a given community for survival." (Crick 1962:22). Thus, "politics" is built on the existence of order; indeed, 
"When government is impossible, politics is impossible" (Crick 1962:24). "Political rule" is however, the highest 
fann of government. Of the many fonns of government, "political rule" is the "most civilized". He compares 
Ilpolitica1 rule" to other forms: 
"The method of rule of the tyrant and the oligarch is quite simply to clobber, coerce or overawe 
all or most of these other groups in the interest of their own. The political method of rule is to 
listen to these other groups so as to conciliate them as fur as possible, and to give them a legal 
position, a sense of security, some clear and reasonably safe means of articulation, by which 
these other groups can and will speak freely." (Crick 1962: 14) 
Plurality is only tolerated in non-political rule for purely instrumental reasons; indeed, "political rule" is not 
synonymous with lipoliticsll : 
"Certainly, there is a sense in which, even in a tyranny or totalitarian regime, politics exists up 
to the moment when the ruler finds himself free to act alone. While he is not free to act alone, 
while he is forced to consult other people whom he regards as his enemies, he is in some kind 
of a political relationship. But it is essentially fragile and unwanted ... Politics is then regarded 
as an ohstacle .. " (Crick 1962: 15-16) 
Implicit in his text (he calls the last chapter of his book "In Praise of Politics") is the advocation of a culture of 
government that entrenches political activity to the maximum possible extent. The extent to which "politics" is 
entrenched and respected is the extent of "civilization". The reason for this is that freedom is concomitant with 
politics. 
Freedom is defined as follows by Crick 
"Freedom is the privacy of men from public actions" (Crick 1962: 14) 
The achievement of freedom is thus the achievement of a society where people can pursue their own private 
activities and interests without interference from the public realm. The individual subject can act to increase 
freedom by the formulation of a "political doctrine" which 
" . .is thus just an attempt to strike a particular harmony in an actual political situation, one 
harmony out of many possible different (temporary) resolutions of the basic problem of unity 
and diversity in a society with complex and entrenched rival social interests. This problem is 
the germ ofpolitics and freedom." (Crick 1962:28) 
Crick deplores the broad contemporary usage of the term 'politics' . In his opinion, the term carmot be applied to 
the activities that happen in trade unions, schools, churches and so forth, except in that they are "pre-political", i.e. 
create conditions for political life proper: 
" .. common use may encourage us to talk about politics in the small group - in the trade union, 
in the office and even in the fiunily; and anthropologists find that many tribal societies are 
more 'political ' and less 'autocratic' than once supposed .... If all discussion, conflict, rivalry, 
struggle and even conciliation is called politics, then it is forgotten, once more, that politics 
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depends on some settled order. They may help to create politics, but their internal behaviour is 
not political simply because their individual function is quite different from the state itself" 
(Crick 1962:25) 
He earlier comments that " .. usage does not destroy real distinctions." (Crick 1962:15), and that " .. political rule 
must be preceded by public order.." (Crick 1962:21). 
He denies that there is any such thing as "international politics"; international relations consist only in "pseudo-
politics". Such talk, in Crick's view, clouds the real issues surrounding political life. The reason for Crick's 
insistence on the state as the only valid basis for political activity proper, is the link betmlen order, politics and 
freedom. Freedom is the end of politics, and its precondition, in that political life proper cannot really exist 
without freedom. "Political freedom" writes Crick, 
" . .is a response to a need of goverrunent - it is not, as so many sentimentally think, an external 
impetus that somehow forces, or persuades, governments to act tolerantly." (Crick 1962:26) 
The two of these together, politics and freedom, are thus necessary products of a problem of order. 
Thus freedom is here not a principle in the sense of a Universal, but a valued by-product of a solution to a problem 
of order in the state. At the sarne time, it is not a necessary solution, merely the best, the solution most conducive 
to "civilization" , 
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Chapter Three 
THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL CONCEIVED AS THE PROBLEM OF 
POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 
INTRODUCfION 
This chapter is mainly an exegesis of the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. Arendt's approach to the 
problem of the political is to consider the conditions of political thought in the modem age, which she 
characterizes by the expression 'Dark Times' . The political problem of the modem age she describes as a ' loss of 
tradition', and, politically, the central problem which arises from this problem is the problem of political 
judgement; the problem of the political itself can be conceived of as a fuilure of the tradition of political thought to 
provide an account of political judgement that is operational under the conditions of the modem age. In response 
to this problem she formulated a conception of political judgement based on a reading of Kant's Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement, which I outline below. In addition, I reevaluate Crick's and Leftwich's conceptions of 
politics in the light of Arendts work. 
'DARK TIMES': THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN THE MODERN AGE 
Hannah Arendt's work is largely focused on the problem of totalitarianism, from two perticular aspects; first, from 
her personal experience as a German Jew forced to go into exile in 1933, after having been detained by the Nazis 
for her work in Jewish organizations, and her involvement with Jewish refugees and "the Jewish Question" during 
and after the Second World War, and second, the experience of Stalinism in the context of the European Left. 
For her, totalitarianism was an "unprecedented" political phenomenon, which posed perticu1ar problems of 
understanding 
"The most obvious escape .. . .is the equation of totalitarian government with some well-known 
evil of the past - such as aggressiveness, tyranny, conspiracy, etc. Here, it seems, we are on 
solid ground: for together with its evils, we think we have inherited the wisdom of the past to 
guide us through them. But the trouble with the wisdom of the past is that it dies, so to speak, 
on our hands as soon as we try to apply it honestly to the central political experience of our 
time. Everything we know of totalitarianism demonstrates a horrible originality which no far-
fetched historical paralJels can alleviate. We can escape from its impact only if we decide not to 
focus our attention on its very nature, but to let it run away to the interminable connections and 
similarities which certain tenets of totalitarian doctrine necessarily show with fumiliar theories 
of occidental thought. Such sintilarities are inescapable. In the realm of pure theory and 
isolated concepts there can be nothing new under the sun; but such similarities disappear 
completely as soon as one neglects theoretical formulations and concentrates on their practical 
application. The originality of totalitarianism is horrible, not because some new "idea" came 
into the world, but because its very actions constitute a break with alJ our traditions; they have 
clearly exploded the categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgement." 
(Arendt, quoted in Vollrath 1977: 175) 
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This passage contains the kernel of Arendt's political thought. Her comprehension of the political condition of the 
20th centtuy w.IS captured for her in the title of a poem by Bertolt Brecht, "Dark Times". "Dark Times" are not 
simply synonymous with "monstrosities", the dominance of evil people and dark deeds, but with a condition of 
thought. In the words of David Luban, 
" .. for Brecht dark times are not merely times of horror but times of confusion in which theory 
no longer helps us to act. .. In dark times traditional forms of explanation no longer explain 
anything .... Explanation .... can go on undaunted, but it is cut loose from any genuine role in 
human knowledge." (Luban 1983:218) 
This notion of "dark times" Arendt linked with a phenomenon she termed "the loss of tradition" (Arendt 1993). In 
her view, the continuity "between past and future" had been broken; there is no sense of a continuity with the past, 
nor did inherited ideas and institutions possess authority (Canavan 1992:68). As a result, each generation has to 
'make anew' the path between past and future. 
POLITICAL THINKING AFTER THE LOSS OF TRADITION 
Arendt saw the tradition of Western political thought as incapable of understanding totalitatianism, but only 
lIexplaining it away": 
"For Arendt, the facts of the twentieth centtuy do not need explaining, they need confronting." 
(Lnhan 1983:231) 
Particularly given her Gernlan-Jewish background, as well as her pre-1933 background as a ratber non-political 
student of Heideggers, the need to understand the phenomenon of Nazism w.IS something she considered an 
urgent task as an essential basis for a grasp of the political realities of the 20th century. 
She attempted this in her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, characterizing totalitatianism as a "uniquely 
modem" phenomenon. ln writing the book, she faced a difficult dilemma. The dilemma had first appeared to her 
a few years before while she w.IS reviewing The Black Book, a work that aimed to expose Nazi atrocities during 
the Second World War, and in which its authors had undertaken to " .. resurrect truth and justice and attempt to do 
so by stating true facts to displace Nazi falsehoods" (Disch 1993: 671). Arendt, surprisingly, took exception to 
this book because she saw the project as a futile and nostalgic endeavour to deal with Nazism as if it were some 
tyranuical regime of the past. She believed that "The Nazis have called into question the belief that truth can 
vanquish power." (Disch 1993: 671) 
In the past, under certain conditions of oppression, merely telling the truth had constituted an effective act of 
opposition. The question of truth had become far more complex in a era characterized by the phenomenon of 
totalitatianism: 
"The problem is tbat in the wake of a political regime that exercised power by means of 
fubrication of reality it must be acknowledged that "truth" can be a construct of power." (Disch 
1993: 671) 
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In such circumstances truth loses its political authority. The assmnptions conceming what we know to be true, and 
how we know this, had been overthrown by the Nazis. In such circumstances, the ability to tell truth from 
falsehood, to judge, would have to be built anew. 
Thus Arendt chose a "third way" in the writing of her book, separate from the traditional forms of historiography 
and polemic. She saw her task as 
" .. to craft the story of totalitarianism in such a way that does not compel assent but, rather, stirs 
people to think about what they are doing." (Disch 1993: 671) 
She rejected traditional historiography on aocount of what she perceived as "the inherent law of historiography", 
namely "preservation and justification and praise" (Disch 1993: 671). She had no desire to "preservell or "praisell 
the Nazis. Polemic, on the other hand, she saw as necessitating a firm ground on which judgements can be 
fomled, as a basis for a project of destruction. In her opinion, this groundedness could not be taken for granted; 
traditional concepts of political judgement had been superseded by the fact of total domination, an unprecedented 
occurrence in the tradition of political thought. 
She adopted another alternative, which she termed "storytelling". She did this consciously in opposition to what 
she saw as typical totalitarian practices. Margaret Canovan, writing about Arendt's book, observed that 
"The great charm of totalitarian propaganda, therefore, was that it allo"",d the masses to escape 
from incomprehensible reality into fiction. Totalitarian movements established ' a lying world 
of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself .. " 
(Canovan 1992:55) 
The traditional forms of explanation in political philosophy have these features; consistency, continuity, and a 
compelling logical consistency. Arendt saw these also as the central features of totalitarian ideology, specifically 
the quality of consistency; she saw the 20th century in opposite terms. Her technique of "storytelling" was aimed 
at understanding rather than explanation. Explanation applies to objects; objects are, grammatically, spatial; it is 
possible to completely analyze and describe objects according to objective criteria, whereas understanding in the 
political realm, applies to appearances, "phenomenal!, llseem-ingness", rather than "essence". 
Arendt saw totalitarianism as a phenomenon, which implied that she regarded it as "inexplicable". Ho"-"Ver, in 
the words of Vollrath, 
" .. phenomena can be understood even though they are .. . .inexplicable . .. Explanation .. [implies 1 
that something is determined by its causes .. " (Vollrath 1977:167). 
He goes on to explain that if causes are determinable, " .. what follow in accordance with a general mle is therefore 
known - that is, it is not a phenomenon." (Vollrath 1977:168). She writes in the preface to her book, 
"Comprehension.. ..does not mean.. ..deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or 
explaining phenomena by such analogies that the impact of reality and the shock of experience 
is no longer felt." (quoted in Vollrath 1977:168). 
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NARRATIVE AS A FORM OF POLITICAL TIDNKING 
The Origins a/Totalitarianism is thus a work which attempts to "understand" the phenomenon of totalitarianism. 
In order to do this, Arendt raises narrative to a category of political thought. Needless to say, this is unusual. As 
Disch points out, this is a view of narrative which runs counter to orthodox acacIentic practice (Disch 1993:669). 
"Stories" have been regarded as vehicles of "prejudice", the receptacles of an essential subjectivity, requiring the 
inlplements of conceptual thought to penetrate and "analyze" them. Narrative is usually viewed as a carrier of 
IIdeep structure". "ideologyll or llhidden discursive practices", In opposition to this emphasis on the "sameness" of 
narrative, Arendt emphasises the differences. In contrast to the factual oontent of the narrative, Arendt wished to 
emphasise the meaning-giving potential. David Luban comments: 
"The unfuvourable oomparison of oonceptualization with storytelling is one of Arendt's 
recurring themes, stated again and again in her books" (Luban 1983:239) 
He then quotes a passage from Men in Dark Times: 
"No philosophy, no analysis, no aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compare in intensity and 
richness of meaning with a properly narrated story." (Arendt, quoted in Luban 1983:239) 
The identification of political thinking and storytelling was intricately related to Arendt's notion of the political 
importance of the phenomenal, the world of appearances, and the event. In her later work, Arendt expanded 
oonsiderably on the nexus between political events, narrative and subjectivity. Fundamental to the notion of 
narrative are time and memory. Seyla Behhabib oomments, in an essay titled "Hannah Arendt and the 
Redemptive Power of Narrative", that 
" .. narrativity is oonstitutive of identity. Actions, unlike things and natural objects, only live in 
the narrative of those who perform them and the narratives of those who understand, interpret 
and reoord them .. 
.. The narrative structure of action and of human identity means that the oontinuing retelling of 
the past, its oontinued reintegration into the story of the present, its reevaluation, reassessment, 
and reoonfiguration are ontological oonditions of the kind of being that we are. lfDasein is in 
time, narrative is the modality through which time is experienced." (Benhabib 1990: 187-188) 
Narrative is significant as memory of human action, that is, the specific occurrence of events in tlle h= world. 
Obviously events are not continuous through time in the way that material objects are, neither are they a property 
of a permanent category such as a species, but it is their specific subjectivity, their relation to a specific human 
subject, that narrative is capable of revealing. Arendt explores the notion of "who somelxxiy is" in the following 
passage from 171e Human Condition: 
Later, 
'This unchangeable identity ofthe person, though disclosing itself intangibly in act and speech, 
beoomes tangible only in the story of the acto!'s and speake!'s life; but as such, it can be known, 
that is, grasped as a palpable entity only after it has oome to its end. In other words, human 
essence - not h= natule in general (which does not exist) nor the sum total of qualities and 
shortoomings in the individual, but the essence of who somelxxiy is - can oome into being only 
when life departs, leaving behind nothing but a story." (Arendt 1989:193) 
"That every individual life can eventually be told as a story with beginning and end is the 
prepolitical and prehistorical condition of history, the great story without beginning and end." 
(Arendt 1989184) 
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Arendt is referring to what she calls the "condition of plurality", which is "that men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world." (Arendt 1989:7), and further, that 
"Plurality is the condition of human action becanse we are all the same, that is, human, in such 
a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live. " (Arendt 
1989:8) 
According to her conception of storytelling, she also reverses the orthodox notion of meaning in narrative. "Those 
who were there" , according to orthodox wisdom, know better than anyone else what "the real story is". Not so, 
claims Arendt. In another passage from The Human Condition, she claims that 
"Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the 
historian, who indeed always knows better what it was about than the participants .. .. What the 
storyteller narrates must necessarily be hidden from the actor himself ... Even though stories 
are the inevitable results of action, it is not the actor but the storyteller who perceived and 
"makes" the story." (Arendt 1989: 192) 
Her notion of storytelling was fundamentally linked also with her notion of new beginnings. The possibility that 
each person could act in a new way corresponded to the human condition of plurality; she coined the term 
' natality' to express the condition of beginning inherent in each acting human being: 
" .. the fundamental polilicaifeature of man's existence is not mortality but ' natality''' (Canavan 
1992:130). 
'Natality' is the condition that corresponds to the fact that every birth heralds a potential beginning in the world. 
In comparison to the natural realm, where a species is inunortal and every birth appears as an eternal cyclical 
manifestation of the same species, humankind is mortal, every life is different, and every life has a beginning and 
an end, and it is under these conditions that people make their appearance in the world. 
The significance of her notion of political thinking as "storytelling" is the contention that we live in "Dark Times" 
where we have suffered a "loss of tradition". At the same time, she links narrative to the human conditions of 
plurality and the occurrence of action, but most of all, her notion of "political thinking" is linked to her notion of 
political judgement, whereby the process of reflecting on political activity is itself the basis for political activity. 
Survivors of Auschwitz such as Primo Levi have written that it was only in the camps where there was a high 
proportion of political activists that any successful resistance was possible. Arendt was convinced that 
" .. only political action and political structures could provide a defence against the evil that had 
appeared in politics in the twentieth century, and which conventional morality, religion and 
philosophy and appeals to nature had been powerless to avert" (Canovan 1992:163) 
Phenomena such as human rights had been demonstrated to be useless unless somehow contained in a strong 
political system. "Storytelling" was thus, for Arendt, a Wirj of engendering political thinking as a hasis for political 
judgement. Her notions of historical and political judgement were based on a reading of Kant's critique of 
aesthetic judgement, which she regarded as his "unwritten political philosophy", and also has an affinity with 
Walter Benjanrin's Theses on the Philosophy of History. Her critique of mainstream social science of the day was 
hased not only on methodological criticisms, but also political ones: 
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" .. the method of science W<IS considered the inductive one of assembling ever more instances of 
the same law, in social science as well one searched for the generalizable and cross-culturally 
"similar", thereby ending more often than not in banal generalizations. For Arendt, the 
problem with this approach W<IS not only just methodological, but also moral and political. This 
search for nomological generalizations dulled one's appreciation for what W<IS new and 
unprecedented, and thus failed to confront one with the task of thinking morally anew in the 
face of the unprecedented. Politically, this method also stultified one's capacity for resistance by 
making it seem that nothing W<IS new and that everything had always already been." (Benhabib 
1990: 184, my emphasis) 
With this in mind, Arendt shared with Benjamin his sentiment that 
"To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognise it 'the way it W<IS' (Ranke)" 
and his conclusion that 
"Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of bope in the past who is finnly 
convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if be wins" (Benjamin 1989:256-
7). 
The 'loss of tradition' means that the past 
.is fragmented and can no longer be told as a unified narrative" (Benhabib 1991: 187). 
Tradition, 
" .. which selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates where the 
treasures are and what their worth is .. " (Arendt 1993:5). 
What is missing with the 'loss of tradition' is the "stage-setting" for the process of me mOly, a 'map' to the past. 
Instead, each generation must find their own way, and perhaps discover new paths on the way. The 'loss of 
tradition' also makes us aware for the first time of its existence, and opens up a realm in which historical 
judgement in Arendt's sense is possible. The fragmentation of the past does not destroy it, but implies that the 
meaning of the past is no longer revealed by a tradition (Arendt 1993:5, see also Arendt 1993:94). However, 
"With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast 
realms of the past, but this thread W<IS also the chain fettering each successive generation to a 
predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up to us with 
unexpected freshness and tell us things no-one has yet had ears to hear." (Arendt 1993:94) 
The fuculty of historical judgement, which creates the potential for selective reappropriation of the past in the face 
of the 'loss of tradition', in Arendt's view W<IS related to the Kantian notion of Einhi/dungskrajl (Benhabib 
1991:182. She translates this term, "literally, the power of creating, producing images"). One has to engage with 
that past imaginatively: 
"In each case, one had to recreate from the evidence available a new concept, a new narrative, a 
new perspective." (Benhabib 1991:182) 
OBJECI'IVITY, THE WORLD AND POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 
Concomitantly, Arendt developed an alternative notion of objectivity, and a related anti-foundational approach to 
political judgement. In The Human Condition, Arendt discusses the notion of objectivity in relation to the concept 
of 'the world'. 
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Arendt makes what she tenns an "unusual" distinction between labour and ""rk Labour, in Arendt's ""rk, 
corresponds to the condition of life itself Labour is the activity of human as animallaborans, within the realm of 
natural necessity. In addition, the products oflabour are objects-for-consumption; they are destroyed in the process 
of use. Labour adds nothing to the ""rid except the continued life of the labourers; in the opinion ofMan<, 
" .. Iabors productivity is measured and gauged against the requirements of the life process for 
its own reproduction" (Arendt 1989:93). 
Labour is thus part of the eternal cycle of nature; insofar as labour comprises part of the "vita activa" it is both a 
necessary and endlessly repetitive activity. 
By contrast, ""rIc; 
" .. fubricates the sheer unending variety of things that constitute the human artifice" (Arendt 
1989:136). 
Work corresponds to the "unnaturalness of human existence" (Arendt 1989:7). The products of ""rk are objects, 
but objects that are not consumed in the process of use. These objects constitute a "human artifice", that is, a 
""rid of objects that is artificial and constant; in Arendt's ""rds: 
" .. against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made ""rid rather than the 
sublime indifference of an untouched nature, whose overwhelming elementary force, on the 
contrary, will compel them to swing relentlessly in the circle of their own biological 
movement.." (Arendt 1989:137) 
On the same page, in a footnote, Arendt traces tile root of "object" and "objective", which is Ille latin infinitive 
obicere, meaning "stand againstlt, In this way, "things", which constirute the human artifice, "stand against" the 
"voracious needs and wants oflheir living makers and users" (Arendt 1989:137) This erection ofa human ""rid 
is the precondition of "objectivity": 
" .. the things of the ""rid have the function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies 
in the fact that.. .. men , their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their 
sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table .. 
.. Only v.e who have erected the objectivity of a ""rid of our own from what nature gives us, 
who have built it into the envirorunent of nature so that we are protected from her, can look 
upon nature as something 'objective'." (Arendt 1989: 137) 
Thus the basic conditions of "objectivity" lie in tile construction of a ""rid, a hwnan artifice, which corresponds to 
the human condition of """rldliness" (Arendt 1989:7). The 'objective' nature of the world of ' things' is thus a 
precondition for subjectivity and '""rldtiness' but the modes of description for objects are different from those of 
hunlaIl subjects and actions. The latter are never fully redeemable in description, and are tlms not fully knowable. 
The psychologist Erich Fromm makes the same point: 
"Having refers 10 things and things are fixed and describable. Being refers to experience, and 
hUlllaIl experience is in principle not describable. What is fully describable is our persona - the 
mask that we wear, the ego that we present - for this persona is itself a thing. In contrast, tile 
living human being is not a dead image and cannot be described like a thing." (Fromm 
1979:91) 
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Objects gain their 'objectivity' by 'standing ag;rinst' the life processes of humans, whereas subjectivity is manifest 
in action and interaction, and redeemed by relation to the world. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "objective" in the follov,IDg terms: ''belonging not to the consciousness of 
the perceiving or tillnking subject" or "dealing with outward things, exhibiting actual facts uncoloured by 
exhibitors feeling or opinion". The notion "objective" is important in relation to knowiedge, specifically in the 
political realm, but for Arendt, there are always important conditions attached to these forms of knowledge. At the 
root of these conditions lies Arendt's belief that there is "a deep connection between politics and knowledge" 
(Luban 1983:219). Tltis connection is expressed in Arendts spatial notion of the public realm. The existence of 
the public realm opens up a 'space' between people in the realization of plurality, which gives rise to the 
realization of perspective. This public realm is termed by Arendt the space of appearance, and is brought into 
being by the realization of plurality through speech and action: 
" .. without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being 
together, neither the reality of one's self, of one's own identity, nor the reality of the 
surrounding world can be established beyond doubt. The human sense of reality demands that 
men actualize the sheer passive givenness of their being, not in order to change it but in order 
to make articulate and call into full existence what otherwise they would have to suffer 
passively anyhow." (Arendt 1989:208) 
In her writing on totalitariartism, she refers frequently to the condition of "worldlessness" in Europe between the 
First and Second World Wars. This condition manifested itself in the effectiveness of totalitarian ideology - as 
Benhabib explains: 
"Not having a particular social perspective from which to view the world, they are particularly 
open to ideological manipulation: they can believe anythlng and everything for they have no 
definite perspective which is tied to having a certain place in the world" (Benhabib 1991: 177) 
Arendt dtaws a distinction between "political understanding" and "objective knowledge" (Disch 1993:680). Only 
a certain kind of understanding is of any political use. She dismisses "objective" knowledge, not because it is not 
knowledge, but because it is apolitical; it is a mode of thinking that is politically irrelevant. The reason for tills is 
that the detachment in "objective" tillnking cannot engage with the phenomenological realities of political life. 
Benhabib outlines what she tenns the "mode ll of "narrativity": 
"Narrativity, or the immersion of action in a web of human relationships, is the mode through 
which the self is individuated and acts are identified. Both the whatness of the act and the 
whoness of the self are disclosed to agents capable of communicative understanding. Actions 
are identified narratively. Someone bas always done such-and-such at some point in time. To 
identiJY an action is to tell the stol)' of its initiation, its unfolding, and of its inunersion in a web 
of relations constituted through the actions and narratives of others." (Benhabib 1994: 127) 
Political judgement is only possible from within the world. The metaphor of the "Archimedean point" is used as a 
basis for a critique of "objective" modes of knowledge. instead, Arendt expanded the Kantian critique of aesthetic 
judgement, and developed the notion of "enlarged mentality". This notion involved the "imagination" of the 
perspectives of others in a particular situation, and was modelled on Kants conceptions of aesthetic judgement. 
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In her lectures on Kant's Critique of Judgement, she claims that 
". judgement is not the faculty of noumenal selves legislating for mankind as a whole, but the 
faculty of concrete subjects operating in a werldly space of appearances" (D'Entreves 1994: 113) 
She built on Kant's distinction between detemtinant and reflective judgements. For Kant, '~udgement in general" 
is "the faculty of thinking the particular as it is subsumed under the universal" (D'Entreves 1994:113). A 
determinant judgement is one where the universal is given and the particular is subsumed under it, and a 
reflective one, where only the particular is given, and the universal has to be found. While detemtinant 
judgements were cognitive, reflective ones were non-cognitive (D'Entreves 1994: 113). Kant categorised aesthetic 
judgement as reflective, and thus non-cognitive as 
" .. in the case of aesthetic judgement the particular object is estimated as beautiful by virtue of 
the feeling that it arouses in us" (D'Entreves 1994: 113). 
Thus the concept of beauty could only be applied "through experiencing a particular object that exemplifies it" 
(D'Entreves 1994: 114). Arendt expanded this concept as a general notion of political judgement, emphasizing the 
notion of the exemplary. Arendt's position was that 
" .. by attending to these events [that possess "exemplary validity that make them of universal 
significance"] in their particularity the historian or judging spectator is able to illmninate their 
universal import and thereby preserve them as an "example" for posterity." (D'Entreves 
1994: 115) 
In addition, Arendt also borrows Kant's specific notion of conunon sense, "a special sense that fits us into a 
human conununity" (D'Entreves 1994: 118) as a criterion for the conununicability of judgements, in tum a 
criterion for their validity. Linked to this is the notion of an "enlarged mentality", which Arendt uses to constmct 
her notion of "impartiality"; the basis for an "enlarged mentality" in Kant is the ability to judge from the 
perspective of others, to "abstract from private conditions and circumstances" . The notion of taste, which Kant 
employed in his Critique, is such that it is not amenable to "objective" judgement, but at the same time, has an 
essentially public existence. 
RECONCEIVING THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL 
The "narrativity" of subjectivity, amongst other things, also made Arendt an anti-foundationalist in the matter of 
political philosophy. Her political philosophy can be categorized as an attempt to 'think about politics without 
having to say what we are' . Thus, instead of political concepts such as rights and forms of government being 
grounded in a theal}' of human subjectivity (' human nature'), such concepts and forms develop in actnal political 
processes, in which the subjectivity of individuals is revealed. In other werds, for Arendt, thinking about politics is 
a confrontation with the werld, not a glance inside oneself in the manner of Descartes. Politically, one gets to 
know oneself through the werld, not the werld through oneself. 
The loss of tradition implies a fragmentation of the political. For Arendt, the problem of the political is 
symptomatic of the loss of tradition, but this does not mean that it is possible or even necessaty to resolve it. The 
political conditions of the modern age have made it possible to construe political activity itself as a normative goal 
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(as Crick does). Thus, willie consideration of the political leads us into the centre of the problem of the conditions 
of political life willch characterize the modem age, we cannot escape litis problem in the old way. 
Political thought can no longer proceed from a conceptualization of the political entrenched in a specific reading 
of European political experience. The notion ofa tradition itself becomes political; as Arendt and Benjamin point 
out, the political complexity of the present can produce any number of traditions. Arendt's solution to the problem 
of the political is to reconceptualize the faCUlty of political judgement, in such a way that it does not require 
grounding outside the political realm. After reevaluating Crick and Leftwich in the light of Arendt's political 
thought, I will explore these ideas in more detail in Chapter Four. 
PROBLEMS IN LEFTWICH'S AND CRICK'S VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL 
I will begin with Leftwich. His notion of "studying politics" can, by definition, be applied anywhere, and will 
produce observations on the "politics" of certain societies, but these "results" will be of no help in understanding 
political events. 
His conceptualization of politics is anti-phenomenal in the extreme. Every occurrence of "the political" occurs in a 
pre-determined framework, first of all, according to his definition, and second, within the analytical framework he 
has established 
The possibility of the new, of evaluating experience in 'the time of the now', so important in the work of writers 
such as Arendt, is excluded from the beginning. In addition, his theory is totally non-substantive, and this is where 
the main problem lies. Leftwich's main aim in writing his bock was to extend popular participation in political 
processes (and thus "democracy") by abolishing misconceptions about what politics "is", but all that his brand of 
political lItinking is able to uncover are iron "structures". The actual aims of political action somehow come from 
outside the political realm. There is not a single substantive issue that enters litis process on its own terms. The 
idea that "politics" might be part of the intersubjective life-processes of a community is not entertainable in 
Leftwich's "system", neither is the political a possible source of contestation. The theory thus has no normative 
content; any normative aims in "political thiriking" of this kind must, again, come from outside the process of 
political analysis. In adtlition, ills "definition" of politics and the subsequent theory says nothing about the specific 
times that we inhabit; in fact it says nothing specific at all. Politically, litis amounts to a kind of theoretical 
imperialism; a range of concepts such as "culture" are deployed in any circumstance where the human species 
occurs, to identiJy formations that have arguably only existed in certain specific societies for about 100 or less 
years. 
The effect is that willch Arendt alluded to; any specific features that comprise the political, are "explained away" 
rather than understood. In using a concept such as 'class', in the way that Leftwich does, one has two possible 
routes; one can either define the term non-substantively, as a purely analytical term, or one can use the term 
substantively, in willch case a new set of difficulties arises. The central point is that Leftwich has no sense of the 
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world in political terms, which is so central to writers such as Arendt. Raymond Williams highlights some of the 
difficulties ofthis position. 
Williams' book Keywords (Williams 1976) consists of a list of alphabetic entries comprising Williams' "social 
vocabulary", which he compiled after investigating the complexities of the shifting meaning of the word ' culture' . 
The "Keywords" have in common a problem of definition, not of the sort involved in distinguishing ' lunch' and 
'supper', but an expression of "different immediate values or different kinds of valuation" (Williams 1976:9). He 
collected the most interesting and significant of these words, and wrote short essays on each, which he termed 
'Keywords' . The book is, in Williams' words, 
" .. the record of an inquiry into a vocabulary: a shared body of words and meanings in our most 
general discussions, in English, of the practices and institutions which we group as culture and 
society." (Williams 1976: 13) 
He began to understand the words he had chosen as examples of a specific kind of word: 
"Every word which I have included has at some time, in the course of some argument, virtually 
forced itself on my attention becanse the problelns of its meanings seemed to me inextricably 
bound up with the problems it was being used to discuss." (Williams 1976:13) 
It became apparent that problems and issues which these words signiJY 
" .. cannot even be focused on unless we are conscious of the words as elements of the problem" 
(Williams 1976: 14). 
For these words, definition of a dictionary sort is confusing and obscuring, and prevents one from comprehending 
at aU the significance of a particular usage. He repudiates the notions that a certain kind of semantics could 
"clarify" the meaning of such words as "class", and thus help resolve "disputes conducted in their terms" 
(Williams 1976:21), because 
" .. to understand the complexities of the meanings of ' class' contributes virtnalIy nothing to the 
resolution, for example, of actual class disputes and class struggles.. .. the variations and 
confusions of meaning are not just faults in a system, or errors of feedback, or deficiencies of 
education. They are in many cases, in my terms, historical and contemporary substance." 
(Williams 1976:21) 
Terms such as class, culture, society, and democracy, as well as being 'descriptive', are ways in which people 
confront and understand complex practical situation. Connolly makes this specific point: 
"The concepts of politics do not simply provide a lens through which to observe a process that 
is independent of them. All we have seen, they are themselves part of that political life - they 
help to constitute it, to make it what it is." (Connolly 1983: 180) 
Moreover, there are specific conditions in modernity that complicate the issue of definition, as demonstrated by 
Heller in her paper, "Sociology as the Defetishization ofModeroity" (Heller 1991b). 
Heller explores a central dilemma in modem social theory. She begins by differentiating sociology and philosophy 
as different modes of knowledge. Philosophy 
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" .. has a tradition which goes back to ancient times, and the rules of the game have been set 
long before the dawn of modernity and cannot be undone unless the genre of philosophy itself 
is abandoned." (Heller 1991b:517) 
Philosophers fonnulate truth " .. sub species aeternatis, being in all times and with a message for all times" (Heller 
1991b:517). Sociology, on the other hand, is concerned with " .. the exigency of our historical age, modernity." 
(Heller 1991b:528). She distinguishes betl>.een modern and premodern societies by what she considers "the 
common element in all theories of modernity" (Heller 1991 b: 518), namely that premodern societies were 
structured by stratification, whereas modern ones are structured by "the division of functions". (That Apartheid 
does not in essence fit easily into either of these categories is a point that verifies Arendt's argument.) 
In premodern (thus stratified) societies it was possible for philosophy to "fonnulate a true theory of society" (HeUer 
1991b:519), but it is not possible in a functionalist society. (It is important here that Heller speaks of social 
knowledge in particular.) This is because in the process of philosophy, 
" .. if a historically relevant social stratum, community or group shares a fonn of life and thus a 
total life experience, the single member of a group can still intuit, and thereby produce a body 
of knowledge or an art work expressing the shared life experience of this group to an extent 
which surpasses in clarity, radicality, and homogeneity, the actual ideas of the other members 
of the group" (Heller 1991b:520) 
This is possible in a stratified society, but not in a functionalist one, as "intellectnals" fonn a functional group, and 
thus have no intuitive access to people perfonning other functions in society, and thus "social theorists cannot 
obtain a true insight into society by relying on their intuition alone". (Heller 1991b:521). Other means have to be 
found to ground social knowledge. In doing this, in empirical sociology other people are made objects of research 
and knowledge, and thus subject becomes object. and thus reified, and theoretical sociology I social theory 
"operates with generalized concepts of social structure or action," (Heller 1991b:523) into which individual 
subjects disappear. Human relationships appear as "relations among social functions" (Heller 1991b:524). Tllis 
reification is necessary for any sort of true sociological knowledge. In the process, however, consciousness of 
implicated subjects is "imputed" to them from the standpoint of the functioning of institutions. Thus for example, 
within the Marxist tradition as regards "designating the class position of social actors" the category "class" is a 
reified or fetishized category. (Heller 1991b:524). Heller maintains that 
"Labor as social function and capital as social function are not identical with the sum total of 
subjects of the cluster 'industrial workers' on the one hand, and the sum total of subjects of the 
cluster ' capitalists' on the other. The concept class, if it refers to modern, socioeccnonlic 
classes, and not to castes and estates, is a fetishistic [reified] category. " (HeUer 1991b:524) 
She highlights a sinlilar problem in modem theory of the state - the premodern state could be defined as a strata of 
persons (e.g. Aristotle - citizens), but under modernity, "what is the state?" "cannot be answered in a 
straightforward way" (Heller 199Ib:525), as "the state" is a reifiedlfetishized category, as are "social class, civil 
society, economy, and the like" (Heller 1991b:525). Unless these categories have a clearly defined membership 
(which they don't under modernity), reification is inevitable and necessary. The problem arises in the 
intetpretation and analysis of action, for 
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"If VIle speak of action, VIle must speak of actors, that is to say, subjects, moreover, individual 
subjects." (Heller 1991b:526) 
This is the traditional and central concern of philosophy, indeed action " .. was and has remained a philosophical 
construct" (Heller 1991b:526) (in the sense that if one wishes to speak of action, one must speak in the language 
of philosophy), and thus any concern with action must take place " .. under the guidance of a philosophical 
paradigm (or metatheory)" (Heller 1991b:526). Thus the dilemma of social theory is that true Imowledge cannot 
be gained about rationalized institutions without reification, but on the other hand true Imowledge cannot be 
gained about rational action (which is one of the hases of modernity) if the possibility of action and thus 
unreifiedluofetishized subjectivity is not admitted In Heller's words, 
"[social theories] have to operate with fetishized (reified) categories, and they must reilY actors 
methodologically, but they will only become true theories if they proceed to perfonn this task 
under the guidance of a philosophical paradigm (or metatheory) which defetishizes (or 
dereifies) human subjects, action, speech, and consciousness." (Heller 1991b:528) 
This, according to Heller, is a dilemma that cannot really be overcome in contemporary conditions, which both 
give rise to the field oflmowledge (sociology) and the dilenuna itself. 
Theoretical sociology, as the mode of objective social Imowledge about modernity, is thus unable to employ 
objective categories such as "class", even descriptively, without eliminating subjectivity and the "philosophical 
construct" of action. She points out that even lIextreme structuralists" such as Althusser, must "impute 
consciousness to members of institutions" (Heller 1991b:523). Even in theoretical sociology, there is an awareness 
that its field of focus is modernity. 
What both Heller and Williams emphasize, as does Arendt, is that there is a link betvveen politics and Imowledge. 
From Heller's observations on modern sociology, VIle can observe that there are certain problems with the use of 
tenns such as ' class' which are not only present in the modern age, but are an essential part of it; an awareness of 
dilenunas related to this condition is a precondition for political thought, not least on account of the complexities 
of the desiguation of the political. Any understanding of the political that will be in the least helpful in the 
understanding of the general political significance of news must have as its starting point an awareness of the 
specific complications of the political in the modern age, a capability to perceive news and the political as specific 
socia-cultural phenomena Leftwich's notion of the problem of the political contains no such awareness, and this is 
related directly to the fuct that his definition is non-substantive. Following from this, Leftwich's fonn of political 
analysis is to select and isolate the 'significant' features of a situation, in order to 'analyze' the political aspects. 
The result is that what is truly and substantively 'political ' simply disappears. In short, this approach simply 
'explains away' real political dilferences and substantive issues, rather than producing any authentic political 
understanding. 
Crick's work, on the other hand is vehement on the substantive nature of the political. This is the great merit of his 
work. He delineates politics culturally, in the sense that he identifies a particular history and a particular set of 
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practices as a tradition culminating in the European nation-state, which is then universalized. In the spirit of this 
tradition, there are frequent nonnative references to 'civilization' and 'civilized values'. This hecomes clear if"" 
examine the impulse that led Crick to write his book, naruely the emergence of a number of "new" states; more 
specifically, the process of decolonization, or alternatively, the emergence of the Third World. This is a decisive 
moment in world histories, in the sense that it is the point at which it hecomes possible to reconsider the 
universality of the nation-state as an inevitable political destiny of each human ' society', and thus the concomitant 
political assumptions, such as 'peeple' , ' nation' and so forth. Crick's insistence on the state as the basis for true 
political activity can best be understood in terms of his reliance on this tradition. Political situations arising outside 
this context, ho""ver, cannot be accommodated in terms of this conception of the political. 
There are two contexts in which this is the case, that illustrate the inadequacy of Crick's sppeal to this tradition, 
naruely feminism and post-colonialism. Feminists would take ill a suggestion that power relationships be!\Mlen 
men and women, particularly those in the private or intimate spheres, was a "merely social" issue. Crick defines 
freedom as "the privacy of men from public actions" . The extent of "privacy from public actions" is not simply a 
measure of "freedom", but also traditionally the division between the private power of men over women and the 
political power of the slate: 
"Patriarchy's chief institution is the family. It is both a mirror of and a connection with the 
larger society, a patriarchal unit within a patriarchal whole. Mediating between the individual 
and the social structure, the family effects control and conformity where political and other 
authorities are insufficient." (Millet 1971: 33) 
In the introduction to Haberrnas' book on the public sphere (Habermas 1992:xiii) Thomas McCarthy comments 
that feminists have 
"identified institutional divisions between the public and the private as a thread running 
through the history of the subordination of women". 
In this case the actual boundaries of the political are the subject of a political struggle. The coining of the term 
'patriarchy' is the founding of a new form of politics, which contests the inberitance of the tradition on which 
Crick founds his notion of politics. 
In a similar manner, Crick's insistence on order and the state is a problem in the political context of the Third 
World. Instrumental forms of order have tended to dominate in many colonized societies, either solely from 
economic imperatives (for example, many British imperial interventions which led to direct imperial rule ""re set 
in motion by direct pressure from big capital) or imperial-strategic imperatives (e.g. the official British view of 
Egypt was that the primary function of the colonial administration was to secure the Suez canal and thus access to 
India - see Said 1987), and thus cannot form a basis for an authentic political order. The dichotomy of order vs 
anarchy which characterizes Crick's work is itself politicized in colonial and post-colonial contexts; there is no 
longer order, but orders - whether a specific situation constitutes order or chaos depends on one's political outlook. 
The state as such, the culmination of the occidental political tradition, is called into question politically. Part of 
this situation is indirectly portrayed by Crick in the reasons that he gives for the current necessity for a defence of 
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politics, namely the emergence of new states after the Second World War. Read differently, this concern is with a 
sense of unease at tlle fuiling of the occidental tradition of political thought in the face of the unprecedented 
situation of decolonization. Crick's response is to consciously transform politics into a technique for maintaining 
peace and quiet. 
Both Crick and Leftwich fuil to solve the problem of the political. Their mere interest in the subject of the political 
is more confirnl3tion ofHellers and Arendt's insights concerning the crises in political thought engendered by the 
modem age. Leftwich fuils because his 'definition' is non-substantive; Crick because his conception of politics is 
too rooted in the tradition of political thought that has given rise to tlle problem of the political in the first place. 
Leftwich's ' definition' cannot provide a hasis for political judgement; because of its non-substantive nature, he is 
unable to provide a conception of the political that demonstrates a unity of normative claims and empirical 
awareness. Crick, on the other hand, does provide a form of political judgement. Politics for Crick is both an 
empirical phenomenon that we ought to learn to distinguish, and a desirable activity; in other words, politics itself 
becomes a "politically effective Ought". The implicstion of this perspective is that the problem of the political 
expressed by Heller becomes a problem of political judgement; this is Arendt's outlook, but Crick's conception of 
politics is not able to accommodate it. The only productive response to the problem that Crick clearly perceives, is 
not to fall back on a traditional conception of the political, but to conceive of tlle problem of the political as part of 
a larger problem of political judgement. This I will explore in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
CONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL JUDGEMENT IN TIffi MODERN AGE 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter, I v.ill first distinguish between the relatively closed concept of modernity and the relatively open 
one of the modern age. I will also outline the political significance of a postmodernism conceived as a political 
standpoint from which to evaluate modernity politically. My aim in doing this is to demonstrate the complications 
ofHelle~s grounding her conception of political judgement in a formulation of the essence of modernity, and try, 
through a consideration of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, to reconceive political judgement in a way 
which avoids these complications. 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MODERNITY AND THE MODERN AGE 
Heller claims that ' the political ' must imply a notion of judgement which "must be of a kind that is central to the 
operation and dynamic of modern societies". This is the hasis of the substantive nature of Helle~s 'concept of the 
political ' , and it is closely related to I\W other key elements in her argument, namely that ' the political' must be 
derived from "the quintessence of the modern political dynamic", and that 
"The substantive aspect of ' the political ' is not a concrete political 'thing' at all; ratller, it is the 
main dynamism of modernity itself" (Heller 1991a:341) 
The alternative to an appea1 to a tradition of political experience, in Helle~s view, is a substantive definition 
drawn from the quintessence of 'modernity' . First I want to distinguish between Helle~s notion of , modernity' and 
the modem age (I borrow this term from Arendt). When Heller writes of "the quintessence of the modem political 
dynamic" she refers to umcx:lemity" or lithe mcx:lem condition". "Mcxiemiti' is a complex term pertaining to 
particular institutions, social and cultural forms, and characteristic approaches to social reality. 'The modern age' 
is on the other hand merely an expression for the ' time ofthe now', the contemporary milieu. Modernity is always 
part of a narrative; it is 'realized' in 'modem societies', and these emerge from 'pre-modem societies'; this story 
has been referred to as The Grand Narrative. It is not, strictly speaking a purely historical ternl, in that it has 
distinct essential content, and is not tied to a specific time. 
The distinction between modernity and the modern age is what has given rise to the possibility of postmodernism. 
Postmodernism is politically relevant on at least I\W fronts. First, it is relevant to the Third World, or so-called 
'developing' countries. The term deployed first in the 50's in relation to the 'development' of these countries, 
namely 'modernization' , is indicative of wbat postmodern writers refer to as the Grand Narrative, the universal 
path of development from pre-modem to modern pioneered first by European societies, but followed by all. The 
notion of "modernization" provided a universalized normative critique of the social, political and economic 
destinies of' developing' countries. Thus the discourse of modernity is also effectively an expression of a particular 
pattern of global power relationships. Nl a corollary, postmodernism is a critique of this pattern. Second, 
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postmodernism is a reflection on the actual development of the political culture of so-called modem societies; the 
failure of the Grand Narrative as both a way of making sense of contemporary social reality, and as a form of 
political judgement. The imaginative elements of modernity and postmodernity are nicely captured in the contrast 
between two films shot two decades apart, both demonstrating a specific urban imagination. 
Guiliana Bruno discusses the film Blade Runner (1982) "as a metaphor of the postmodern condition." (Bruno 
1993:238). The film is set in the future, the ideal imaginative realm of modernity, but 
"The future does not realize an idealized, aseptic technological order.. ..The city of Blade 
Runner is not the ultramodern, but the postmoclern city. It is not an ordinary layout of 
skyscrapers and ultra comfortable, hyper-mechanised interiors. Rather it creates an aesthetics of 
decay, exposing the dark side of technology, the process of disintegration." (Bruno 1993:239) 
The streets of the Blade Runner city are filled with decaying buildings and a multitude nf strange subcultures and 
languages. The film is shot to demonstrate the incomprehensibility nf everyday life; there is no order, no scheme 
for interpretation. In comparison, Jean-Luc Godard's AJphaville (1961), pictures a society of ultimate Onwllian 
surveillance, controlled by a huge computer, dOlninated by antiseptic corridors. If one considers Blade Runner to 
be a metaphor for the postmodern condition, one can consider Godard's film to be a metaphor for the alienated 
modem condition, and so as a useful basis for comparison. The Godard film is shot in monotonous black and 
white, Blade Runner, a collage of weird colours, strange and varied architecture, anarchic night street markets and 
so forth. Whereas AJphaville depicts the totalised technological society culminating in its true material fonn, 
literally realizing the dream city as machine ofLe Corlmsier, the sanitized city, in Blade Runner the city is 
" .. a polyvalent, interchangeable structure, the product of geographical displacements and 
condensations .... the explosion of urbanization, melting the futuristic hi-tech look into an 
intercultura1 scenario, recreates the third world inside the first." (Bruno 1993:240-1). 
There is a strong sub-text in both films detailing the struggle of the main characters in their attempts to make a 
human space for themselves. In AJphaville, every reality of the city, every challenge and every space is 
comprehensible in terms of the computer as an expression of the uniJYing principle lurking behind every aspect of 
the city. In Blade Runner the protagonist faces the problem of making any moral sense at all of his actions or the 
world in which he finds himself These two films represent two positions on modernity. In the Godard film, a 
strongly theological element; the computer as an expression of the modem order, is all-pervasive; the struggle is 
one between good and evil. Blade Runner, on the other hand, represents a loss of faitil, the realization of the 
postmodern city as a failed drean], a metaphysical ruin. The main problem for the protagonist in Blade Runner is 
to distinguish between good and evil, to fins some basis on which to make judgements. 
THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF POSTMODERNISM 
Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher in their book The Postmodem Political Condition (Heller 1988), conceptualize 
postrnodernism specifically as a perspective on modernity: 
"Postmoclernity is neither a historical period nor a cultural or political trend with well-defined 
characteristics. Rather, postmodernity may be understood as the private-collective time and 
space, within the wider space nf modernity, delineated by those who have problems with and 
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questions addressed to modernity, by those who want to take it to task, and by those who make 
an inventory of modernity's achievements as well as its unresolved dilemmas." (HeUer 1988:1) 
This "private-collective time and space" is thus a space from which the evaluation of modernity as a whole 
becomes possible. In inhabiting this space, " .. those who have chosen to understand themselves as postmodern are 
in the first place after 'the grand narrative'" (HeUer 1988: 1). This narrative; 
"recounts the story with an overtly causal, covertly teleological self-confidence. This position of 
superiority to the recounted story implies a philosophical and political transcendentalism, the 
presence of the onmiscient narrator." (Heller 1988:2). 
The Grand Narrative is the 'story' by which modernity is the teleological goal of hun Jan development, which in a 
disguised form, is the 'story' of what HeUer and Feher call "the project of 'Europe'''. The Grand Narrative is 
"world interpretation of a very peculiar kind"; in other words, a specific way of malcing sense of the world, 
characterized by its universal perspective. 
They describe this "project of 'Europe'" as "the hermeneutical culture par excellance" (HeUer 1988:2), a culture 
with an inherent tension. On the one hand, "European" culture has always regarded itself not only as superior to 
all other cultures, but also as demonstrating tendencies of development that were still latent in other cultures, thns 
embodYing in the narrative of European history the path of development of the whole of humanity. These 
universahzing prectices seek to situate truth and certainty outside of any specific cultural experience, but are 
mythologically based in the histories of Europe. On the other hand, Europeans have constantly engaged in a 
critique of these universahsing practices, " .. to expose them as just so many particularities having a false claim to 
universahty" (Heller 1988:2). This is the basis of the development of the notion of 'ideology', but in this process, 
Marx 
" .. in exposing the particularity of all European universals, and in proceeding from here to the 
creation of tlle most universal universals .... only proved himself to be the ultimate European." 
(HeUer 1988:2) 
The resolution of the complex interrelationship between modernity and "the project that is Europe" has meant, in 
political tenns, that " .. cultural and political campaign against ethnocentrism has in fuct been a major campaign 
for postrnodernism" (Heller 1988:2). Concepts such as universal history, universal hwnankind, culture and art as 
universal occurrences are central to the 'project of Europe': 
"European identity, or the identity of the West, has been brought into focus by non-identity: the 
European genius or 'spirit' imagined, projected, and thus created hunJankind, as well as the 
other universal notions as 'art' or 'culture. If tllere is a humankind, then everyone lives in a 
(particular kind of) culture, everyone creates (a particular kind of) art. Yet, and this was at the 
heart of European self-identification, European culture is not simply one among many, but 
ratber the highest, most supreme culture or art, indeed, the overarching one in the cornucopia 
of diverse cultures and arts .. " (Heller 1988: 148) 
Thus the very notion of 'humanity' is inlplicated in a modernist account of the modem political clynamic. A 
global network of power centred on the First World is thus understood as a collection of autonomous societies on 
their own courses of development, which course (to paraphrase Marx) is shown by the more advanced society. 
Modernist social discourse experiences the global political effects of colonialism and imperialism as the social 
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unfolding of the common destiny of 'humanity'; the destiny of the margins is thus experienced as 'progress' along 
a linear path much has been trodden before by the centre. The general notion of ' humanity' is thus an obstacle to 
thinking politically about a post-colonial and neo-colonial reality. 
AE a result, I W<Ult to argue for a fonn of postmodernism that is a critique of modernism, specifically in the post-
colonial context, but that is not simply a "private-collective time and space", but a political position arising 
specifically from the disjuncture between the political experience of modernity in specific historical contexts, and 
the power relationships that categorize the first-third world relationship. Not subscribing to the Grand Narrative 
does not imply, as Heller and Feher conclude, that "the very foundation of postmodernism consists in viewing the 
world as a plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities" (Heller 1988:1 ), but, in a post-Apartheid context, 
is the only public alternative for the praxis of an authentic politics. This is not simply a question of what is 
appropriate in a post-colonial, post-Apartheid, Third World context, but is the point at which the geographical 
and historical situation ofthe modern age becomes philosophically effective. Thus when calling on an image from 
the 'pure world of ideas' (after Plato) to measure the world by, all that is forthcoming is the same world that we 
wish to measure, nhistorical and contemporary substancel' , 
Under these conditions, deriving the political from ' the quintessence of the modern political dynantic' expressed 
as the essence of modernity amounts to deriving it from a specific historical-political situation which caunot be 
regarded as universal; more precisely, the Grand Narrative, no longer concealed under a philosophical cloak as 
the narrative of the modern age, becomes a narrative amongst other narratives. With the 'loss of faith ', or 
defetishization of the Grand Narrative, narrative also becomes philosophically effective as the specific condition 
for historical and political meaning. 
LANGUAGE AND MEANING 
Once the "teleological self-confidence" of the Grand Narrative is laid waste, what of political judgement? Hellers 
fonnulation is not sustainable. I will preserve the notion of Oughts, much, as Kant pointed out (see above) are 
inherent in the very concept of judgement, but give a different account of them based in Wittgenstein's philosophy 
of language as well as the concepts of narrative referred to above in the writing of Arendt. I will first outline the 
concept oflanguage-games put forward by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. 
A comparison between Wittgenstein's earlier and later views of language is necessary to properly explore the 
concept of language-game. His earlier view of language 
" .. may be seen as the culmination of an ancient and well-established tradition much conceives 
of language as reference, as our way of referring to things in the world." (Pitkin 1993:24) 
The central problem for Wittgenstein in his earlier work is to deal with the problem of correspondence between 
language and the world. Hanfling points out that there are two forms of this correspondence: words with 
meanings, and sentences with states in the world (Hanfling 1989:5). These two correspondences are the bases of 
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Wittgenstein's "picture theory of meaning". According to this theory, ordinary sentences have meaning in virtue of 
the fuct that they are, in some foml, propositions. Thus the proposition "John is here", and the question "Is John 
here?" have the same basic meaning structure. Propositions form a picture of the world, in that the elements of the 
proposition refer to objects in the world, and these elements are related to each other logically in the proposition in 
the same way as the objects in the world are related to one another; thus a proposition forms a "picture" of reality. 
In addition, most propositions are made up of "complex facts" which are analyzable into "atontic fucts", which 
refer unambiguously to the world, and are combined in various logical structures in order to form pictures of 
reality. The logical structure itself cannot be pictured; this can be "shown but not said". This logical structure can 
be shown to derive in each case from a "general propositional form" (see Hanfling 1989: 19), which is the logical 
"essence" of the proposition. The aim of philosophy is thus to clariJY meaning, to analyze statements and problems 
to reveal this underlying form: 
" .. without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them 
clear and to give them sharp boundaries." (from the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus - quoted in 
Pitkin 1993:28-9) 
By contrast, his later work conceives of language and philosophy in a totally different way. He conceives of the 
relationship between language and the world in terms of language-games, emphasizing the interactive, activity-
hke nature of language, relegating its representative function to a specific form of language activity, amongst 
many others. He begins the Philosophical Investigations with a passage from St Augustine's Confessions, in 
which Augustine describes how as a child he had learned language through adults pointing out objects and saying 
their names: 
"In this picture oflanguage, we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. 
This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands" 
(Wittgenstein 1988:2) 
This is the commonsense view of language (with very deep philosophical roots, including Wittgenstein's earlier 
work) which he seeks to challenge. He does by establishing in various ways that the above picture of language 
represents only one use of language, and there are countless others. 
He uses an example of a game in which a teacher points to an object, and a child says tile name of the object, 
referring to " .. the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which is it is woven, [as] the 'language-
game'." (Wittgenstein 1988:5) Later, he gives some other examples oflanguage-games: 
"Giving orders and obeying them -
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements -
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) - Reporting an event-
Speculating about an event -
Fonning and testing a hypothesis - .. 
.. Asking, thinking, greeting, cursing, praying." (Wittgenstein 1988: 11-12) 
The use of the expression 'language-game' has several purposes. One of these is to demonstrate the diversity of 
uses that language has (besides naming) by emphasizing language as activity: 
41 
" .. new types oflanguage, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and other 
become obsolete and get forgotten .. .. Here the use of the term "language-game" is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of 
life" (Wittgenstein 1988:11) 
He uses the analogy of tools; a toolbox might have a number of different tools which all perform different 
functions; there is no common function that defines them all as tools. Another purpose of language-games is to 
introduce a central idea., that meaning is use, that the meaning of a word is what it is used for, which replaces the 
old notion that meaning is reference; reference is only one use that words can have. Words might have different 
meanings, mean in different ways according to their use, according to the language-games of which they form a 
part. Wittgenstein uses the example of 'games': 
"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games' ... . What is common to them all? 
Don't say "there must he something common, or they would not he called 'games' " - but look 
and see whether there is anything common to all . - For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at 
that ... We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes 
similarities of detail. 
I can think of no hetter expression to characterise these similarities than "family resemblances"; 
for the various resemblances hetween members of a family overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way. - And I shall say: 'games' fonn a fantily." (Wittgenstein, 31-2) 
Elsewhere, he uses the notion of a rope twisted from many fibres, none of which is very long or very strong, but 
the rope itself is long and strong enough to moor a ship in a storm (Hanfling 1989:p.65). 
Each use of the word "game" has some definition, but no property is characteristic of all gan1es. For example, 
some games have rules, some do not; some involve other people, some do not, some involve winning and losing, 
or even just a goal, some do not, and so forth. Another aspect of language that language-games illustrate is its 
nature as human activity; language-gan1es are part of what Wittgenstein tenns 'fonns of life'. "It is through 
sharing in the playing oflanguage-games that language is connected with our life." (Kenny 1993:163). Language 
is only meaningful inasmuch as it is a part of specific forms of life; Wittgenstein was fond of conunenting that if a 
lion could talk, it would not be possible to understand him (see Monk 1990). 
Another point of sig;nificance that arises from language-gan1es is the notion of grammar. It seems that words 
' signiJy' in quite a strnightforward manner when one considers the names of physical objects, but at closer 
examination this is not so; there are conditions attached, which become clearer when more diflicult words, such as 
those to descrihe "private" sensations such as pain are exantined: 
"But what does it mean to say that he has ' named his pain'? - How has he done this naming of 
pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose? - When one says "He gave a name to his 
sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the 
mere act of nanting is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to 
pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the granunar of the word "pain"; it shews the post 
where the new word is stationed." (Wittgenstein 1988:92) 
"Stage-setting" and the "station" of a word are what Wittgenstein means by the grammar of a word or an 
expression. He distinguishes between "surface granunar" and "depth granunar". The former sig;nifies the 
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conventional use, and the latter his notion of a word having a specific place in a language-game, an activity, a 
series of connections for which there are no general rules. What is wrong with Augustine's description, be claims, 
is that 
"Someone coming into a strange countty will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants 
from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of 
these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong. 
And now, I think, we can say Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the 
chlld came into a strange countty and did not understand the language of the countty; that is, 
as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, 
only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself'. (Wittgenstein 
1988: 16) 
For instance, in the case of the word "red", Kenny explains that 
" .. when I leam my first language I have to master a whole complicated system of the 
identification, classification and nanling of colours if I am to lmow the place into which 'red' 
fits." (Kenny 157-8) 
Learning the French term for 'red' is simple, because we have already mastered the grammar of the term in 
English; we are familiar with the language-games in which 'red' occurs. This is not the same as learning the 
whole set of activities surrounding colour identification and description. 
Ostensive definitions (defining a name by pointing at an object), writes Wittgenstein, "can be variously interpreted 
in every case" (PI 28). This is 
"due in part to the irreducible complexity of things, the fact that anything we point to can be 
described in an indefinite number of ways" (Hanfling 1989:58) 
In addition, the act of pointing must be understood as a significant act. All of these fuctors comprise the "stage-
setting" necessary for naming to be effective. 
It is important to note that Wittgenstein was not proposing a theory of meaning or a theory of language. Quite the 
opposite; his work can be best described as a sort of anti-theory, a set of assertions about why such theories are not 
possible. This outlook is centred on his view of language: 
"Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. - For 
someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of 
language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of 
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or 
parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you 
yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and oflanguage" 
And this is true. - Instead of something common to all that we call language, I am saying that 
these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -
but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this 
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language" .. " (Wittgenstein 1988:31) 
On the same page, in the section on the "fumily-resemblance" nature of the term "game", he admonishes his 
interlocutor 
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"What is common to them all? - Don't say: ''There must he something common, or they would 
not he calJed 'g;unes'" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all." 
(Wittgenstein 1988:31) 
Language has no 'essence'; there is no Language, but only language and language-g;unes, and even this term 
Wittgeustein uses with some qualification: 
"Our clear and simple language-g;unes are not preparatory studies for a future regularisation of 
language - as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-
games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of 
our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities" (Wittgenstein 1988:50) 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language can he contrasted to his earlier one by the metaphor of a room filled 
with objects. In the earlier view, his aim was to ilInntinate the room with bright light, to see every cranny, and 
note every detail. In this way the room could he said to he "analyzed", "known". In practice, however, this is not 
how we ordinarily experience rooms; his later philosophy, S<K:alled "ordinary-language" philosophy might he 
understood in terms of this metaphor as attempts, with concepts such as "language-games", to, without moving 
the objects or even shifting one's perspective, change the lighting, or observe the room at different times of day, or 
the experience of different social occasions. In this way, such things as "moods", and such expressions as "the 
room is gloomy" might become meaningful . By shedding various lights from various angles in the room, we will 
learn that the room has certain moods, aspects, certain potential. All these constitute ' knowing' the room, not 
merely heing able to detail its contents. 
HanfJing characterizes the Tractatus view of logic that Wittgenstein rejected in his later writings as a "theological 
conception oflogic" (Hanfling 1989:40). This conception rested on the notion of a basic logical form underlying 
all language, in terms of which all mearting can he analyzed. According to the later Wittgenstein, language is 
neither conventional (meartings decided by agreement) nor essential (corresponding to the world), but is 
structured by human activity; his interlocutor asks 
" 'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?' - It is what 
human heings say that is true and fuise, and they agree in the language that they use. This is 
not agreement in opinions but in fonn of life .... If language is to he a means of communication 
there must he agreements not only in definitions but also (queer as this may seem) in 
jUdgements." (Wittgenstein 1988:88, my emphasis) 
HanfJing gives the example of the flat earth movement. It is possible to disagree about the shape of the earth 
because two parties agree both on the definition of "flat" and "curved" as weU as judgements (activities) of 
"shaped" and "curved" things. If they disagreed about whether a sphere was flat or curved (say a small ball) then 
the disagreement would he pointless; through the activity of using "flat" and "curved" in the same way in a 
language-game, agreement and disagreement are possible. 
Concolnitantly, Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy was that it is siniilar to psychoanalysis (Kenny makes this 
comparison in Kenny, 1984, 41) in that it is therapeutic. The aim of philosophy is not to search for an ultimate 
44 
truth or ultimate logical fonn, but to dispel 'conceptual confusion'. The aim of philosophy is "to leave everything 
as it is". one ought to 
" .. do away with explanation, and description alone must take its place .... The problems are 
solved, not by giving new information., but by arranging what we have always known .. " 
(Wittgenstein 1988:47) 
The ainl of philosophy is specifically not to provide a basis for reasoning. It is only philosophical problems that 
are dealt with by philosophy: "Philosophy isn't anything except philosophical problems" (quoted in Kenny 1984: 
45). Philosophical problems "extend as far as the common element in different regions of our language" (Kenny 
1984:45). With the demise of the "general concept of language", philosophy in the old sense is no longer possible, 
but 
"If the general concept of language dissolves in this way, doesn't philosophy dissolve as well? 
No, for the task of philosophy is not to create a new, ideal language, but to clarify the use of our 
language.. ..its aim is to remove particular misunderstandings; not to produce a real 
understanding for the first time." (quoted in Kenny 1984:45) 
Ifthere is no unitary concept of philosophical problems, then there also cannot ever be Kanfs "perpetual peace" in 
philosophy. Language, and thus reason, is not perfectible unless language as a whole bas a specific use, which it 
does not. There are uses for language, but no determinate use. (Wittgenstein 1988:138). 
LANGUAGE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 
The shift in the image of language from the earlier to the later Wittgenstein is of great significance for political 
thought. Politically, the power of language derives not from its ability to speak unarubiguously and clearly about 
the world, but from its openness and indetemlinacy. Seigel writes of how Roussel had inspired the following 
insight into language in the work of Foucault. Roussel had 
" .. shown how language drew power from its very wealcness, its inability to provide a separate 
and unambiguous description of each and all the objects encountered in the world. Because 
language used the sarue words to describe different things, there was 'no system common to 
existence and to language .. ' II 
and on the next page, 
''' . .language only speaks from a lack that is essential to it'" (Seigel 1990:289-90) 
Seigel explains how these insights concerning language infonned and ignited Foucault's inquiries into discourse 
and social foml that formed the basis of his earlier work What in fuct separates Foucault from other more 
traditional social thinkers is that he bas "abandoned the attempt to legitimate social organization by means of 
philosophical grounding" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986: 115). Simons makes the sanle point concerning Foucault's 
work on the problem of sovereignty (Simons 1995:53); he defines foundationalism as follows: 
" .. all political theory that claims to legitimate political order bas to portray itself as external to 
the system it judges. In this sense, all political philosophy is foundationalist in a weak sense. 
Foundationalism can be defined as a belief that ' any political justification worthy of the narue 
must be grounded on principles that are (I) undeniable and immune to revision and (2) located 
outside society and politics' .. " (Simons 1995:53) 
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The 'theological' conception oflanguage espoused by the early Wittgenstein and other political philosophers such 
as Hobbes and Locke is foundationalist; concepts such as justice, truth, greatness and freedom are grounded in an 
extra-political, extra-societal realm. From this vantage-point, the political philosopher can measure the political 
world, judge it, according to these 'universals'. This is Heller's characterization of the basis of political judgement. 
To repeat Heller's characterization ofphilosophy: 
"Philosophy has never stopped insisting that what is regarded as truth is not really true, but that 
something else is true; or that what is regarded as just is not just, because something else would 
be more, or even perfectly just." (Heller 1991a:336) 
Further, the characterization of modernity as the "here and now that universal values become politically effective", 
and her notion of political judgement is constructed on this basis: 
"Men and women constantly juxtapose Ought, that is, universalized values, to Is, to their 
political and social institutions which fail to live up to their Ought. Men and women interpret 
and re-interpret those values in their daily practices and they go about using them as vehicles of 
critique and refutation, of realizing philosophy, or philosophy's ultimate end." (ibid. , 337) 
The problem that the work of Wittgenstein highlights about Heller's portrayal of political judgement is that the 
'Juxtaposition" requires a degree of 'stage-setting' taken for granted in traditional political thought. Arendt's 
objection to foundationalism is that the conditions necessary for an ' Archimedean point' are in the first place 
political. 
In the political conditions of the modern age, this becomes apparent; the problem of political judgement is not 
solved by the application of universals from outside the political realm by a process of interpretation, but by the 
narrative redemption of values such as justice from a fragmented past as part of an engagement with an 
unprecedented present. The problem does not lie in the interpretation of Oughts, but their application, the creation 
of perspective and the active use of the political imagination. The problem of political judgement is a problem of 
seeing, of making sense of the world so tllal judgement is possible, which is why Arendes reading of Kant's 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is so important. In the next Chapter I will elaborate this problem through a 
reading of one of Brecht's plays. 
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Chapter Five 
POLITICAL JUDGEMENT AS A WAY OF SEEING 
INTRQDPCfIQN 
This chapter illustrates by a reading of a play by Brecht, some of the themes developed in the previous chapter. 
Political judgement is exercised in the play in the face of the unprecedented by the narrative redemption of the 
concept of justice. The implications of this process of thinldng will be further explored in the next chapter. 
BRECHT'S TELLING OF JUSTICE 
In Brecht's play The Caucasian Chalk Circle, there is a section entitled "The Story of the Judge" (Brecht 
1982:61). During a civil war, when the state has fallen and the Grand Duke has fled, Azdak, a poacher and a poor 
peasant, is appointed judge almost by chance by the masterless soldiers, after the previous judge has been hanged 
in a popular insurrection. For two years he sits on the Judge's Seat, hearing cases and maldng judgements. The 
two years are an interregnum, an "era of disorder" (Brecht 1982:80), a time where the ruler, the Grand Duke, is in 
exile, and there is no 'order' in the land. Azdak is presented with a large Statute Book, which at the end of his 
time as a judge he says he 'has alw.lyS used' (as a cushion on the Judge's Seat). As a judge, Azdalr is thoroughly 
unpredictable; he demands bribes from the rich and powerful, and judges in favour of the poor; he ignores the 
law, he makes judgements in the most outrageous way; he confiscates property at will and redistributes it at will 
(to himself as well as to others), and his judgements are enforced by the "ironshirts", the soldiers who have been 
left masterless for the two years of disorder. His every act is a parody of the traditional concept of justice. There is 
no consistency in his judgements; he offends every norm of decency, he has no impartiality, every judgement is 
not expressed in the direct language of a moral conviction or rational decision, but in the most confusing sequence 
of narrative twists, impulsive confusion of cases, and layers of misrepresentation. Nevertheless, there is an 
overridingly strong sense in the play that justice is indeed being done, and being done for the first time. The 
Narrator captures the situation in these verses: 
"No more did the Lower Orders 
Tremble in their shoes 
At the bellows of their betters 
At Come-Here's and Listen-You's 
His balances were crooked 
But they shouted in the streets: -
'Good, good, good is Azdak 
And the measure that he metes!' 
He took from Wealthy Peter 
To give to Penniless Paul 
Sealed his illegal judgements 
With a waxen tear, and all 
The rag-tag-and-bobtail 
Ran crying up and down: -
'Cheer, cheer, cheer for Azdak 
The darling of the town!' 
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To love your next door neighbour 
Approach him with an axe 
For prayers and saws and sennons 
Are unconvincing facts 
What miracle of preaching 
A gQQd~lwp blade can cjQ: 
So, so, so, so Azdak 
Makes miracles come true" 
(Brecht 1982:77) 
This particnlar section of the play is a narrative about a man who is revealed in the narrative to be just, whose 
actions do not meet any normal criteria for justice. His rule as judge is in a time when nothing is as expected; 
there are no laws of any sort, no norms, and no way of knowing what to expect. The twin elements of the justice 
system that Azdak takes over, namely Law, which renders judgement predicable, and bribery, which renders the 
application of the law amenable to the rich and powerful, have been abandoned by him Nothing means what it 
' normally' does. As a result, Azdak is very popular amongst the 'lower orders' . Justice is done by those who 
normally only experience injustice; their situstions are cast in a new light. 
The context of the story is that after the massive disruptions of the Second World War, there is a dispute amongst 
two groups of peasants who both want to start collective fanns on the same land; they both have a justifiable claim 
to it. The story of which the "Judge's Story" forms a part is narrated by a travelling singer, partly as entertairunent, 
and partly to shed light on their dilemma. The past is no help. One group of peasants have always lived on the 
land, but they have never owned it, as they and the land were part of a pre-war feudal order. The other group have 
defended the land during the war against the Nazis, with much heroism and sacrifice, in the course of which the 
old feudal order was swept away. Thus neither group has an unambiguous claim, and there is no principle 
founded in any political order that can help them decide the validity of the two claims, as all the old political 
orders have been swept away by the war. 
The culmination of the play is the story of Azdal<s final judgement. He must decide who the real mother of a child 
is. The child's biological mother is the wife of an aristocrat, and she abandons the child to save her own skin while 
fleeing the chaos that comes with the insurrection. A servant girl takes the child in and rears him as her own, for 
which she undergoes great hardship, material as well as social (she is ostracised as an illegitimate mother). Azdak 
cannot decide who should have the child, so he devises a test, whereby both claimants stand inside a chalk circle 
holding the child; whoever manages to drag the child from the circle first will be awarded custody. 
The servant girl cannot do this, as she loves the child too much to tear him to pieces or canse him pain, and so she 
lets the child go. Azdak thus awards the child to her, as she is the one who has demonstrated the love of the true 
mother. The final moral of the story is 
"That what there is shatl belong to those who are good for it, thus 
The children to the maternal, that they thrive; 
The carriages to good drivers, that they are driven well; 
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And the valley to the w.aterers, that it shall bear fruit." (Brecht 1982:96) 
This sto!)', told by the stol)lteller at the gathering to decide the fate of the valley, selVed a singular function. In the 
beginning of the play, it had a1ready been decided who should fann in the valley (the "waterers", the party of 
peasants who wished to start an irrigated fruit fann, who had defended the land during the w.ar), and both parties 
had agreed amicably. There are two processes of understanding involved in the play, both concemingjustice. The 
first is the process whereby the filte of the valley is decided. The considerations are practical ~ there are plans for a 
fruit and wine fann, which are more significant than the plans of the goatherds, who are willing to forfeit their 
claim on these grounds. Nevertheless, they have one outstanding unanswered claim~ that of having grown up in 
the valley 
"Comrades, why does one love one's country? Because the bread tastes better there, the sky is 
higher, the air smells better, voices sound stronger, the ground is easier to walk on .. " (Brecht 
1982:5) 
The solution to the dispute about the land is solved practically by consideration of what is going to be done there, 
but the feeling of belonging, the sense of injustice of losing one's birthright, is dealt with narratively in the sto!)'. 
The aim of the sto!)', in other words, was to show whether the decision was just or not. There are several ways in 
which this is done. There is the setting of the sto!)', namely in a time of upheaval and uncertainty. There is the 
character of Azdak, and his w.ay of being a judge, and finally, there is the culmination of the sto!)', that of the 
judgement of the Chalk Circle. The importance of this judgement is that in abstract there are criteria for justice in 
the case of the allocation of the child (contained in the Statute Book that Azdak uses as a cushion), but there is no 
guide to determine which of these principles should be applied or how, in this case, a truly just decision cannot be 
arrived at cognitively. There is in fact a sense that if times had been 'nonnal' , justice would not have been 
possible. 
This has obvious analogies with the land question being debated by the peasants~ there are incommensurable 
claims on both sides, but only one decision can be taken. There is no legal system, no system of accepted 
procedures. More than this, there is no tradition in the context of which ajust decision can be legitimated as such. 
Before the telling of the stoty, it was an open question as to whether the decision was just or not. At the end, the 
question has not been settled definitively, but it has been settled politically. 
JUSTICE AS PART OF A LANGUAGE-GAME 
' Justice' is a part of OUI language, and like any other part, the concept of justice must be learned~ in other words, 
learning what justice is, involves leaming when to apply the word The condition for the public use of language, 
as Wittgenstein pointed out, is that 
" .. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreements not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may seem) in judgements." (Wittgenstein 1988:88) 
The key philosophical problem is the extension of the concept of justice from the limited contexts in which it is 
learned, or in other words, the applicability of the concept to unprecedented situatious. Wittgenstein points out in 
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the ' rule following' sections of the Philosophical Investigations that there is no necessary logical reason for a 
particular extension to follow from a given pattern and a given rule, as the interpretation of the rule is not given. 
He uses the example of a mathematical sequence, '2, 4, 6, .. ' and so forth, to demonstrate that there is no reason, 
given the rule '+2' , mty someone should not continue the sequence, ' .. 1000,1004.:. (Wittgenstein 1988:74-75). 
Cavell remarks on Wittgenstein's conclusions, that 
"We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to 
be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place 
(in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing 
ensures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a 
matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of hmnour and of 
significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a 
rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an 
explanation - all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life' . Human speech, sanity 
and community, rests upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this." (quoted in Pitkin 
1993:49) 
The case of 'justice' in what Brecht and Arendt call 'Dark Times' is that this 'projection' has no preoedent, no 
tradition handed down from the past; there are no rules from our use of 'justice' that imply a necessary extension, 
for, according to Wittgenstein, each rule implies the necessity of interpreting a rule, and each rule can be variously 
interpreted in every case (Wittgenstein 1988:81). Political tlllnking in these cases requires a special imaginative 
quality. 
The point oftlle Brecht play is that he creates a sense of justice in the context of the story, in a particular situation 
that is relevant to the land dispute. The story appeals to the peasant's sense of justice; that is what is recognizable 
in the story. The story about the Caucasian Chalk Circle is not about an "interpretation" of a universal concept of 
justice that somehow existed outside of any language-game; it is about the rendering of the unfamiliar meaningful, 
and thus familiar (Arendt commented that the aim of political understanding was to make us feel at home in the 
world). Susan Sontag, in her essay "Against Interpretation": 
" .. the knowledge that we gain through art is an experience of the fonn or stYle of knowing 
something rather than a knowledge of something Oike a :fuel or moral jUdgement) in itself" 
(Sontag 1994:22) 
The story provides the peasants with a way of knowing about justice; 'justice' itself is given substantively as part 
of the language, and this givenness is a precondition for the meaning of the story. The concept is ' enlarged' in this 
process; Wittgenstein characterized the process as follows: 
" .. we extend our concept.. .. as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of 
the thread does not reside in the :fuel that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in 
the overlapping of many fibres" (Wittgenstein 1988:32) 
Roussel's insight is that this character of language, which is referred to as a wealcness by philosophers such as 
John Stuart Mill (see Hanfling 1989:69), is in fact the source of its power. Wittgenstein also implies in this 
passage that the ' strength' of concepts is derived from their composition of overlapping 'fibres', or multiple 
meanings; if a single thread breaks, it does not tlueaten the whole rope in the way that it would if each thread ran 
the whole length. The polyvalence of language is actually the precondition for political thought in the modem age. 
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Chapter Six 
THE GENERAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NEWS 
INTRODUCfION 
In this chapter I will outline how political judgement can be conceived narratively, drawing on readings of Arendt 
and Benjamin, and how this conception of political judgement is characteristic of the conditions of political life 
which characterize the modem age. This conception of political judgement is the basis for understanding the 
po~tical significance of news, which can best be conceived of as a form of political judgement. This is the basis for 
understanding the political significance of the media coverage of District Six. 
NARRATIVE AND POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 
One of the consequences of the loss of tradition is 
" .. the great chance to look upon the past with eyes undistracted by any tradition, with a 
directness which has disappeared from Occidental reading and hearing ever since Roman 
civilization submitted to the authority of Greek thought." (Arendt 1993:28-9) 
A formulation of the concept of political judgement in terms of the radical openness of the past in the wake of the 
loss of tradition, can be constructed on the basis of the narrative redemption of Heller's politically effective Oughts. 
This is most clearly perceived by Arendt and Benjamin, and is referred to in Benhabib's paper on Arendt's. use of 
narrative. She identifies a number of "tensions" between different moments in Arendt's thought and experience, 
between 
"Arendt, the modernist, the storyteller of revolutions, and the sad witness of totalitarianism; 
Arendt, the brilliant student of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, the philosopher of the polis 
and its lost glory, Arendt, the German-Jew who did not cease defending the Muttersprache and 
the legacy of Goethe, Kant and Schiller to those Anglo-American liberals who saw in National 
Socialism the bankruptcy of classical German culture, these tensions remain." (Benhabib 
1990:196) 
Arendt's writing was primarily aimed at making sense of these tensions. In The Human Condition, she wrote that 
"What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing" (Arendt 1989:5). 
Her perception of 'the political' in the modem age was structured and limited by two opposite but connected 
phenomena; revolution and totalitarianism; total freedom and total domination. 
In response to totalitarianism, she reformulated the notion of political understanding and political thinking, and in 
response to revolution, the most total Ought of modem political thought, she, following Benjamin, developed the 
notion of redeeming the "lost treasures", the Oughts of modem political experience, that represented the "failed 
hopes, untrodden paths, unfulfilled dreams" of what she perceived as an authentic political life. The Oughts were 
at the same time ideals, images and normative goals, defined by their imaginative engagement with the past. 
Benhabib continues: 
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"And it is these tensions which inspire the method of political theory as storytelling, a form of 
storytelling which, in Arendt's hands, is transformed into a redemptive narrative, redeeming 
the memory of the dead, the defeated and the vanquished by making presents to us once more 
their failed hopes, their untrodden paths, and unfulfilled dreams." (Benhabib 1990: 196) 
In her essay on Walter Benjamin, she comments on his insight into the 'loss of tradition' in connection with ltis 
notions of historical thinking: 
" .. he concluded that he had to discover new ways of dealing with the past. In tltis he became a 
master when he discovered that the transmissibility of the past had been replaced by its 
citability .. ", 
and later, 
" .. history itself - that is the break in tradition which took place at the beginning oftltis century-
had already relieved him of the task of destruction and he only needed to bend down, as it were, 
to select his precious fragments from the pile of debris .. " (Arendt, from an essay, "Walter 
Benjamin", published in Men in Dark Times, quoted in Benhabib 1990: 189 - my emphasis) 
Arendt referred to Benjamin as a "pearl diver", quoting the verses from Shakespeare's The Tempest (those that 
begin "Full fathom five thy father lies .. "). The "pearl diver" recovers the "memory of the dead" from the past, 
converting them into something "rich and strange" (Benhabib 1990: 188). In another book, she refers to the poet 
and French Resistance fighter Rene Char, who wrote that "our inheritance was left to us by no testament" (Arendt 
1993:3). He speaks also of a "lost treasure", lost after the Liberation. The activity of the "pearl diver" recovering 
the "lost treasure" from the past, and in the process returning to the present with "sometlting rich and strange" is 
the activity of the political thinker, and tltis is the key to deployment of the Oughts of the political dynamic of the 
modem age. 
In the same volume, Arendt wrote two essays called "What is Authority'?" and "What is Freedom?". She writes in 
the Preface that "such elementary and direct questions .. "can only arise if no answers, handed down by tradition, 
are available from the past" (Arendt 1993: 15). The "quintessence" of the political condition of the modem age 
dictates that Heller's Oughts can only be redeemed narratively by a political-historical thinking unfettered by 
tradition. Benjamin conunents in his 'Theses", that 
"Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in 
ltistory. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason ltistorical. It became ltistorical 
posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. A 
historian who takes tltis as his point of departure stops telling sequences of events like beads on 
a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite 
earlier one. Thus, he establishes a conception of the present as the 'time of the now' which is 
shot tluough with cltips of messianic time." (Benjamin 1989:262) 
It is possible to make a distinction between political thinking about the past and purely ltistorical thinking. Purely 
historical thinking has notlting to do with the present; it is objective and removed; the past is considered as dead 
time. Political thinking about the past, however, following Benjamin, is not dead it is concerned intimately with 
the present: 
"History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous empty time, but time filled 
with the presence of the now" (Benjamin 1989:260) 
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Later he characterizes the "pure historical" thought as follow.;: 
"ro historians who wish to relive an era, Fustel de Coulanges recommends that they blot out 
everything they know about the later course of histOly. There is no better way of characterizing 
the method with which historical materialists have broken. It is a process of empathy whose 
origin is the indolence of the heart, acedia, which despairs of grasping and holding the genuine 
historical image as it flares up briefly." (Benjanlin 1989:257) 
There is nothing further from the idea of political tllinking than to attempt to say "how things were" in the sense 
of reconstructing the past objectively. In these terms, a criterion for the political must be that it gains its 
substantive quality from a quintessential insight into the present; each act of political thinking must illwninate the 
present; political thinking must be obsessed with the essence of the present; not in objective law-like terms, hut in 
specific political terms. 
J adopt here Bel\ianlin and Arendt's view of the past as fragmented. The implications of this view are that the past 
is never settled, history is never the final judge. Every new moment of the present gives birth to a new 
constellation of images from the past, as if the causality of the historicists has been reversed. Benjanlin comments 
on the "spiritual" aspect of the class struggle: 
"They have retroactive force and will constantly call into question every victory, past and 
present, of the rulers. As flowers tum towards the sun, by dint of a secret heliotropism the past 
strives to tum towards the sun which is rising in the sky of history." (Benjanlin 1989:256) 
Every political judgement abut the past should throw the present into relief, by illwninating its specific properties. 
It is in fuel, only in the context of memory, the recall of past images, that it is possible to describe the present in 
specific tenos. Memory is the condition for language. 
THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL LIFE OF THE MODERN AGE 
The condition for political understanding is nothing else than the language-games whose granunar we intuitively 
absoIb by our experience of political tuilieux. The political is neither an attribute of human society nor a specific 
tradition, but a form of life. The same is true for other 'universals' such as justice. This is the granunatical 
precondition for political thinking and political judgement, and its provenance is the fonns of political life 
themselves. It is meaningful to speak of 'the conditions of the modern age' only because of the specific political 
situation in which we exist, i.e. a post-colonial global reality. The fuel of this international political condition is 
what makes the expression 'modern age' politically meaningful. These conditions are well-represented by 
Arendt's notion of a ' loss of tradition'. Under such conditions, it is not possible to delineate the political extra-
politically. This is because the substantive aspect of the political, the forms of life that comprise the granunar of 
the concepts which people deploy in political life, is open to constant revision in political processes themselves, 
wllich the phrase designates. Moreover, the political itself can be construed as a normative goal and can thus be 
deployed imaginatively in the creation and uncreation of political contexts. 
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Any substantive "non-political" definition of the political can thus become politically effective itself. Instead, the 
' quintessence of the modern age' is the ' loss of tradition'. The ' loss of tradition', as well as agnosticism toward 
the Grand Narrative, implies that the central task of political judgement is political understanding, or in other 
words, furniliarization of the unexpected and unprecedented, the new, in a way wltich makes political life 
sustainable, which implies the perpetuation of a specific political culture, a collection of capacities, ways of 
engaging meaningfully with the world. This political culture comprises both wtrys a/seeing, as well as a specific 
representation 0/ a political context, a political terrain. Both events, as well as political positions, are made sense 
of. 
The new is the essential political reality of the modern age. There is no longer any philosophical authority that can 
impose an order on the contestations of universal values such as justice and greatness. This necessitates a type of 
political judgement that functions narratively, that has no inherent model of human subjectivity and thus no 
determinate view of action. This type of political judgement, unfettered by tradition, is aware that in place of a 
tradition of political thought that kept alive political ideals, these very ideals must be redeemed from history. In 
Benjamin's language, if the past is no longer transmissible, it is citable. It is in this way that light is shed on the 
unknown, the new. This is the precondition for the conception of the political significance of 'news' as a political 
communicative form of the modern age. Thus the political represents neither a domain nor a quality. As a 
domain, the political is constituted by an orientation towards the specific, the contingent, and it therefore 
constitutes itself as a set of instances which are designated political; as a quality the political adheres in a group of 
instances, and through becoming the subject of political judgement, constitutes itself as a domain. The "final and 
dialectical unity of normative claims and empirical awareness" in this conceptualization of the political is derived, 
as outlined above, from the notion of political judgement. Political judgement is the attempt to understand the 
dissonance of the new, the unprecedented, by the narrative redemption of a fragmented past in terms of the 
grammar of the present. 
THE POLITICAL SIGNIF1CANCE OF NEWS AS A COMMUNICATIVE FORM 
News is the result of an institutional process of ascertaining what is significantly new in the world. News consists 
of events, defined by their visibility against the backdrop of ' ordinary' life. Every act of designation of news thus 
defines the boundary between the everyday and the unexpected, between the ordinary and the significant, 
happenings of no consequence and those of much consequence. The ordinary and the extraordinary thus have no 
fixed boundaries; what is ordinary can become extraordinary, and vice versa. Wittgenstein characterizes 
"reporting an event" as a language-game, wltich is useful as it highlights the active aspects of reporting events, the 
activity of distinguishing an event from everyday life. An event is not only an unexpected occurrence, but a 
significant unexpected occurrence, one that is meaningful. 
Events are identified narratively, as part of a news "story". News items are fragmentary; in every major news 
medium there are discrete news "units". News coverage of a specific context thus consists of a set of fragmented 
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images. In contrast to the mode of history, a collection of news items on a specific theme does not fonn a history 
in the sense of a text in which events are given significance narratively, but a complex and fragmented set of 
glimpses of a specific phenomena or situation. The significant difference bellM:len the two fonns lies in the 
teleological nature of historical narrative; every element contributes toward a specific interpretation of the past, 
which is constructed narratively. A collection of news reports, on the other hand, do not have this property. Every 
fragment of news is written without the hindsight of the historian; no news report contains the phrase, " .. but little 
did they know what was in store for them .. " Matters of the tiniest insignificance in the present, can be granted, in 
retrospect, great historical significance. 
A collection of news reports does not represent a political position. Even though media have identifiable political 
inclinations, the proper political significance of news lies in the extent to which a specific media practice is 
characteristic of a particular political culture. a characteristic way of representing events and political positions. 
Specific media practices such as the media coverage of District Six only make sense politically on account of the 
institutional nature of news. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF NEWS 
When one speaks of the institutional nature of the news media, what is implied is a systematic and regular 
approach to the unexpected. This regularity is institutional in that it is not situated in any specific subjectivity, but 
socially, in the fonn of a set of organizational principles. This institutional nature produces an apparent 
contradiction, alluded to by McQuail, namely that the setting of the boundaries bellM:len the event and everyday 
life is an institutionalized practice: 
"The expression 'manufacture of news' has been coined to express the reality of news 
processing and the contradiction inherent within it, since news is supposed to be reports of 
uncontrolled events, while manufacture implies planning, prediction and routine production. In 
reality, the contradiction is not so total, since news processing may also be seen as efforts to 
deal systematically with the unexpected and in so doing impose an order on it." (McQuaiJ 
1983:116) 
The phrase "dealing systematically with the unexpected" is a neat summary of the political significance of news in 
general. In fact there is no contradiction at all here. The institutional nature of news is the condition for the ability 
of the media to deal systematically with the unexpected. In political teons, news is not primarily the transmission 
of facts but the exploration of the meaning and significance of these fucts in a systematic way. This exploration 
comprises a fonn of political judgement. There is a dialectic at work, between the familiarization of the new 
through telling an event in a specific way. and the evaluation and elabcration of universal values through the 
encounter with the unknown. 
Each practice ofreportiug, each style of writing, fonns a way of knowing. The grammar fomting the basis of these 
fonns or styles of seeing or of knowing comprises a resource of interpretation; each fonns a specific language-
game with a specific grammar. and a particular political significance. The "objectivity" of media is redeemed in a 
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stable pattern of selection and interpretation in a particular milieu \Wich allows an audience to construct some sort 
of reading practice over a period of time, \Wich is capable of evaluating news reports politically. 
NEWS AS THE RITUAL OF A SPECIF1C POLITICAL CULTURE 
I would like to return to Carey's conception of news as ritual. News is a constant negotiation be~n the given 
resources of interpretation of a specific political culture and the unknown. News suggests a style of knowing 
something. McQuail writes that 
" .. the direct product of the media is not knowledge itself but messages with the potential for 
knovJedge-forming. ." (McQuail1983:51) 
To paraphrase a remark of Wittgenstein's, knovJedge in the political realm is not fuctual, but it is not non-factual 
either. Factual information contributes to the formation of political knovJedge but is not identical with it. For this 
reason, alternative readings of the facts are always possible. If alternative reading are possible, then there can be 
no determinate political effect caused by the media, as there is then no causal link be~n political opinion and 
media activity, and as the media can only be said to act politically in the realm of speech and thought, if there is 
no detenninate effect on the consciousness of the participants in political processes, then there is no determinate 
effect at all. This does not eliminate the use of the word 'effect ' in relation to the media; it would be silly to deny 
that we can talk or write about the media having certain effects. It does, however, rule out the possibility that 
media analysis can reveal a specific necessary political effect in any specific context. In the way that Wittgenstein 
uses the notion of 'stage-setting' to critically reflect on the problem of the designation of the word 'pain' (see 
above), we can say the same for fucts in newspaper reports. A fact does not ' designate' an event or a state of affairs 
in political terms (it might do so in other terms) in itself; a good deal of 'stage-setting' is necessary here, too. The 
political significance of news is not only that it conveys 'facts' of what has occurred, but it shows the meaning of 
these facts in the telling; an analogy to Wittgenstein's use of the conception of 'grammar' in this context is 
narrative, as well as the context of the institutional form of the media, \Wich 'shows the post where the new fact is 
stationed' in political terms. News is a ritual in that, as an activity, it demonstrates the capacity of a specific 
political culture to make sense of the world. In addition, it perpetuates a specific practice of political judgement. 
A COMPARISON OF NEWS TO SPEECH 
In the context of the modern age, the political significance of news in general is that it comprises a form of 
political judgement of the unknown, both concerning politically effective values and phenomena. The conditions 
for the constitution of the political distinguishes the political communicative fornl of speech from that of news. 
Speech as a politically significant communicative form takes place within the public realm. The archetypaI pre-
modern image of the political significance of speech is the Greek polis with its agora, or public space of 
appearance, where peeple gather to speak in public. The agora exists before and after speech does. 
On the contrary, in the modern age, in terms ofpolitical conununicative fonns, news is speech ' turned inside out' ; 
its source is institutional rather than subjective. Rather than occurring within a pre-existing social-political site, it 
56 
constantly creates and recreates a political field or terrain and espouses a specific political culture inherent in 
specific news practices. In contrast to ancient political institutions, which were, as HeUer observes, transparent, 
modern political institutions do not comprise the state in a fixed and essential way. The public realm, as the site of 
political life, does not reside in specific institutions, but the existence and articulation of the public sphere v.:ith 
institutions in the state (or, sometimes more importantly, outside it) is itself a constant outcome of political 
processes. In terms of political understanding, the non-subjective nature of media practices implies that, unlike 
speech, the products of the media cannot be understood in tenns of a specific position v.:ithin the political process. 
A specific media practice usuaJly generates a fragmented and complex image of a specific political situation 
(possibly a contradictory one), which in itself creates a problem of political understanding not posed by the speech 
fonn. Again, an awareness of fonn and style rather than factua1 content is the precondition for the resolution of 
this problem. 
The political significance of news lies in tlle capacity that news practices have to make sense of a constantly 
changing world in specific political contexts. To quote Carey again, 
"[News is] a desire to do away v.:ith the epic, heroic, traditional in favour of the unique, novel, 
new." (Carey 1989:21) 
News is a cultural-political response to the loss of tradition in the modern age, a response to the "gap between past 
and future" (to use Arendt's expression). The 'loss of tradition' is the demise of traditional modes of interpretation 
and political judgement. The epic, the heroic, the traditional, that Carey refers to, are relics of pre-modern political 
thinking These forms are characterized by repetition, limited content, in the Greek case, a finite set of myths. The 
political significance of the finite archetypes of the Greek gods are their immortality, their constant ability to cast 
light on human affirirs. The shifting world of the political realm could be measured against the pennanent 
immortality of the gods. 
News, on the other hand, has necessarily changing content, new narratives, new instances of the heroic, the just, 
the ordinary, the great, the free, or the opposite of any of these. News expires. Unlike an epic told again and again, 
news dies and disappears after a very short time, and is replaced by something comparable only in its 
unprecedentedness. The dominant political question pertaining to the phenomenon of news is "How do we make 
sense of the unprecedented as a part of ordinary life?" or "How do we maintain the pennanence of political 
institutions in the face of the unprecedented?" In terms of Wittgenstein's notion of ' stage-setting', traditional 
political communicative forms are characterized by a solidity that is lacking in modern political understanding In 
the sarne way that there are preconditions for the use of names in ordinary language, there are preconditions for 
the understanding of political events. The epistemic conditions of the modern age are such that these 
preconditions are never given, but must be constantly re-established 
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Chapter Seven 
MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF DISTRICT SIX 
INTRODUCfION 
In this chapter I will outline the problems that need to be solved in order to make sense of the media coverage of 
District Six during the specified period. Following this, the political context will be outlined, as well as the two 
basic approaches to analysis, namely the analysis of the image and representation of District Six, and the analysis 
of the representation of the political terrain, which will be undertaken in the next three chapters. 
SPECIFIC MEDIA PRACfICES AS PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING 
Over the period encompassed by this study, there is a range of different forms of journalism, ranging from 
editorials to letters to reports of crime to reports of the prooeedings of government committees, etc. There are 
several problems in interpreting these texts. The first problem is alluded to by Umberto Eco in the Preface to his 
book, Travels in Hyperreality (a collection of articles by Eco published previously in a variety of newspapers, 
magazines, journals, etc.), when commenting on the distinction between his journalistic writing and his more 
considered, academic writing; 
"Some of them may discuss, perhaps over a period of time, the same problems. Others are 
mutually contradictory (but., again, always over a period of time). I believe that an intellectual 
should use newspapers the way private diaries and personal letters were once used At white 
heat, in the rush of an emotion, stimulated by an event, you write your reflections, hoping that 
someone will read them and then forget them." (Eco 1987:x) 
Media texts (I generalize here) are produced in the instant., a momentary response to the world as it is, and an 
attempt to express what the world is at a particular moment. This momentary nature enhances the reflexive, the 
instinctive, over the considered, the contemplative, the predominance of ordinary language over careful analysis. 
To interpret such texts as if they were well-formulated and carefully meditated political positions, or even to 
attempt to deduce such positions from tllem, would be to misconstrue the phenomenon of news; even the trained 
academic is, as Eco points out, reacting to the unexpected. An awareness of the momentary nature of the 
newspaper article must form an integral part of any interpretation. 
In order to capture the essence of this type of discourse, it is necessary to avoid what I will characterize as the 
orthodox approach to textual analysis. This form of analysis involves the inlage of a consistent structured 
argument in the academic form as the kernel of the sense of a text; this inlage is derived, obviously, from ordinary 
academic practice. The process of textual analysis is thus the process of uncovering what is said, by the techniques 
of infomlallogic, which involves the production of a new text, or in other words, the translation of a text into a 
specific form, so that its sense is clearly apparent. This is commonly regarded as the essence of the process of 
interpretation; however, one of the consequences of this form of interpretation is that the reflexive and momentary 
quality of news is erased. There are two aspects of form that are important. On the one hand, a turn of piuase, a 
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reaction, a fonn of expression (both more and less formal) betray a great deal about the ordinary language, the 
non-cognitive response of the reporter and thus about the institution which supports his or her work On the other 
hand, "what is said" in a newspaper article can come in many different forms, ranging from direct opinion to 
'pure' ne~. In this case, the fom, is of great importanoe. 1 characterize below briefly the range of material on 
District Six that occurs during the period of study. 
DIVERSITY OF FORMS IN THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF DISTRICT SIX 
In 1949 and 1950, there are two striking series of feature articles, one entitled "How They Live" and the other 
"District Six: The Facts". Both these series have the clear aims of increasing general knowledge "amongst 
Europeans" of the "unknown" District Six, and both discuss possible solutions to the "problem" of District Six. 
These can be contrasted to other articles of the same period, which exult "local colour", one emphasizing the 
"sentimental" side of the district, another celebrating the "uniqueness" of Hanover Street. During the 50's there are 
occasional articles on "local colour", a feature on a stalwart cinema manageress, a street boxing match, and so 
forth. In the 50's, there are a high peroentage of reports about gang activity in District Six, mainly citing either 
polioe reports or court cases, and clearly related to these, reports about various social institutions whose aim was to 
deal with the "problems" of the district. There is an extended series of reports on the future of the Liberman 
Institute, on account of the possibility of the Cape Town City Council withdrawing its funding support. In 
addition, tllere are a couple ofletters suggesting various "solutions" to the "problem" of District Six. 
In the 60's the amount of ooverage increases dramatically, witll the coming declaration of District Six as a white 
area under the Group Areas Act. There is a lot of coverage of the prooeedings of the Cape Town City Council's 
(crCC) planned upgrading of the area, the deliberation of the Minister of Community Development (p. W. Botha) 
and his Department, an occasional report on conditions in the area, one or two features on interesting local 
personalities. However, after the declaration of District Six as a white area in a Government Gazette of II 
February 1966, the coverage becomes much more focused. Editorials devoted to the issue become quite common 
after this date. New forms of writing begin to appear; the vie~ of ordinary residents are sometimes reported. The 
number of letters from all sides of tile political spectrum increases dramatically. Local political activity is reported 
far more extensively than before. Feature articles expressing various viewpoints on the subject of the removal are 
frequent, ranging from (more unusually) the wife of a Nationalist Minister, to opinions of various city planners 
(quite frequently). News reports diversify after 1966, to include reports on planning conunittees, property deals, 
business interests and so forth. There are more series of feature articles, one in particular titled "The People of 
District Six" by the journalist George Manuel, which have a strikingly different tone from the 1949 and 1950 
series, as well as a number of different reflections on different aspects of daily life in District Six, and finally, 
direct advocation of alternative urban planning scenarios for District Six. 
This brief and rather cursory overview of wllat the media coverage of District Six consists of, provides a clearer 
view of the problem of interpretation. What emerges from a close reading of tile collected material is a complex 
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and sometimes contradictory collection of fragments, encompassing direct political opinion, reported opinion, 
mere reporting, and so on. The problem is to examine the significance of the media coverage as a whole, which 
necessitates that we find significance outside the actuaJ content of the individual articles themselves; it is the shape 
of the actuaJ constellation of opinions, reports, facts and images that constitutes the political significance of the 
media coverage of District Six. Even 'District Six', which is all the articles have in conunon, is not a constant; it 
can in some instances signify an issue, in others a geographical location, etc. The main problem of interpretation 
is thus the problem of creating a narrative context in the light of which the matenal as a whole can be understood 
politically. 
A POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE 
The political context in the light of which I will interpret the media coverage of District Six from 1946 to 1970 is 
the series of events surrounding its declaration as a "white" area and consequent removal. There ane several other 
contexts of relevance but the context of removal is the context that structures the articles in the most significant 
historical way. I must empbasize that placing the media coverage in this context creates meaning that is not 
inherently present; thus articles from the 50's become politically significant in ternlS of the removal, even though 
at that stage probably no-one conceived that District Six would be declared a "white" area. 
What is of specific interest here is not the actuaJ narrative of the removal and declaration tmder the Group Areas 
Act of the district as a "white" area but the connection between the way in which District Six was defined and 
viewed as a problem, and the racial zoning that guaranteed its destruction, or more directly, the political 
relationship between the practices of the liberal media and the ideologues of Apartheid. The self-understanding 
that emerges from the liberal press is that of unqualified opposition to the razing of District Six, but as I hope to 
demonstrate below, the question is considerably more complex than that. Specifically, the question does not 
revolve around how the liberal media reacted to the specific act of the destruction of District Six (such an 
approach would take too much at face value) but more broadly, the relationship between the political culture 
inherent in the media practice concerned, and the politics of apartheid. It is tllis broader context that the real 
significance of the liberal media coverage of District Six can be properly appreciated 
THE IDSTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE REMOVAL OF DISTRICT SIX 
The community that was once ternled District Six is now largely a memory, leaving only a barren patch of land on 
the slopes ofDevil's Peak in Cape Town next to the fraction that was not demolished, punctured by the monolithic 
bulk of the drab buildings of the Cape Technikon. It is also, however, a sign, internationally known, for the 
tragedy of Apartheid, and specifically tile hunlan tragedy of the Group Areas Act. However the sign 'District Six' 
actually signifies a complex and multi-layered history, which is intricately connected with its removal . In tile years 
leading up to its destruction, both the commmlity itself, as well as the citizens of 'European' Cape Town referred 
to a roughly-defined urban geographical area as District Six. The conditions of the identity of the district are as 
important as the way it was portrayed and represented in various public contexts. One of the feature articles in the 
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50's refers to District Six as 'Cape Town's Problem child' (Ar.9/7/55), which is a middle point in a complex and 
changing history of the identity and representation of the district. The phrase 'problem child' is a good 
encapsulation of the position of the liberal media on District Six during the 50's and 60's; there is a clear distance 
between District Six and 'Cape Town'. While Cape Town included District Six geographically, 'Cape Town' as a 
form of urban order did not. At the same time, District Six was perceived as being an essential part of ' Cape Town 
history'. This dialectic of belonging and not belonging is central to the development of the media representation of 
District Six, and is the basis for its political significance. In other words, District Six was defined by what it was as 
much as, if not more than, by where it was. 
District Six was unusual in a number of respects. Firstly, it was an area that was not clearly defined in racial 
terms, which was unusual in the context of South African urban development at the time. Increasingly 
'townships' or ' locations' housed so-called non-white people on the periphery of the 'white' city, and new urban 
developments from about the end of the 19th century were consistently planned with a specific ' race' in mind. 
This aberration is specifically bound up with the urban history of Cape Town, which stretches back long before 
the end of the nineteenth century when segregation began to be systematically and thoroughly applied in South 
African cities. 
Secondly, it was an inner-city area, in the heart of Cape Town, with a distinctly cosmopolitan character. In this 
sense it was a historical anomaly, an urban space that had somehow developed its own autonomous character in 
the midst of the "white" city, and it is in this anomaly that its political significance lay. District Six comprised an 
alternative vision of the South African urban environment. This situation must be understood in the context of 
urbanization in South Africa in general; a distinctly South African urban form was only developed in a few 
centres before tlle late 19th century, which made Cape Town unique as a city which was older than any other in 
South Africa, having a complex development which had been shaped by a number of different social milieux. To 
a certain extent, the struggle over District Six was a reflection of tlle fact that Cape Town was not merely a 
product of late 19th century social formations (in which the ideas of race were already geographically expressed). 
Bickford-Smith writes of the area at the turn of the century that 
"It was, arguably, one of the most cosmopolitan areas in the Cape, if not the whole of sub-
Saharan Africa. Yet there were no examples of widespread racial or ethnic antagonisms .. 
.. Despite its poverty, District Six was a relatively peaceful place to live in compared to the 
creatures spawned by segregation and its scion, Apartheid Thus the latter finally and 
symbolically devoured "Kanaladorp" [colloquial term for District Six 1 and the promise it had 
held as an alternative to a racially ordered and legislated society." (Bickford-Smith 1990:43) 
It was precisely this aspect of District Six that firstly made it a target for total destruction in the political context of 
Apartheid, and secondly is the key to understanding the political significance of the press coverage under 
consideration here. District Six was, in the context of the emerging South African urban order, Difference 
incarnate, an urban form which particular qualities were incomprehensible to contemporary observers of the 
urban environment. At different times in its history, the district had accommodated not only 'Coloured' and 
'Malay' people, but a wide range of different immigrants, a diversity of religions and social classes. It constituted 
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an open fonn of urban existence, in existential terms opposite to the homogeneous unicultural middle-class 
suburb. An ideal opposite is the 'Garden City' of Pine lands (a middle-class historically 'white' suburb on the edge 
of the Cape Flats). Planned and developed in one stroke, residents of Pine lands in the early phase of its existence 
were obliged contractually not to sell their houses to non-whites or Jews. (referenoes to Pinelands are gleaned from 
interviews I conducted with older inhabitants of the suburb, as well as a local newsletter) 
In common with other societies that were utbanizing rapidly in the wake of the economic transformation brought 
about by capital accumulation and industrialization, the notion of urban fonn became an intensely political issue 
in South Afiica, developing from a merely local to an issue of prime national importance in the years from 1910 
to 1950 and beyond. By 1950, the issue of political order was virtually synonymous with the issue of urban order. 
Concomitantly, with the politicization of a sector of human life, a language is necessary to express the political 
concerns with certain features of that sector. In Wittgenstein's terminology, certain language-games develop as 
part of a political process. There are two aspects of the media coverage of District Six that need to be considered, 
namely the identity and representation of District Six itself, and the representation oftlle political terrain by which 
political positions on the issue of District Six were made sense of. The fonner consisted in the processes of 
description or language-games whereby the identity and nature of District Six were able to enter the political 
realm. The language of identity and image, however, as well as being a condition for the political existence of the 
issue of District Six, also had political significance itself The latter consisted in a portrayal of the main contesting 
positions, the conditions of debate and the margins between contestation and the sheer exercise of power. 
Together, these two aspects comprise a media practice which is characteristic of a specific political culture. I will 
deal with the fomler first, then fonnulate a number of concepts that will be useful in the description of this 
political culture, and then consider the representation of the political terrain in the light of these concepts. 
IDENTITY AND IMAGE OF DISTRICT SIX 
There is an article dated 27 May 1966 (Argus) dealing with the defeat of the Council at the hands of the 
goverrunent on the issue of District Six and Group Areas, which has a key paragraph: 
" .. The City Council has a role akin to that of a colonial power, for it is expected to invest in the 
future of a people \\-ho one day will no longer be its citizens .. " 
The context is a discussion of the merits of spending ratepayers money on developing ' coloured' areas in the light 
of their possible imminent removal from the jurisdiction of the Council. The article itself is in fuvour of what is 
tenned a " .. policy of racial harmony over 100 years of full municipal government..", as opposed to removing the 
'Coloured people' from the jurisdiction of the Council, but the rather imaginative reading of the history of Cape 
Town, coupled with the language of European imperialism in the above quote, highlights an important issue; that 
of the identity of District Six. The image of a colonial power is a politically charged one, whose function here is to 
establish the idea of a Cape Town of which District Six is not an integral part; not in geographical or economic 
terms, but in tenns of identity. The relinquishing of a colony by an imperial power does not alter the nature of the 
mother country, although the mother country's identity is often defined in opposition to its colonies. 
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A basic condition for understanding this image, and all the images of this type employed in the exploration of the 
reality of District Six, is its double implication. It is a statement about the nature of the fate of District Six, but also 
a statement about the nature of Cape Town and the urban order in general. The media coverage of District Six can 
be understood, from the viev.point of identity and image, as a complex matrix of different attempts to understand 
the problems posed by the rapidly expanding and changing face of the Cape Town uman order. It is in this 
shifting melee of conflicting political and racial discourses, the related notions of family values and uman 
planning, imperial and colonial discourses, class structures and the remnants of treditional urban order that the 
debate on District Six must be situated. Political allegiances and positions over the period 1940 to 1960 consisted 
of complex and often contradictory reorientations. The opposition of the Council, and indeed, open opposition of 
the liberal press, and thus of a large sector of the citizens of Cape Town, to the removal of District Six, must be 
understood in the context of the political development of Apartheid. There is enough evidence to suggest that the 
Council, and for that matter, the liberal media, had no doubt that something had to be 'done' abut District Six (see 
for instance, Barnett 1993), which usually involved the resettling of large sectors of the population. Barnett and 
Pinnock have pointed out that the Cape Town City Council's own proposals for the demolishing of District Six 
were already far advanced in the 1940's (Barnett 1993, Pinnock 1989). 
Even though these plans were never implemented, this point demonstrates the complexity of the issue of 
opposition. This is not only true of District Six; there were plans to demolish Sophiatown drawn up by a liberal 
United Party-controlled Johannesburg City Council at least a decade before the bulldozers of the Nationalist Party 
government moved in (Van Tonder 1993). Another common simplification of great significance is that opposition 
to Apartheid entailed opposition to racism itself, and that there had somehow developed in Cape Town a non-
racial urban environment, which Apartheid destroyed. It is clear from the media coverage that if anything, 
average liberal media perception of the urban order in the 60's was more racially understood than earlier. 
(Bickford-Smith explores the complex issues surrounding race and the pre-Apartheid uman order in the Cape -
see Bickford-Smith 1989) 
In the following chapter, I will consider a number offeature articles written specifically on the subject of District 
Six, with the aim of exploring exactly how the image and identity of District Six was explored and expressed in 
the liberal media from 1949 to 1970. My approach, in terms of my analysis of the political significance of news, is 
to assume that there is no continuous, objective discourse that is inherent to the material concerning issues such as 
race, culture and urban space. Instead, these issues are explored, ways of meaning are found, and a complex 
hermeneutic network is established. The political crisis of urbanization of which Apartheid was patt1y the result, 
created an unprecedented situation where traditional political ideas about the urban order, racelcolour and class 
were of no help. The media practices which produced the articles that I will explore below, I conceive of as a 
response to this situation; in historical terms (and only in historical terms) they can be viewed as an attempt to 
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establish a political terrain in terms of which issues of urban order could be contested and understood. I have 
focused specifically on articles that epitomize certain modes of seeing. 
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Chapter Eight 
IMAGE AND REPRESENTATION OF DISTRICT SIX 
INTRODUCfION 
In this chapter I will outline three ways of seeing which occur in the representation of District Six in the liberal 
media between 1949 and 1970, namely the familiar-redemptive, the picturesque and in terms of the respectable. 
The first is characterized by an approach which defines District Six as a 'problem' and constructs a potential 
solution based on the identification of 'the familiar' , a redemptive strategy whereby the otherness of the district 
can be exorcized. The seoond, through the notion of ' local colour', creates an alienated identity for the idea of 
Cape Town, at one remove from the hegemonic reality of the 'white city'. The third is a form of judgement that 
delineates and illustrates the hegemonic ideal of the urban environment. These fornlS of seeing define the garb in 
which District Six entered the political realm, and thus form a basis for the outline of a specific political culture 
comprised by the media coverage. 
THE UNKNOWN PROBLEM: DISCOVERY OF DISTRICf SIX, 1949-50 
In 1949 and 1950, there are series of articles in the Argus and the Cape Times respectively on the general topic of 
District Six. The purpose ofboth sets of articles is to 'demystify' District Six, to give 'European' readers a way of 
grasping the nature of the district, to outline the 'problems' of District Six, and point to ways of solving them. 
The first series, from 1949, is entitled "How They Live" . In tile text frequent references to ' us', 'we' , ' they' and 
'them' occur (e.g. " .. our own inability to help them .. " (ar.23/3/49)). From the beginning of this series, the basis of 
the reporting is clear. The title of the first article is "Forgotten Thousands in Squalor of City Slums", and the last 
"Slum Clearance Held Up by Shortage of Houses"; the series develops from an outline of conditions in "Cape 
Town's slums [which] must be among the world's worst" (ibid.), to an exploration of possible solutions. 
The reponer experiences District Six firsthand (with the mediation of the welfare services) for a few hours: 
"With a Child Life Protection Society investigator, and Cape Town's Chief Welfare Officer, Mr 
J. Kuit, I toured the city's dismal slumland. What I saw appalled me." (ar.23/3/49) 
The vision of the district is from the beginning in terms of a Problem, which the spectator strives to understand. In 
shocking and explicit detail the conditions wlder which a woman and her seven children live, as well as those of a 
few other households, are painstakingly described The articles are continually filled with almost audible gasps of 
astonishment at the extremity of conditions under which the ' slum dwellers' live. Words such as ' miracle' are 
frequently used (e.g. "How they settle down for the night is a miracle of organization "), and comparisons are 
frequently drawn between the life OftllOse who do not live in District Six and the perseverance of those who do, to 
draw attention to the extremity of the situation there. Altogether conditions in only two houses are described in the 
five articles, but these are taken as representative of District Six as a whole; sentences such as "they are all in the 
same boat in the area" (ar.I/4/49) and "tllese remarks you can apply to most people living under these conditions" 
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(ar.29/3/49) abound The last article is titled "Slum Clearance Held Up by Shortage of Houses", and is begun by 
the questions, 
"What is the answer to the housing problems of the Peninsula's sub-economic group? How long 
can the appalling conditions in District Six endure? Not only are the dirty hovels an insult to 
humanity, they are a miracle of survival ." (ar.6/4/49) 
Quite a lot of emotive language is used, of which the following is a particularly good exanlple: 
"Off Hanover-street tllere is a cobbled, sinister little alley that crawls like a filtllY reptile 
towards the mountain. Flanking it, the drab buildings seem to lean towards each other in an 
effort to shut out the sun." (ar.4/4/49) 
Eartier (ar.23/3/49), District Six is described as "this area, that sprawls like a grey shadow at the foot of Table 
Mountain". There is no redemptive quality about "How They Live"; even the buildings and the alleys have a 
horrible animation about them. The inhabitants are characterized as "cynical" (23/3/49), and at the same time the 
"slum dwellers" suffer from "apparent insensibility to circumstances" which is a "tragedy" (29/3/49). The whole 
feeting of the series is of the horror of a quick glance into Pandora's Box. A brief tour of a few houses, to which 
the reporter gpined aocess by accompanying welfare officers, produced a snapshot of District Six. The following 
paragraph indicates more clearly tile perspective of the reporter: 
"Cape Town's slums must be anlOngst tile world's worst, but here the tragedy is heightened by 
the non-European population. Circumstance has herded these unfortunates into a forgotten 
comer of civi1ization, and over them have grown the cobwebs of our own inability to help 
them" (ar.23/3/49) 
The gaze of the reporter is the gaze of a respectable 'European' peeping under the cobwebs. One striking aspect 
about this series is that no substantial viewpoints of the actual residents of District Six are included. There are a 
few referenoes to a comment here and there, but these comments are incidental to the main thrust of the series 
which is an emphasis on the "how", i.e. the "conditions" of Ufe in District Six, by which is meant inunediately 
visible, physical conditions. 
What is most significant in this form of 'knowing' is not what we are told about District Six (which is actuaJIy not 
much), but ~t this momentary glance at the horrors of the 1949 District Six tells us about the perspective from 
which the glance is directed. The first thing of note is tlmt "How They Live" could be told at a glance, at a few 
houses, to be exact. This leaves us with an inJage of an urban language that, in the words of Adam Small in a later 
article from the 60's, can deal only in 
" .. the houses that went bad and the streets that polluted through the years [sic]; the double- and 
treble-storied dilapidations which sordidly wear the semblance of ~t they used to be long 
ago .. " (ar30/7/66) 
This is not a comment on the limits of the ability of a reporter to describe, but a limit on what I will elaborate 
more fully below, an urban imagination. In addition, we get a sense of the reification of middle-class Ufe, which is 
tile object of comparison; it is inconceivable how the inhabitants cope under such conditions. This is meant by the 
reporter to be an expression of the extremity of the conditions under which the residents of District Six tive, hut it 
is actually an indication that "How They Live" is a question that the reporter cannot answer. What he or she does 
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not and cannot refer to is the ""II-known community spirit, or social existence of the district, the actual substance 
of the form of life that by most accounts characterized District Six and contributed so much to the survival and 
""II-being of the inhabitants. 
The next series is a little different in tone. Written just under a year later, it also consists of five articles, and is 
titled, "District Six: The Facts". The first article is titled, "City's Little-Known Home of 40,000". Again, 'to know' 
here is used in an interesting sense; a comparative use might be a "little-known" beach, cave or isolated village, 
but in ordinary parlance, writing that a place which is the home of 40,000 people is 'little-known' is a little odd, 
especially considering that the 40,000 people in question lived in the middle of Cape Town. Exactly what this 
means is manifest in the first few paragraphs; District Six is 
" .. the most talked-of part of Cape Town, but the least known .. .. What is really strange is that 
European Cape Town itself knows little more of tlus intricate, highly organized community 
which lies in its midst, sealed offby barriers of ignorance and fear." (ct21/1/50) 
Obviously 'little-known' is a quality of 'European' Cape Town. An emerging theme is that District Six is 'known' 
in part only by those 'Europeans' and foreigners who go there for less than respectable reasons; indeed, " .. one 
may hear [District Six] discussed in any seaport where sailors foregather .. " (ibid.). Immediately the basic 
conditions of the identity of District Six are laid out. There is a wall of myth barring 'respectable Europeans' from 
District Six; it is a place apart, an unconscious geography of prohibition. 
The aim of these articles is to get to grips with the ' real' District Six, to 'demythologize' it. 'To know' is not to 
know as sailors or others who have gone to the district in search of vice of one sort of another, or to know as the 
residents ' know' District Six. In this context, ' to know' means something very specific; namely to understand in 
terms of the criteria of ' respectable European' Cape Town, or more precisely, the english-speaking Cape Town 
middle-class. It also means to reveal more than will be revealed by a cursory glance at tile physical conditions 
' revealed' in "How They Live". The aim of this series is to find ways to reveal the meaning of what confronts the 
('respectable') stranger to District Six. 
A short history follows; the name 'District Six' , originally designating a municipal ward, outlasted the abolishing 
of the old ward system in the early part of tile century, "" are told, on account of the growing 'notoriety' attached 
to tile district. It is lamented that in many seaports of the world, the name District Six is known for this reason; it 
has a fame of its own, which has set it apart from the rest of Cape Town. In addition, this reputation bas also 
established District Six as the antithesis of 'respectable' Cape Town. The history of District Six, that is, of the 
development of its contemporary notorious state, is a history of decay: 
" . .District Six was not always notorious. Its beginnings, of which there is no precise record, 
""re ' respectable' in the extreme .. "(ct2J/ 1/50) 
The story of decay begins with the building of the district by "Cape Town's rapidly increasing European middle 
class", who soon left for the SUbUlbs, leaving space for "Coloured and Malay workers". In a nutshell: 
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"Where one European "",nt out, tv.u, three and even four Coloured families came in, soon 
swamping the services which had been sufficient for the few Europeans and creating what has 
been the cause of most of the evil that has since arisen in District Six . . . overcrowding." 
(ct2I / I/S0) 
This is one of the central contentions of the article, which is concerned to isolate (in a more sophisticated way than 
the first article) the causes of the ills of the present district, and their possible remedy. The story of the Fall is 
important for several reasons. The true authors of District Six in its essence as a functional (as opposed to 
malfunctional) urban unit are the 'European middle class' . What is emphasized quite commonly in this and other 
articles is that, in the language of urban planning, District Six was not being used as it was planned. In other 
words, the original district's resources were being used contrary to design, which all implies that underneath the 
chaos and 'problems' of District Six lies a hidden skeleton of 'European' origin. In addition, the Fall is at the 
sarne time the formation of the identity of District Six. According to the reporter, "no-one quite knows why" the 
name was perpetuated, 
" .. but the most likely explanation is that, as the area had already become notorious for offering 
the shadier forms of night life to sailors and visitors, its reputation and its original narne 
became so firmly linked that nothing could separate them." (ct2l / I/S0) 
However, what interests the reporter is an exploration of "The Facts" of District Six which will ditferentiate the 
redeemable from the irredeemable elements. 
The following articles proceed to describe the 'real' District Six. The first characteristic that is emphasized is that 
District Six is the 'natural home' of the 'Coloured' people. Having established this, it is made clear that 
"It is the overwbehning desire of almost every Coloured person to live "decently", to rear a 
happy and united fumily in conditions of cleanliness and modest comfort, to enjoy the simple 
necessities of life and a few of its luxuries, and to have some leisure to dance and sing. These 
are not extravag;mt ambitions, but only by the hardest struggle can even a part of these be 
realized in District Six today. " (ct23/I/S0) 
What follows is a narrative ofthe frustration of these 'simple' desires by the brute realities of District Six. Again, 
there is the sense of astonishment that life is possible at all , in sentences like, "There is such an air of 
disintegration that one feels instinctively that here there can be no life save that of tile vemtin." (ibid.). 
Here, again, the reporter uses a technique of an intimate description of a household to represent the private life of 
the average resident of District Six. In this case, a ' lodging house'; a tale of the heroism of the inhabitants is told. 
(One gets the feeling, as with a lot of this material, that the inhabitants of District Six "",re living extraordinary 
and unorthodox lives.) They, according to tile article, scrub floors incessantly in a vain effort to maintain 
cleanliness but, 
" .. the dirt which has accumulated beneath them seeps up through the gaps between the boards 
and the scars of rot, and lays a film of mud before the surface has had time to dry." (ibid.) 
This hyperbole is repeated continuously, to emphasize the 'virtues' of the inhabitants in pursuing decency in the 
fuce of such overwhelnting futility. In comparison, the reporter writes about another part of District Six: 
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"District Six has rows and rows of neat houses, and if one would see how the Coloured people 
live when they have the chance of something better one has only to glance into these houses 
during the morning when the front doors are left open .... Here are neat rooms .... the perfection 
of cleanliness and order: though one may guess that tllese things are hard won by constant 
work and the careful budgeting of meagre wages." (ibid.) 
The significance of this article is now apparent. The aim of the series is to 'demythologize' District Six, to remove 
the ''barriers of ignorance and fear" that 'hide' the nature of the district from 'Europeans'. Traditionally, District 
Six had been seen as a ' notorious' place; the aim of this article is to reveal different ways in which it can be 
regarded, in particularly a way in which it and its inhabitants can be understood as ' respectable', and, more 
importantly, be understood by 'respectable' people. This is a form of political judgement par excel/ance; what 
happens here at this point is nothing less than the redemption of the 'Coloured' people from the notoriety and 
degradation of District Six. The degradation normally associated with District Six can thus be wlderstood in the 
context of a struggle against overwhelnting odds for a 'decent' life. This is the hermeneutic key; the notion of 
'decency' constructed on a finn base offami1y values, is the 'European' way into an understanding of District Six. 
Tllis basic categorization of 'Coloured' people as 'respectable' also qualifies them as potentially useful citizens in 
a recognizable fashion. 
The next article in the series is titled "Virtues Thrive in Squalor: Where Kindness is Typical", and concerns the 
'remarkable' virtues of District Six. As the reporter points out, 
"District Six is best known for its vices; its virtues are more numerous, and, flourishing as they 
do in squalor and poverty, they are remarkable" (ct24/ l/50) 
A number of virtues are detailed, but what is most interesting is the explanation for the origins of these, which 
have two sources. The first is poverty; "The virtues of District Six are the virtues of the very poor" (ct24/l/50), and 
the second, the virtue of 'Coloured people' , for example, " .. the Coloured people have a natural sympatllY with 
distress and will go to the assistance of anyone in emergency .. " (ibid.), and later, 
"It is the high courage of the Coloured man which makes it possible for him to pluck happiness 
from the rhythm of a guitar or two pieces of stick, from the flashes of brilliance which is 
sunlight on a line of washing, from the long trudge to work which his nimble feet turn into a 
shuffling dance." (ibid. - tllis paragraph is indented in tile original article to draw attention to 
it) 
An interesting paragraph deals with the attitude to 'Europeans': 
"With its kindness, District Six has also the virtue of gratitude. It is said, and with some truth, 
that it is unsafe for a European to walk through its streets at night, but no-one who has helped 
the district, no nurse or welfare worker or kindly official, is ever assaulted or abused." (ibid.) 
However, those 'Europeans' who visit the district for its 'vices' (bars, prostitution, gambling, etc.) and those who 
exploit its people (included here are "landlords, tricksters and over-smart salesmen"), "are liable to be beaten and 
robbed, which is no more than tlley deserve". These 'Europeans' have "done much to spread [District Six's] 
vices". The next article in the series concerns the 'vices' of District Six. Night is the time when these emerge into 
the open. The headline is "When Day Becomes Our Colour Vices Dominate the Evening Scene". To reveal the 
clliefvices of District Six, a story is told: 
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"This history of an evening "spree", v.hich lands a man in the gutter, sick and penniless, is 
tragically typical" (ct25/1/50) 
The 'typical' story involves the progressive inebriation of "Johannes", who, through a series of unforrunate 
circumstances, such as lack offood, domestic dishannony, and drudgery, ends up drunk in the gutter. A particular 
relevant section is "Gangdom": 
"Its most tragic feature is that the boys who join the gangs and come to be called "skolJies" are 
usually from good homes" (ibid.) 
"Gangdom" is ascribed chiefly to unemployment, in fact, all the vices of District Six are ascribed to "conditions": 
".they are all of them [the vices, that is] the natural outcome of conditions over v.hich the 
people of District Six have no control" (ibid) 
At this point, the structure of the first four topics ("City's Littl<>-known Home of 40,000", "The Struggle to Live 
Decently - MOdest Ambitions Hard To Realize", "Virtues Thrive in Squalor - Where Kindness is Typical", "When 
Day Becomes Our Colour - Vices Dominate the Evening Scene"), far from being limited to "The Facts" (whatever 
those are), suggest very strongly a theme of redemption. Far more incisively than the first series, the second 
suggests a way of regarding District Six v.hich permits rational solution of its ills, but specifically solutions from 
outside; the characterization ofthe residents of the district "having no control" over conditions naturally implied 
that there would be no solutions forthcoming from them. Solving these problems is the focus of the last article in 
the series, entitled "Something That Is Worth Keeping - A Place In Cape Town History" (ct261l/50). A 
comparison is made between Adderley Street and District Six: 
"Adderley Street could be duplicated in any of the world's big cities. District Six could only be 
where it is." (ibid) 
This is on account of ""the fusion of many races into a single community"; this uniqueness earns District Six a 
"place in the history of South Africa". Thus tlle essence of District Six, the fact that makes it unique and part of 
South African history, is the 'Coloured people' themselves. Both they and the district are a result of "the fusion of 
many races into a single community". The rest of the article is devoted to an exploration of the fate of District Six; 
why it is "decaying" and what can be dnne to redeem it. The main problem is identified again, to be 
'overcrowding' resulting in the misuse of resources, v.hich is being exacerbated by the influx of "Natives" (This 
influx is also portrayed as the threat to tlle "Coloured" people). Various ideas are considered including one from 
"the Coloured people themselves". The series concludes with the following paragraph: 
"How much of this is practicable is for the lawmakers and town planners to decide. A just 
solution will leave the solid body of decent, hard-working citizens, who are the majority 
population of District Six, to stay where they are, in a township cleansed and thinned out but 
keeping for posterity those characteristics which give it its right to existence at the centre of the 
Tavern ofthe Seas." (ibid. - my emphasis) 
At the beginning of the series we have a mythologized inJage of a ' notorious' District Six, frequented only by 
' notorious' ' Europeans' (and of course the people actually living tllere), but by the end we have a clear analysis of 
the mechanisms of the district's salvation, what is worth saving and what is not, and how the aspirations of the 
citizens of District Six can be understood in 'European' middl<>-class tenus. 
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There are several important links that emerge in an analysis of this series. The first is that bel\Wen ' knowing' 
District Six in a way that is comprehensible to 'respectable Europeans' and the possible redemption of the district 
and its people. In a nutshell, District Six is redeemable to the extent that it can be understood from a while 
middle-class perspechve~ to put it another way, the elements of District Six that are revealed by the reporter which 
can form the basis of a 'respectable' urban life are the basis for ' respectable Europeans' to find District Six life 
comprehensible. The key to this link is in the distinction drawn in the articles between the knowledge 'respectable 
Europeans' had of District Six and that of those 'Europeans' who visited the district for the sake of its vices. 
The white imagination required an exploration and numeration of the 'virtues' (this is, virtues in the white 
middle-class sense) of the district to Ullderstand the life of District Six. Thus, this particular form of 'knowing' is 
linked directly to the politics of District Six as a 'problem' (a redeemable problem). The type of vision that this 
link entails I will term the 'familiar-redemptive' form of urban vision. The other interesting 1iuk which emerges 
in the last section is bel\Wen the perceived uniqueness of District Six and the general notion of Cape identity. To 
repeat a key passage, "Adderley Street could be duplicated in any of the world's big cities. District Six could only 
be where it is.". This is in embryo the notion of 'local colour' deployed often in descriptions of District Six. The 
dichotomy is very significant, and is often repeated, bel\Wen the cosmopolitanness of "Adderley Street" (read the 
White city) and the specific and unique qualities of District Six, which are synonymous with place in the way that 
landscape is synonymous with place~ both specific and unique, and a specific foml of language built around this 
uniqueness. From this image, some problems of Cape Town identity emerge~ the dominant White order is a 
representative of 'Europe', a universal order, but the essence of Cape Town is to be found not in this order but in 
its margins, in District Six. This conceptualization, wltich I will term the 'colonial attitude' leads to a number of 
complex political problems and insights which I will explore in the next chapter. The contrast bel\Wen these !we 
series of articles highlights some interesting political conditions of urban imagination. The first series ends in the 
conclusion that only large-scale change is possible, and deals with District Six as a complete entity. There is little 
room for redemption, and, coupled with this, an overwhelming sense of alienation. Even the buildings of the 
district are personified in these articles, The second series, on the other hand, as mentioned above, provides a 
much more detailed progranulle for redemption, primarily by a heavy empbasis on ways of differentiating the 
vices of District Six from its virtues, which is done by providing 'anchors' for 'European' notions of ' decency', 
SENTlMENTALlTY AND THE PICTURESQUE: LOCAL COLOUR AND ALIENATION 
There is an article entitled "Canleos of District Six", from 1955, which has an altogether different approach from 
the above articles, which I will term 'the picturesque', The essence of 'the picturesque' is a form of urban 
imagination that attempts to epitomise the expression of 'local colour', which proposes an aesthetics of the 
specific, Broadly speaking, this is a kind of vision tllat can appreciate the aesthetic charm of a bustting ghetto from 
the outside~ a detached, alienated vision not engaging tlle political faculty at all, The aestheticization of the ghetto 
is a solution to the problem of the inscrutable Other. The article begins: 
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"Fred 1. HaMcins roams around what he calls Cape Town's most boisterous locality. But 
District Six has its sentimental moments too, as he shows." (ar.9/7/55) 
The quite lengthy article is literally a series of seven short cameos, snapshots of street scenes, involving newspaper 
sellers, jivers outside a local music shop, strains of a choir practising, and so forth. This time, the experience of the 
reporter is unrnediated by any welfare or other official intetpreter. The article is the reporter's ' impression' of a 
night in District Six, unadulterated by any concerns for 'urban problems'. The structure of representation 
functions in the following way. 
There are a series of narratives, ostensibly related by the reporter, the witness, deemed together to give some 
impression ofthe ' life' of District Six, woven into a tapestry to 'represent' the district. The incidents are viewed, 
noted and selected according to how closely they represent what is ' unique' in the district, to the extent to which 
they represent its ' essence' . All well as the narrative of the seven ' Cameos' , there are some other noteworthy 
qualities to the writing. No-one speaks; the language is that of a non-communicative, mute observer, detached and 
almost anthropological in tone. In addition to this, there is a background series of images which personifY District 
Six in various ways. At the beginning of the article, the situation is described as a " .. mournful Friday night. 
Overhead the sky is moody and overcast.." (ibid.), and later at the end of the article, the last paragraph proceeds in 
the following terms: 
"Overhead, black rain clouds scud across the face of the heavens. The moon, showing its face 
briefly, withdraws again behind darkening clouds. And down below, District Six, problem 
child of Cape Town, drifts into an uneasy sleep." (ibid.) 
These are instances of a general mode of seeing which has as its object the personified 'District Six', which is 
specifically relevant to our concerns because it suggests an approach to dealing with the notion of ' local colour'. 
This quality was referred to briefly at the end of the last series above, captured in the notion of District Six as a 
'unique' urban environment, in comparison, say, with Adderley Street. In another article (''fhis Shabby Street 
Has Personality", arI4/4/51), Hanover Street, despite lacking "respectability", "still has personality". Following 
this is a description of picturesque disorder, unusual juxtapositions (" .. garlic keeps company with hair-nets and 
egg-fiuit with braces."), exotic (alien) smells and merchandise. There is a sense of difference; shops are not 
shops, streets are not used as they 'usually' are. In fact, the way the notion of "personality" is deployed, it is clear 
that this sense of difference is what gives the street "personality" ; the term would not be used to describe Adderley 
Street. 
This is perhaps the essence of the picturesque mode. The vision, encompassing the whole ('District Six') is a 
vision from outside. The language is that of difference. There is another article ("Shouts and Blows - but all in 
sport", ar27/7/57), about an impromptu boxing match, held on a street corner between two "diminutive pugilists". 
The article, again, is a snapshot of District Six street life. In the narrative, 
"A European postman, who stopped for a moment to have a look, shook his head and 
murmured something about the Marquess of Queensbury's rules. But the rest of the spectators 
were not perturbed. This was all-action fighting and good entertainment." (ibid.) 
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This is the epitome of ' local colour' . A boxmg match one might see in any part of the world, but this is a boxmg 
match in the 'style' of District Six. Picturesque is by definition applicable to the margins, not the centre. It is, in 
the case of District Six, a way of seeing which makes sense of the 'incongruities' which appear from the 
hegemonic 'European' viewpoint. It is thus a mode of valuation. This is expressed in the ' Cameos' article, in the 
notion of 'sentimental moments' (to recap, ".District Six has its sentimental moments too, as he shows."). 
"Sentimental moments" are a form of intimate experience that involve momentary identification in a strongly 
affected marmer. By comparison, an article published in 1953 entitied "the Birth of a baby in District Six" 
(arI6/12I53) is unequivocally bleak: 
"Always the same broken, stinking stairway to climb; the same cramped, airless room; the 
same stale smell of cooking and unbealthy hwnanity; the same questions to tile same weary-
looking women. As she made her way through the foetid streets, no-one molested her.." 
The article is about the experiences of a nursing sister on her rounds of District Six. There is no "local colour" in 
this article, no hint of a vibrant community, just a portrait of despair and gloom in shades of grey. The entire 
attention of the reporter is focused, via the nursing sisters, on "conditions" in District Six, which amount to the 
relativity of "nomtal" physical modes of life. 
When these two types of articles are juxtaposed, the question 'what was District Six like?' produces only 
contradictions. These contradictions are not different aspects of District Six or different opinions, but different 
ways of seeing, and ultimately, different forms of urban imagination characteristic of a specific media practice. It 
is important to realize that tilese different forms of urban imagination are neither part of a single framework nor 
representative of different political opinions, as both these positions would obscure the real significance of the 
media practices in question. Instead, it is necessary to imaginatively find links between these forms of urban 
imagination and the specific political context with which we are concerned. Below I will now consider a few 
articles which deal in more detail with the notion of 'respectability' in relation to District Six, anotiler mode of 
seeing which comprises a more direct form of political judgement. 
RESPECTABILITY AND NOTORIETY 
A key article in the 50's is titied "Once Notorious District Respectable, says CJD. Chief' (arll/7/59). the opening 
paragraph is as follows: 
"The hooliganism which once made Cape Town's District Six a by-word for violence and vice 
and the stamping-ground for skollydom at its worst is flickering out. The district is becoming 
respectable. Police, church and social welfare officers in the once-famous district conlirm this 
trend, which has been noticed over tile last five years." 
Other examples abound In the above-mentioned article on Hanover Street, the following sentence appears; ''The 
higher it climbs, the more respectable it becomes .. " (arI4/4/51). The distinction is a subtle one; in the text of the 
first article the actual criteria which justify the use of 'respectable' are not supplied directly. What is suggested is 
that ' respectability' is linked to an absence of 'vices' such as violent crime, prostitution, public diunkenness and 
73 
social phenomena such as gangs. What is significant about the tenus is that it captures the notion of the ' tone' of a 
neighbourhood, thus allowing the comparison of whole districts. 
By contrast, the adjective 'decent' is applied to individuals (e.g in the series articles and in the above article, 
'''The vast proportion of people living in District Six are decent, law-abiding citizens"'). The notion of ' tone', 
unlike that of ' local colour' or ' the picturesque', is normative in tenus of hegemonic notions of ' respectability' . 
There is a strong sense that 'respectability' is an environment in which 'decent' people can thrive, realize their 
life-goals; in other words, ' respectable' is the term used to describe such an environment. Thus the notions of 
' decent' and ' respectable' are inextricably linked). There is an editorial in the same paper two days later 
(ar13/7/59) on the same subject where the subject of reputation is linked to that of respectability. The editor 
applauds the changes in District Six detailed by the Police Chief. He then makes the suggestion that the name of 
the district be changed: 
"In spite of its change of character, for the seanl3ll and the stranger to Cape Town District Six 
still retains its old reputation. There may be some who will be heard to say that this is just as 
well, because it keeps the curious and the reckless from tempting fate ; but that ignores the 
feelings of those who inhabit District Six. If they are coming up in the world, they should not 
be held back by the burden of a bad name .. " 
(Interestingly enough, a string of letters from "those who inhabit District Six" in the 60's vehemently rejected the 
idea of changing the name of the district.) The implication is that the public image of District Six is an important 
factor in its new-found ' respectability'; in fact, quite a considerable amount of political energy was expended in 
the 60's to improve the image of District Six in the public (read mainly white middle class) eye, as part of an 
attempt to mobilize resistance to its demolition (see for instance ar2212166). The editorial ties the name 'District 
Six' to notoriety so firmly that it is suggested that it would be considerably easier to adopt a new name tll3ll 
overcome the social stigma attached to the old. Towards the end of the 50's issues of ' respectability' became 
increasingly complex, and images of District Six more complex and better founded in fact, partly due to the 
writing of a journalist who actually grew up in District Six. There are certain important continuities which emerge 
again. 
Respectability in this context, is of lise in this analysis on account of its nature as a quintessentially public form of 
judgement, which establishes, more than any other form of judgement in the urban political context, a 
geographical expression (a clear boundary between 'respectable' and 'notorious' areas of the city) of the political 
order of the urban environment as a whole. To use the term in this way is to subscribe to a hegemonic notion of 
'decency'. Beyond this, it has a nonnative function too, as pointed out by tlle editorial referred to above. 
'Respectability' is a criteria for social inclusivity, and is thus a goal for social as well as political or material 
redemption. How then, does 'respectability' constitute a way of seeing, in the urban political context? It is 
primarily dependent on reputation, or in other words, a set of historical narratives which divide the urban 
environment. It does not therefore reside in the experience of an encounter with an urban environment, but with 
the public image of that environment only. A casual encounter with such an environment will provide only 
74 
fragmented images, whereas the reputation of a district is expressive of the district as a whole, as well as being a 
context in which it is possible to make sense of the images encountered in such an encounter. The media play the 
role of validating or invalidating these narratives, which on the one hand critically evaluate the 'respectability' of 
a specific district, and on the other, constitute the notion 'respectability' narratively in the process. 
PORTRAIT OF THE DECENT PERSON 
I will now outline some disconnected articles from the 1960's written by George Manuel, a journalist who grew up 
in District Six. In an article entitled "Their Heritage: Keeping Up With The Whites" (ar22/3(65»,Jhis can be more 
clearly seen. District Six here is portrayed as a site for the realization of 'Coloured' aspiration: 
"The heritage of a large section of Coloured people in the Cape is an upward struggle to attain 
a status of equality with the White people by whose side they have lived for generations. 
Competition with the Whites, rather than among themselves, has formed the background of 
their efforts to rise. Part of this struggle has been to attain a status by acquiring their own 
homes .. " 
In the light of these general observations, the text continues as follows: acquiring this 'independence' is a long 
struggle which consists of scrimping and saving over a period of years, in order to purchase a piece of land, upon 
which, with more saving out of meagre incomes, a house can be build However the Group Areas Act (from now 
on GAA) can remove all of this in a single stroke, thus setting back the family involved to square one, in their 
struggle for independence and dignity, which is precisely the fate of a large proportion of people in District Six: 
"This is part of the record of the Group Areas Act - that people are degraded from economic 
status to one of dependence - is the tragedy of the thrifty, hard-working and self-respecting 
coloured citizen. " 
'Economic status' is a reference to the housing discourse of the time. 'Sub-economic' housing was housing 
subsidized by the crcc or state, the implication being that the residents in such circumstances were not in a 
position to pay an 'economic' rent (one which covered the cost of the house's production and maintenance, etc.) 
This is, according to the reporter, the fate hanging over a number of Coloured homeowners in District Six. - . 
By contrast, another is titled "The Gang Tamer of Hanover Street" (ar24/7/65), and is mainly a narrative profile of 
Mr Nordien Frizlar, the manager of Avalon cinema of 24 years standing. The article is devoted in part to 
explaining the oddities of the cinema (such as that it is equipped with an air-raid shelter due to having been built 
at the beginning of the Second World War, and the origin of its name and current site), but of central interest for 
current purposes is its portrayal of the way in which Mr Frizlar reconciled the running of the cinema with the 
daily realities of District Six. One of these realities was the presence of gangs and other 'trouble-makers', 
including 'dagga smokers', which required considerable decisiveness and ingenuity, and the evolution of a series 
of techniques to maintain order. One of the more amusing anecdotes related by Mr Frizlar is that of a "well-built 
ex-serviceman .... a former sergeant-major" who was employed as a bouncer, who "confessed that he could make 
disciplined soldiers toe the line, but the unruly knifemen were more than he had bargained for"; in contrast, a 
women appointed by Mr Frizlar was more effective in dealing with gangsters than anyone else. Another reality 
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with which Mr Frizlar had to deal v.as the large proportion of the audience who arrived with babies or very young 
children. In response to this problem, Mr Frizlar 
" .. has a staff of ushers who know just how to handle a squa1ling baby. When a mother comes 
along with a crying baby, an usher takes charge and mother goes back to the show. 'There have 
been times when our foyer resembles a creche, but is all part of the service"", try to offer. ' says 
Mr Frizlar. 1I 
In addition, a woman once gave birth to a baby in the foyer of the cinema 
This narrative is of relevance in terms of the principle of order, whereby a central facet of the social life of District 
Six is used as a focus to differentiate elements in the concept 'District Six'. There are two opposing forces in the 
narrative, namely the forces of order epitomized by the cinema manager and his assistants, and the forces of 
disorder epitomized by the gangs and the ungovernable conditions of life. The conduct of the cinema manager is 
cast in an extraordinary light, rather like heroic behaviour during a war, which is why it is particularly interesting; 
the condition for its being good journa1ism is that the conduct of Mr Frizlar (in the context of the conditions of 
District Six) is not that of an 'ordinary' cinema manager. 
Both these articles are more complex than the preceding ones, partly because Manuel writes with an authenticity 
and a feeling about District Six which is lacking in the previous journalism, but the articles still have certain 
formal features in common. As news, the first article has a double-edged import. There is a slightly laconic tone in 
the title's 'Keeping Up With The Whites' overlaying the analysis of a real predicament; the text is clearly an 
insight into the injnstice and frustration caused by the OAA to 'Coloured' aspirations, but there is also a subteX! 
which views this situation with irony. The same applies to the other article. Manuel worked at the cinema in 
question. The form of the article draws on forms in the previous articles (the picturesque, the farniliar-
redemptive), but underneath this there is also the beginning of an authentic urban imagination. 
So far I have used the phrase ' urban imagination' in a general descriptive sense. I will now define it more 
precisely, and add a normative dimension to it. At this point, I would like to outline some key concepts and 
political contexts tlmt will be useful in understanding further the political significance of the above texts. These 
are, the politics of the ordinary, urban imagination, and an exploration of the history and content of urban 
planning in South Africa 
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Chapter Nine 
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE ORDINARY 
INTRODUCfION 
In this chapter I outline a specific political culture which 1 have tenned the politics of the ordinary, which is an 
expression of the political significance of the v.ays of seeing outlined in the previous chapter. The defining feature 
of this political culture is a conception of political judgement characterized hy what I have tenned the ' colonial 
attitude', the reification of 'Europe' into a universal notion of the Ordinary. In relation to District Six, the political 
significance of the modes of seeing outlined above can be perceived hy evaluating them against a fonn of political 
judgement which values the quintessence of a specific urban enviromnent, which I have tenned urban 
imagination. Politically, the discourse of urban planning plays an opposite part in the media coverage of District 
Six, so I consider its specific history in Soutll Africa, and the complex relationship between urban imagination, 
urban planning and the politics of the ordinary as a precursor to tile next chapter, where I will explore the 
representation of the political terrain, the way in which the political process surrounding the razing of District Six 
'MiS represented 
THE POLITICS OF THE ORDINARY AS A POLITICAL CULTURE 
As has been outlined above, a specific media practice can be said to be characteristic of a specific political culture. 
The political culture of which the media coverage in the liberal press is characteristic, I have tenned the politics of 
the ordinary. 
To explain the idea of the politics of the ordinary: traditionally the sphere of human activity that is tenned the 
political has been concerned with greatness, the political virtue par excellance. Even in modernity, the dream of 
the republic and the revolution involve the incarnation of the extraordinary. Existentially opposed to these notions 
is the notion of the everyday, the mundane. That which is great stands out, is contrasted hy, outlined hy, that 
which is merely ordinary. Recall, from the section on the political, Heller's characterization of modernity in ternlS 
ofthe essence of philosophical activity, wherehy philosophy 
" .. has never stopped insisting that what is regarded as truth is not really true, but that 
something else is true; or that what is regarded as just is not just, because something else would 
be more, or even perfectly just." (Heller 1991a:336) 
Philosophy is "realized" in modernity, as people constantly evaluate tile Is of their institutions and social lives in 
tefilS ofnniversalized Oughts; in fact, 
"What has hitherto happened only in philosophy, can and does now happen in political practice 
and life." (Heller 1991a:336) 
She then observes that this striving after universalized Oughts is in fact "the quintessence of the modem political 
dynamic" (ibid., 337). This structure of the notion of greatness is imprinted into the notion of the political from 
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ancient times. Arendt, in her work, The Human Condition, goes so far as to suggest that the chief political 
function of the polis is to remember the great deeds of its citizens. For Arendt, greatness is connected with the 
expression of the essence (the 'who-ness') of the individual through speech and action in the public realm. In 
various traditions of public thought, the notion of essence has been associated with greatness, through the notion 
of realization. Greatness is a matter of contrast and context; what is great in one context is merely ordinary in 
another. Ordinariness, the flow of life, is the background against which greatness emerges. In this context, the 
'politics of the ordinary' seems like a contradiction in terms. The 'politics of the ordinary' is merely the pursuit of 
the ordinary as a political goal. The obvious problem that arises with this conception is that in the case of the 
pursuit of greatness, the ordinary is given as the basis on which the notion of greatness rests. How is it possible to 
pursue the ordinary? How is it that the ordinary can become, in Hellers terms, a politically effective Ought? 
THE POLITICS OF THE ORDINARY AND THE 'COLONIAL ATTITUDE' 
The construing of ' the ordinary' as a politically effective Ought, is, in the context of the removal of District Six, 
linked inextricably to two notions, namely urban planning and what I will refer to as urban imagination. As a 
political image, the ordinary has its seed in the very nature of modernity in the shape of the Grand Narrative itself, 
that is, the concept of the 'normal development' of societies in the pattern of the history of the European nation-
state. But this is not sufficient to imagine a politics of the ordinary, given the ' Grandness' of the narrative. From 
the European perspective, the Grand Narrative is the realization of the fate of the whole of humankind in the 
European nation-state. From the non-European 'European' perspective, the narrative of Europe is the displaced 
vision of the future. I will argue below that the political and social contexts of colonialism as they existed (and 
perhaps still live on) are necessary conditions for the Ordinary to become a politically effective Ought. These do 
not comprise objective social and political conditions, but comprise what I will term the 'colonial attitude' , which 
is not necessarily coincident with the actual experience of colonialism, but comprise a specific political response to 
a colonial or post-colonial situation associated with a displaced 'European' consciousness. 
In this context, ordinariness is projected into a mythical context situated in 'Europe' . Narratives about 'Europe' 
become myths; insofar as narratives are a foundation for the notion of culture, the mythologization of these 
narratives is coupled with the mythologization of the narratives of other cultures (those of 'the Others') also, and 
'culture' becomes a reified category. Under these conditions, Ordinariness is something that is located 'outside' , 
against which even ' ordinary life' can be measured, and judgements formed. Daily life from the perspective of the 
'colonial attitude' is extraordinary; thus the Ordinary becomes a possible political goal. At the same time, the 
external Ordinary becomes reified. Under these conditions, the Ordinary can become a politically effective Ought, 
and thus a form of political judgement, effectively turning the traditiooal political virtue of greatness on its head. 
Thus, at the same time, greatness as a political virtue must disappear within the local political context. For people 
under the spell of the Ordinary, Cape Town cannot be a great city, but only a great 'European' city. Ouce this 
'Europeanness' is realized and surpassed, the Ordinary becomes politically ineffective and so true greatness would 
require a totally transformed political terrain. In any case, a political culture under the spell of the 'Ordinary' 
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cannot realize its 'Europeanness', as 'Europe' itself is reified into a myth; the identity of those who subscribe to 
the 'colonial artitude' is partly their separateness from Europe. The phrase "more English than the English" is a 
typical indication of this phenomenon. 
THE 'COLONIAL A TIlTUDE' AND MODES OF SEEING DISTRICT SIX 
The three main modes of seeing that I have outlined above are the :familiar-redemptive, the picturesque and the 
respectable. The 'essence' of an urban locality is appropriated in the picturesque mode, and is thus located on the 
margins rather than the metropole (one oftlle features of the coverage of District Six are the frequent references to 
District Six containing what is 'unique' to Cape Town). The political and social order, however is located at the 
centre, which colonizes the margins through the familiar-redemptive mode, which, further evaluated through the 
notion of respectability, attempts to universalize the 'ordinariness' of the urban order present at the centre in tlle 
margin. This political inlpulse is not driven by an impulse to realize the essence of the centre universally, or an 
apprehension of such essence as 'universal ' (modernity). There is in fact no 'essence' of the centre in the politics 
of the Ordinary, only a sense of the ordinary. Again, the 'uniqueness' of District Six is contrasted to the 
'ordinariness' of Adderley Street repeatedly: tlle only 'essence' of the Cape Town urban order, its only 
'uniqueness' is perceived in the mode of the picturesque. The political dilemma that arises from these 
contradictory modes of engaging with the urban environment is how to 'redeem' District Six, make it thoroughly 
' respectable' without destroYing its 'essence', its picturesqueness (and thus, of course, its separateness from the 
rest of Cape Town). In order to situate the politics of the Ordinary more clearly in the urban environment, I will 
below outline the concept of urban imagination. 
THE CONCEPT OF AN URBAN IMAGINATION 
To begin, urban imagination can be defined as the capacity to visualize and appreciate the specific phenomena of 
forms ofurban life. As such it comprises a central place in the formation of images of the urban environment, not 
in the sense of literally seeing or experiencing a specific urban environment (the empirical/cognitive faculty), but 
tlle actual process of understanding and making sense of specific urban environments as a whole (faculty of the 
imagination). The urban imagination employs a specific range of concepts which express what is specific in a 
form of life of a specific urban environment, and more broadly, the urban forms of a specific culture. This 
vocabulary is imaginative in that its use is not a matter of empirical application; that is to say, a specific image of 
an urban environment is not inherent in the concrete nature of the environment. This is the condition for the 
urban imagination being a politically important faculty; it is only on account of the thus inherent contestabiJity of 
the urban imagination that the image of the city can be politically contested. Nevertheless, urban imagination is 
not unsubstantive; it is embedded in concrete hUlllan experience, and is embedded inextricably in concrete forms 
of urban life. 
The political significance of the notion of urban imagination is related to Arendt's notion of political judgement, 
after Kant, which emphasizes the faculty of the imagination, the Kantian notion of Einhi/dungskrajl (the power of 
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creating and producing images - see section above on Arendes conoeption of political judgement). This analogy 
requires that we conceive of wban imagination as a form of judgement as well, understood in the mode of 
aesthetic judgement, as a form of 'appreciation' . In common with Kanes notion of aesthetic judgement, the wban 
imagination is dependent on sensibility, and thus, in the language of Kant, a reflective form of judgement (i .e. 
non-cognitive). There are two other properties that ought to be emphasized, the first of which is the notion of the 
exemplary. To refer again to the above section on Arendt, her position on the exemplary W<lS that 
" .. by anending to these events [that possess "exemplary validity that make them of universal 
significance"] in their particularity the historian or judging spectator is able to illuminate their 
universal import and thereby preserve them as an "example" for posterity." (D'Entreves 
1994: 115) 
It is in this ""'y that the faculty of the urban imagination can become politically effective, but there is another 
condition, namely that of 'collUnon sense' that Arendt again dtaws from Kant's critique of aesthetic jndgement. 
This is the expression of a criterion that renders this form of judgement politically relevant. We have seen how 
political judgement according to Arendt is only possible from within the world 'Common sense' is both a 
criterion for the communicability and validity of political judgements. In summruy, the condition under which 
wban imagination is politically effective is when it is constituted as a fonn of judgement, when it is a publicly 
communicative and validatable. In addition, and this is most important, in order for a specific form of wban 
imagination to become politically effective on its own terms, its exercise must provide an account of the 
particularity (essence) of the urban forms under consideration that "is able to illuminate their universal import". 
CRITERIA FOR AN AUTHENTIC URBAN IMAGINATION OF DISTRICT SIX 
In practical terms, one of the characteristics of the recent history of District Six is the cooflicting images, ofwhich 
there are some examples above (we are interested particularly in those that originate from similar 
political/ideological positions). Richard Rive, the well-known author and native of District Six, expresses 
eloquently the problem of 'defining' District Six: 
"Of course, we all knew that it W<lS a slum. Nerone who grew up there will deny that. It W<lS a 
ripe, raw and rotten slum. It W<lS drab, dingy, squalid and overcrowded Years later, I W<lS 
walking up Tennant Street with a group of friends. As we crossed over Caledon Street, one of 
them pointed out the mouldy, ramshackle tenement in which I had grown up. Someone asked, 
I felt almost reproachfully, "Did you come out of that?" 
It is interesting to notice how attitudes towards District Six have changed over the years. Before 
we were forced to go, those who could moved out for reasons of upward social mobility. They 
left for the preferable social c1in13tes of Walmer Estate and Wynberg. The poerer ones in the 
community went to the City and Divisional Council matchboxes on tlle windy Cape Flats. 
Those who remained were by and large those who were unable to go. A few stayed because 
they just preferred to stay where they were. But a slum is never romantic especially for those 
forced to live in it. 
Once we moved we left the past behind and seldom discussed our origins. We did not wish to 
be recognised as someone who had "come out of that". Today, time has sufficiently 
romanticised and mythologised the district's past. It is now a mark of social prestige to have 
"come out of that" ." (Rive 1990: 111) 
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After this slightly laconic reflection on the tendency of contemporary commentators to downplay the brute reality 
of the District Six of his childhood, and even shroud it in a romantic haze, Rive makes a crucial point about the 
media coverage of District Six. He comments on the experience of having seen "pictures of ourselves and our 
mean houses in the local newspapers under urgent and pious appeals for slum clearance" (Rive 1990:111) and 
then expresses incisively what, on the whole, fuiled to appear in the pictures and reports: 
"But what many newspapers fuiled to say, either deliberately or by defuult, was that District Six 
had a mind and soul of its own. It had a homogeneity that created a sense of belonging. It 
became more than a geographically defined area It developed a separate and unique attitude. It 
cultivated a sharp, urban inclusivity, the type which coclmeys have in the East End of London 
and black Americans in Harlem. It was both urban and urbane. It developed a verbal dexterity 
of its own. It cultivated a macabre and biting sense of humour to laugh to keep from crying. 
The graffito at the entrance to this slum proclaimed: "You are now entering fuiIyland". It 
viewed with suspicion and disdain the middle-class values of Walmer Estate and Wittebome. 
Within its boundaries, it practised no form of religious or colour discrintination. There was no 
observable Apartheid since the district was one, big Apartheid. It practised no class 
discrimination since almost everyone there was working class. It insulated itself against the 
outside world which was always threatening it. It was nervously aware of the white world 
which intruded in the form of slum landlords, pious social workers and arrogant policemen. It 
wore a blank mask in the presence of hostile officialdom but dropped all posturing and became 
itself again once the interlopers had left." (Rive 1990: 112, my emphasis) 
I have quoted these two passages as such length to indicate and emphasize the style of Rive's writing. The 
important point for Rive about the contestation of the image of District Six was tllat the debate ought not to 
revolve around the issue of its being a slum or not, of the dreadfulness of conditions, or its salvageability, but an 
appreciation of its uniqueness, encapsulated in the emphasized sentences. He deliberately uses the phrase "mind 
and soul of its own" to express this specific uniqueness, as metaphor for the unique human subject. This is a 
qUintessential exercise of the urban imagination. Rive incisively describes the particularity of District Six, using 
the metaphor 'soul' . He does this, unlike tlle articles considered above, with the full realization of the (not 
unmitigated) awfulness of the place. The use of the metaphor is holistic, it reduces nothing (there is almost no 
language to say what a soul is), which makes it possible to understand the concept 'District Six' politically, as a 
place, a quality, an unanalyzable expression of a specific urban truth. 
THE NATURE AND IflSTORY OF URBAN PLANNING IN CAPE TOWN 
Urban planning, on the other hand, as an abstract discourse, proceeds with an objectively expressible and 
evaluable notion of an 'acceptable' urban environment. The relationship between urban planning as a practical 
discourse, and aspects of South African urban history and geography such as the Group Areas Act, is a complex 
and problematic one. Authors such as Alan Mabin unequivocally establish that the genesis of the GAA, one of the 
cornerstones of Apartheid, was much more complex that has been supposed, and rested fur more on the existing 
practices of racially-motivated urban planning by white-dontinated local authorities than has been supposed by 
orthodox historiographies of Apartheid 
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He makes a clear link between the devolution of urban planning po""rs to local authorities and the development 
of legally enforced segregation, and, more importantly, the point that there was a natural affinity between the 
notion of urban space usage and the racialist perceptions of the 'function' of (non-white) racial-defined 
populations in geographical-class terms in the South African urban environment. For instance, in nM:l newspaper 
articles on the economic impact of the racial zoning of District Six from 1966 and 1969 respectively, such an 
outlook is evident; specifically that "normal" urban growth involves a ring of low-income residential areas around 
the central business district, and that this implies that this area should be zoned non-white (see "City will lose its 
inner ring labour force" (arI8/2166) and "District Six: A Wind of Change" (ar2211169)). 
This kind of race-class logic goes uncontested in the media of the 60's. As Mabin puts it, "In short, planners were 
readily seduced by group areas" (Mabin 1990:31), and earlier, 
''The origins of ' the group' [colloquial expression for the GAA], then, had much to do with the 
creation ofa·method by which comprehensive planning could take place" (Mabin 1990:26). 
In addition, authors such as Swanson (Swanson 1977), have established clear links between aspects of urban 
planning such as health (a crucial aspect of the definition of a 'slum'), and the ghetto-ization of urban black 
populations at the tum of the century and subsequently. Swanson's paper also indicates very clearly how socio-
political issues concerning migrant labour, race, housing and the urban environment were 'medicalized' (to 
borrow a phrase from Foucault) and thus shifted from tlle political arena to the 'objective' and ' scientific' domain 
of medical discourse. Here, the question is not so much the inherently political nature of the discourse of medicine 
in modernity, but the particular constellation of political reality and discourses of subjectification (to borrow 
another). In the case of urban planning, our basic concern is with the function of urban planning as a specific form 
ofurban vision within a specific political situation. Don Pinnock has made tlle stronger claim (Pinnock 1989) that 
urban planning and planners ""re the chief villains implicated in urban forms of oppression wIder Apartlleid and 
its precursors. Pinnock conceives of "two histories" of communities such as District Six, and writes at the 
beginning of a paper on urban planning in Cape Town: 
"What follows is a prelinlinary investigation into the history of only one discourse - that of the 
architects of 'urban renewal ' . The other history belongs to those who lost tlle struggle for urban 
rights .. " (Pinnock 1989: 150) 
In PinnoclCs historical narrative, urban planning in its specific political form in Cape Town in the mid-20th 
century is pitted against what Pinnock terms "the struggle for urban rights". It is necessary to consider this claim 
historically, in order to avoid a general analysis of the general political implications of urban planning, which 
beyond tlle scope of this thesis. I will begin by considering the history of urban planning in this specific situation. 
The widespread and automatic application of urban planning is a relatively new phenomenon, and in fact was 
only introduced into South Africa, primarily from the United Kingdom, in the early part of the 20th century. 
While the need for, for instance, centrally-planned (or at least centrally-coordinated) se""rage systems and water 
supply is not often contested (the question of who is to supply them is), the use of space is frequently contested, 
and tlle functional images of the city so common in urban planning are often called into question politically. As 
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Habennas and others have pointed out, discourses such as wban planning cannot provide grounds for their own 
application; in other words, perceiving the city in teons of use is a basis for wban planning which is not justifiable 
in teons of wban planning. If a specific space has a use, this use must be understood in terms of the larger 
functioning of the city, which must in turn depend on a reified image of urban order culled from the political 
realm. The discourse of wban planning can serve as a language for the mediation of conflicts over the use of 
wban space, but it perfoons this role only under conditions of political consensus concerning the wban order as a 
whole. 
Both Pinnock and Barnett have emphasized the importance of the development of wban planning in the history of 
Cape Town. The specific significance of wban planning in Cape Town is that it is there that it was first fonnally 
introduced into South Afuca (Barnett 1993:116), though as Mabin and others have pointed out, there was also 
great enthusiasm from other urban centres, particularly Johannesburg. Its early history is that of a number of 
amateur enthusiasts (most of which were qualified either as architects or in some cases, responsible for public 
health) eagerly proposing wban planning to wary publics and councils who only later, after the political 
conditions had arisen to accommodate wban planning into the activities of municipal government, invested in 
wban planning as a matter of course (and later as a matter of law). These early enthusiasts had utopian visions of 
what wban planning could accomplish (in common with British reformers of the latter part of the 19th century, 
such as Ebenezer Howard, creator of the 'Garden City' concept), and were even prepared to spend their own 
money building planned wban environments. (e.g. Stuttaford, see Pinnock 1989). 
In 1915, a deputation of the Cape Institute of Architects approached the Improvement and Parks Conunittee of the 
Cape Town City Council with the proposal that a 'complete scheme of development' be drawn up for Cape Town 
and the Cape Flats. Ultimately this proposal was not implemented due to lack of political will, of legislative 
powers and of funding. (Barnett 1993: 117). In 1927, a Town Planning Ordinance was passed. Barnett cites 
pressure from (overwheInringly white middle-class) ratepayers associations as an important factor in the 
introduction of such powers. This ordinance was followed by another in 1934 (partly to remedy legal inadequacies 
in the first Ordinance, and partly to extend to powers of local councils to implement and enforce planning 
schemes), as well as a Slums Act (empowering local councils to declare buildings or areas slums, and eoforce 
their demolition and/or redevelopment). Under the 1934 Ordinance, major wban local authorities had to 
introduce planning, and were compelled to "submit town planning schemes within three years" (Barnett 
1993: 120). This mandatory emphasis on urban planning highlights the ambivalent history of the power of local 
authorities. On the one hand, the introduction of the necessary legal power to enforce planning created the scope 
for a vast extension of the powers of local councils, which had been fur less politically significant before about 
1910 (in this year the Cape Town City Council came into existence after the unification of the various suburbs, 
which had been independent and relatively powerless local authorities until then). On the other hand, however, 
urban planning was increasingly. as Mabin pointed out, a channel for central government interference and 
encroachment on local authorities, culminating in the GAA, whereby the state could, theoretically at least, 
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arbitrarily remove or add whole neighbourhoods to the jurisdiction of local councils via racial zoning. Politically 
speaking, urban problems arising from the modernization of the South African economy, development of 
manufacturing and mining sectors and so forth, were perceived in racial temlS, according to Mabin on account of 
the collapse of ' traditional' or ad-hoc segregation as ""ll as the failure of the United party to provide any plausible 
pelitical alternative. Increasingly, the solution of urban problems through the means of urban planning was 
associated with racial zoning. As a result, 
"As the L TAB [Land Tenure Advisory Board] initiated the process by which group areas 
would be created, planning and planners found themselves at the heart of the process. In some 
cases, group area plruming was considered by municipal planners to form a subset of their 
general activities .. " (Mabin 1990: 26) 
In the case of Cape Town, pelitical pressure for urban planning pewers originated primarily from white middle-
class neighbourhoods seeking pewers to legally prevent the establishment of either industrial areas or new non-
white urban developments in their proximity (see e.g. Barnett 1993). Land use (in urban planning terms) was, 
from the beginning conceived by the white middle class in racial-economic tenns, where working-class / non-
white housing was deemed a 'use' as in Stallard's conception of the 'use' of non-white South Africans in South 
African cities. 
There are several impertant peints of significance concerning the provenance of the pelitical pressure in Cape 
Town for the introduction of urban planning. The urban upper class in Cape Town were geographically isolated 
in most cases from any pcssibility of being subjected to either industry or non-white housing developments on 
their borders, as well as being more mobile (in temlS of buying and selling houses), having access to more ready 
capital. The white middle class (I use the term 'middle class' to embrace the new lower middle class emerging 
from the ' solution' to the 'poor white' problem, at least pelitically if not actually ensconced geographically in the 
area of Greater Cape Town under the jurisdiction of the crCC), on the other hand, first of all, existed in suburbs 
such as Pinelands, which were new developments with a pre-defined racial character (unlike the older, more 
cosmopelitan areas of Cape Town), and second, were rooted (usually with bonds to pay back) in areas surrounded 
by more open space, and thus almost certainly to be considered for the erection of industry or new housing 
developments designated for non-whites. 
However this geographical and economic situation, which explains the keenness for use-zoning and later racial 
zoning, has one proviso, and that is that it is dependent on the development of a white-middle class ideology of 
the 'white city', which is epitomized in its most extreme form by Stallard's dictunl. This notion of the 'white city' 
involved more than simply a racial typing linked with urban segregation, but entailed a complex vision of the 
urban order constructed around the white tniddle-class lifestyle; in other words, a reification of suburbia, with all 
the associated values of the social and intimate spheres. The link bet'Mlen urban planning and the 'white city' 
vision is the notion of function. In an ideal form, this notion amounts to a vision of the whole urban environment 
organized in temlS of the function of perpetuating / reproducing the white middle-class lifestyle, which is both a 
reification and elaboration of the concept of 'whiteness'; urban planning is a technique for the realization of 
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increased or ultimate efficiency of this function. This 'whlte city' view of urban life was articulated on many 
different political levels, including by planners. It is worth considering some of the ideas of the 40's and 50's 
current amongst urban planners, as these are a quintessential expression of some of the less obvious attributes of 
the 'whlte city' . 
URBAN PLANNING AND THE POLITICS OF THE ORDINARY 
Pinnock makes some interesting connections between South African urban planners and the high priest of 
modernism, the architect Le Corbusier. The latte!'s influence on South African notions of urban planning is 
evident from 1938 onwards: 
"Le Corbusian town planning emerged in South Africa with a flourish at the Town Planning 
Congress held In Johannesburg Of the six exhibits on display, four were Le Corbusie!'s .. " 
(Pinnock 1989: 155) 
Le Corbusie!'s notions of urban design were utopian in the extreme, involving the virtual reconstruction of entire 
cities. Very few of his urban plans were actually implemented (see for instance, Muroford's The City in History), 
but he was intellectualJy the inspiration for a generation of planners and architects. His work is characterized by a 
functional extremism; for Le Corbusier, a house is 'a machine for living in'. The 'disorder' of European cities 
with histories stretching back to ancient times had to be replaced by a formal 'geometric' structure to meet the 
challenges of modem economies, to remedy' dying' cities tom apart by '''the ruthless violence of private interests'" 
(quoted in Pinnock 1989:154). Le Corbusie!'s violent urban designs can be seen as a reaction to the effect of the 
uncontrolled individualist free enterprise of 19th century capitalism on the urban landscapes of Europe, as well as 
a progressive articulation of the utopian politics of the modernist movement (Pinnock characterizes the avant-
garde of modernism as the aesthetic articulation of emerging monopoly capitalism. The question is more complex 
than this, whlch is partly testified to by the popularity of these ideas, far beyond their life in the West, behind the 
Iron Curtain). The Third World proved ideal ground for such discourse, given the space available coupled with 
rapid urbanization. The only city that Le Corbusier designed and actually built was the new capital of India, 
Chandigarh, whlch 
" .. came to be seen as 'a tragedy .... a city designed for automobiles in a country where many, as 
yet, still lack a bicycle.'" (Pinnock 1989:154). 
AJphaville, Godard's modernist nightmare referred to above, is a good fictional incarnation of a totally 
implemented Le Corbusian city. 
URBAN PLANNING AND THE IDEAL OF THE COLONIAL SUBURB 
At the Town Planning Congress of 1938, with its strongly Le Corbusian emphasis on utopian mass destruction 
and reconstruction of the urban enviromnent (Pinnock quotes Le Corbusier as saying, '" Surgery must be applied 
to the city's centre. Physic must be used elsewhere. We must use the knife .. "' , whlch he comments, must bring to 
mind the GAA), Pinnock comments that 
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"The spirit of the congress was unambiguously colonialist. Introducing the Cape Town plans, 
Norman Hanson [planner who enthusiastically promoted the doctrines of urban planning and 
architectural modernism in South Africa in the 30's] observed: 
' National sentiment fixes Cape Town as the focal point of South African history and character. 
White civilization gained its first hazardous foothold on that southern peninsula and from there 
it has spread in successive waves into the great hinterland. The atmosphere and character that 
time alone can create can be sensed where man established himself along the sculpturesque 
lower slopes of Table Mountain.' .. 
.. 'We must concentrate our first activities at the city's centre, so that freedom of movement., 
accessibility and breathing space can be restored where they are vital. It is possible to achieve 
this radical re-organization by drastic methods only, by a fresh start on cleared ground. 
This ruthless eradication directed toW<lfds a re-vitalization process we have, following Le 
Corbusiet's lead, narned the Surgical Method .... through surgery we must create order, through 
organization we must make manifest the spirit of a new age .. '" (Quoted in Pinnock 1989: 156) 
There is one more passage of note which Pinnock quotes from Le Corbusier concerning suburbia; 
'''The suburb .... is a kind of sewn churning against the walls of the city, the abode of an 
unsettled population enmeshed in numerous afilictions.'" (Quoted in Pinnock 1989: 154) 
A noteworthy quality of Hanson's speech is the sense of claustrophobia in his plea for "breathing space" in the city 
centre, characteristic of the imperial impulse for lebensraum. The colonial tone that Pinnock comments on is 
central to modernity; the desire to be rid of the ' decaying past' so eloquently expressed by avant-garde movements 
such as the Futurists. However in a colonial context there was no rejection of the suburb in practice, but on the 
contrary, its exultation . The Garden City (I.e Corbusier referred to his utopian high-rise cities as 'vertical Garden 
Cities') in the South African context (in its first and archetypal incarnation, Pinelands) becomes the White Suburb, 
free of non-whites and Jews. The belief in the universality of the suburban environment was so powerful 
(notwithstanding Le Corbusiet's denunciation) that in a paper for the National Building Research Institute (set up 
by the CSIR to research 'low-cost' [i.e. non-white] housing in 1946), P.H.Connel wrote that 
"There is a tendency of the Native to imitate the white man's form of dwelling when he comes 
into permanent proximity with European settlements. A general trend such as this would seem 
to indicate a distinct preference on the Native's part for the type of house characteristic of the 
more advanced culture. 
Up to the present, the form of dwelling universally preferred by Europeans in this country has 
been tile single-story detached house standing in a separate plot, each with a front garden, back 
garden or backYard and two narrow strips of ground on each side giving access from front and 
back Tlris is the picture which the native has in his mind when he thinks of 'progress' in terms 
of his dwelling. Second, there remains the old tradition of the separate hut which is the typical 
Native way of building. ... the tradition of the isolated structure remains, and tends to reinforce 
rather than retard the observed preference of the typical European style of home. 
From the foregoing it will be seen that the action of the local authorities in casting the location 
in the same mould as the European suburb is reasonably in accordance with the observed 
tendencies and preferences of the urban Native .. " (Quoted in Pinnock 1989: 167) 
Besides the imperial claim to ' know' the ' urban Native' , what is of drief interest here is the way that 'European 
culture' is portrayed. What is notable about European cities is the variety of social foffilS of housing. very few of 
which are suburban in the sense described above (The United Kingdom is an exception here, but even in London, 
detached houses are not all that common). What the author is referring to, both wben be speaks of the preferred 
housing of 'Europeans' or 'the white man' , and the 'preferences' of ' the Native' , in cultural terms, is the colonial 
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white middle-class suburb, whose particularity bas its roots specifically in its colonial nature, not in its European 
root (besides South Africa, the countries that spring to mind immediately as paragons of the suburban form are all 
colonial societies, namely Australia, the United States and Canada). The condition of suburbia is well summed up 
by Mollison in a discussion ofland use in the Australian suburb: 
''The condition is peculiar to the British landscaping ethic; what we are really looking at here is 
a miniature British country estate, designed for people who had setvants. The tradition bas 
moved right into the cities .. " (Mollison 1991: 105-6) 
The colonial suburb is a parody of the English Country House, with all its aspirations of class and individual 
status. 
Politically speaking, the most fruitful way to interpret Connel's passage is as an image of the ideal form of the 
South African city. The writer makes it very clear that the suburban form is not only that 'preferred by Europeans 
in this country' but also sought after by the 'Native' . Furthermore, the suburban form is historically rooted in "the 
typical Native way of building", "the old tradition of the separate hut". This set of syllogisms has two corollaries; 
first, the hegemony of 'Europeans' , and secondly the continuity from ancient times into the future of a frozen form 
of 'Native culture', that precluded the development of, for instance, the kind of specifically urban vibrancy of 
Sophiatown, which was anything but suburban. One of the characteristics of this and later Apartheid thinking was 
the denial that 'the Native' could have an essentially urban existence. 'Natives' like the inhabitants of 
Sophiatown, who developed a uniquely urban culture, were regarded as having been 'corrupted'. The suburban 
form is thus portrayed as the South African urban form par excellance, the form most suited to all South Africans. 
This belief in suburbia as an archetypal form of life is the dividing point between the utopian fantasies of the Le 
Corbusian planners and substantive urban political developments. Pinnock is slightly mistaken in his analysis at 
this point; his essay is ambiguous on tile actua1 influence of tile architects of the 40's which he explores in such 
detail, and the actua1 material development of the urban geography of Cape Town. He draws a strong comparison 
between the ruthless, undemocratic technicist visions ofLe COIuusier, and the implementation of the GAA, and is 
on the verge of suggesting that the proponents of modernism and the political formations of tile National Party 
were equal impetus to Apartheid; that understanding the urban environment in extreme-functional tefUlS and 
dognlalic-racialist tefUlS contributed to the same political result. There is no questioning of the fact that Apartheid 
is essentially a Modem social formation, but in tenns of the inunediate concerns of this thesis, I will suggest an 
alternative interpretation. The first problem lies with Pinnock's notion that modernist planning trends of the above 
type are just a reflection of trends in monopoly capital worldwide. This tells us nothing specific about the political 
culture(s) that specifically crystallised into Apartheid, and this is the central concern in this context. In addition, 
Pinnock does not explain the mechanism, political or otherwise, connecting Le Corbusian urban planning with 
the destruction of District Six, or the conditions under which it could have had an influence. I have chosen a 
different approach, whereby I propose that the specific political context of District Six can best be understood by 
reference to another comment of Pinnock's: 
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"In the 1930's Cape Town w.lS (despite the urbane pretensions of its white elite) a Third World 
city at the foot of Africa." (Pinnock 1989: 150). 
In other 'Mlrds, modernism in the South African context has to be understood in terms of the colonial nature of 
South African politics; as a parody. 
THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN URBAN FORM 
Here tbere is a crucial distinction to be made be~n 'ideology' and politics. A specific content, i.n this case Le 
Corbusier, has a specific political and 'ideological' significance at its moment of birth, but this is not to imply that 
it is intrinsically imbued with it. Rather than understanding the popularity of Le Corbusier in South Africa as an 
attempt by white South Africans to build a modem European (or 'first 'Mlrld' , a mucb later term) city, one must 
rather begin from the observation that the "pretensions of its white elite" are precisely what was specifically South 
African. Tbe political culture that expressed itself in a fondness for Le Corbusier, in other 'Mlrds, must be 
understood not as a product of ''Mlrldwide monopoly capital' , but as a specific crystallization of certain trends in 
the narratives of South African, and specifically Cape history. 
The South African urban geograpber A J. Christopher argues convincingly for the point of view that urban form 
in South Africa is best understood in ternlS of the development of what he refers to as the 'colonial city' 
(Christopher 1983). He draws on a wide range of comparisons be~n cities in colonial or necrcolonial contexts, 
specifically ex-British-colonial contexts beginning with the Welsb city, Flint. He notes that 
"On the basis that colonization and imperialism involve the interaction of different cultural 
groups, English colonization has been consistent in its resistance to any degree of integration." 
(Christopher 1983: 147) 
He continues, 
''The origins of urban segregation and allied urban structures appear to have been finnly rooted 
in the English experience as the dominant urban element and influence upon politics in South 
Africa be~n 1806 and 1948. Indeed little break in policy is apparent in 1948 when the 
present Afrikaner Nationalist government came to po""r .. " (Christopher 1983: 147) 
He comments on the last page tltat, 
"It may be argued that the colonial city, whether British, French or Russian, had features in 
common which create a distinctive urban type .... A case may be argued for the Apartheid city, 
as it has evolved in South Africa, to be but one of the variants of the more widely distributed 
colonial city .... The influence of the rural settlement frontier and the Afrikaner nation on the 
origins of this development is subordinate to the major input of English colonialism. The latter 
is a part of a shated heritage of northern and eastern European expansion as a whole, based 
upon an urban perspective of society .. " (Christopher 1983: 148) 
Christopher's 'Mlrk is valuable in that he makes a convincing case for the development of a specific urban form 
under the social, cultural and political conditions of European, and specifically BritishiEnglish colonialism, thus 
definitively differentiating the 'colonial city' from the European city. 
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DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE 'COLONIAL ATTITUDE' 
It is important to distinguish between two different possible conceptions of the notion ofa 'colonial attitude' . The 
first is to conceive of a ' colonial attitude' being a mindset of people who are ' really' Europeans, looking at the 
world through European eyes, attempting to 'reconstruct' parts of Europe in various parts of the colonial or neo-
colonial world. Another conception is one which characterizes a specific discourse in South Africa (I will not 
reflect on the occurrence of the ' same' phenomenon elsewhere), in which the constellation of references to 
'Europe' (mythologized, in Barthes' sense) fonns an integral part of a specific political culture; not only this, but 
the 'colonial attitude', instead of being conceived as a ' European' (i.e. alien) phenomenon, is the quintessence of a 
local political culture; in other words, the ' colonial attitude' is a uniquely local product. This second conception is 
more useful and significant in a nwnber of important ways. First, the idea of ' European' identity, which appears 
as some sort of ' internal essence' in the first conception, appears as a political fact in the second, which 
immediately transfonns the whole question of identity from a mysterious internal quality into a political quality 
that is amenable to analysis, understanding and critique, and above all, it becomes possible to understand the 
problem of identity politically. Identity becomes part of the world, not the ' nature' of the ' individual ' . Second, 
instead of, as in the first conception, the ' colonial attitude' being a phenomenon that is rooted in 'Europe', as it 
""re, ' projected' onto Europe, it is conceived as an integral part of a specific political culture. 
Once this is apparent, again, the category of 'Europe' does not 'refer' to a place, a ' culture' or a form of life, but to 
a complex historico-political situation, and above all to a political state of affirirs. Thus, again, instead of 
mistaking the 'colonial attitude' for an alienated European sensibility, it appears as a specifically South African 
political attitude, part of a specifically South Africa political culture. By this I am not attempting to deny here that 
this phenomenon does not occur elsewhere (or deny that a comparative study might reveal valuable patterns), but 
wish to emphasize the advantages of conceiving it as a local phenomenon for the purposes of political 
understanding. Each act of political understanding is dependent on a specific context; the emphasis on the local is 
important if the results of such understanding are to make plain anything meaningful about South African 
political life. In the context of a politics of the ordinary, as outlined above, the Ordinary becomes effective in 
relation to a ' colonial attitude'. Under such conditions, politically, the scientific aspects of urban planning, the 
aspects that generate ideal images of the urban environment, undergo a specific transformation. From being the 
result of the cnlmination of a specific urban culture, the ' ideal conditions of urban life' cease to have a political 
context, namely the history of urban culture in a specific context, and are transformed into abstract ' objective' 
qualities which become the epitome of the ' ordinary'. Urban plamting in this specific political context can be 
conceived of as the ' science of the ordinary' . By this several things are implied, namely that urban plamting as a 
discourse is a language in which it is possible to speak of the ordinary as a universal goal, as it frames specific 
cultural assumptions (e.g. the conditions of life embodied in the middle-class suburb, coupled with a 
mythologization of 'Europe') in objective tenns, tenns unattached to any political context, but considered sub 
species aetematis, as if from outside the world. Where urban plamting discourses are referred to in the media 
ooverage of District Six, ' facts ' are often bandied about such as the ' optimum popnlation density' of an ' ideal ' 
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residential area; this is its 'scientific' cemponent. It is also a technology of the ordinary, as it provides a mode of 
analysis of urban areas which establishes methods for the achievement of the ' ideal'. 
This 'world1essness' of urban planning in the context of the politics of the ordinary is ideally expressed in the anti-
urban imagination of the followers ofLe Cotbusier, whose greatest ambition was to replace the 'accidental layout' 
(read historical-political expression of urban fonn) of the city with a 'fonnal' layout; an urban fonn that has no 
specific historical-political centent. This highlights another aspect of the above choice of conceptions of the 
'colonial attitude'. The seduction of the supposed lack of history of the celonial environment, ceupled with the 
utter hostility toward history as a cultural fonn on the part of the South African ruling class (both on behalf of 
Apartheid and 'liberal ' historiography), and the resultant favouring of the mythological, ultimately supports the 
seccnd cenception. What the effect of the appropriation of the discourse of urban planning to the politics of the 
ordinary is, is to effective render the faculty of the urban imagination politically ineffective; in other words, to 
render an authentic urban politics impossible. In terms of urban imagination, when people look at, for instance, 
District Six, they, instead of bothering to invent or explore language-games that capture what is uniquely valuable 
(I use the word here in its original sense, namely render capable of valuation, to capture the 'soul'), they look for 
features that are recognizable in terms of the science of the ordinary as a basis for ccgnitive judgements, which by 
definition are non-political (see section on political judgement). In the next chapter, I will show how urban 
planning enters, and partly defines, the political terrain. 
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Chapter Ten 
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL TERRAIN 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this section is to explore the way in which the issue of the removal of District Six was represented in 
the liberal media. I have used the phrase 'political terrain' to indicate the image of the political process so 
represented, the background against which specific political positions were situated As specific political positions 
do not exist autonomously, such a representation is a means to make sense of individual positions, to situate them 
in the whole. The aim of doing this is to gain a clear idea of the structure of the politics of the ordinary, so as to 
situate it in the hroader context of South African politics of the period. 
THE PRIMARY DICHOTOMY 
I will begin by considering two articles published in the Cape Times within four days of each other, which I have 
taken as indicative of the political terrain, representing the range of opinion and its portrayal. This representation 
of the political terrain is best expressed as a conflict between central goverrunent ideologues such as the Minister 
of Community Development, and the local Cape Town ruling estahlishment, including the crce, about what 
was 'to be done' about District Six. The media practice in question stretches the political terrain between them, 
mediating accusations and counter-accusations, investigating their content and testing claims and counter-claims. 
In addition to this representation forming a hasis for debate via letters, feature articles and editorials, it also fornlS 
the political terrain against which mere reports of events surrounding the removal are rendered politically 
meaningful. The particular structure of this representation can best be described by the analogy, from 
psychoanalysis, of projection. 
THE REPRESENTATION OF APARTHEID 
The first article is written by a certain Joyce Waring, both a politician in her own right (a former councillor in 
Johannesburg, former United Party member, and at the time a member of the National Party), and the wife of a 
Nationalist Cabinet Minister (the Minister of Information at the time), and is titled "District Six compared with 
Sophiatown" (ct24/2166). The article comes in the form of a very long letter, and its aim is to attack the opponents 
of the removal of District Six by using the removal of Sophiatown as an example of a ' sucoessful ' clearance of a 
'slum' , and a triumph of political will against the selfish sentimental spinelessness of the United Party, the press 
and 'liberals' in general. She portrays the National Party as a decisive political force which is prepared to take the 
political risks necessary for the redemption of South Africa's cities. 
Her portrayal of the Sophiatown removal is of a strong central government grasping the nettie and overriding a 
weak local authority who both did not have tile moral courage to demolish the 'slum', as well as having vested 
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interests in its continuation (via the representation of rack-renting landlords on the Johannesburg council). Her 
portrayal of the SophiatOWll removal is astonishing to readers of today for its blatant fictional quality: 
"Unfortunately for them [rack-renting landlords] in Johannesburg, in spite of the dramatic 
posturing of Father Huddleston and the liberals and the feeble cries of outraged United Party 
councillors and Rand MPs, a Nationalist Party government, with Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of 
Native Affuirs, took action, razed Sophiatown, and moved an exulting - yes, I repeat exulting -
African population to Meadowland, to decent homes with running ""ter, se""rage, lights, 
gardens, schools, clinics and cburches. 
I attended some of these removals, as did an eager and bloodthirsty Press, local and overseas, 
who waited for "the blood to flow". What did they see? African women singing and dancing 
with joy at moving from tlus ghastly place - African women still not eligible for removal 
begging to be taken amy to the IInew place". 11 
No-one would now seriously believe that the population of Sophiatown "rejoiced" in their removal, or wanted to 
be forcefully removed at all, for that matter. Shortly afler this, she makes another series of startling claims: 
"It is all very ",,11 for a ""ll-fed ""ll-housed Coloured leader or business man, who owns his 
own property, to hold forth on this "tragedy of the Coloured people", but what of the mothers 
who see their sons become skollies, their daughters prostitutes, their baby children thieves and 
hooligans, filthy and lousy because the street is the only playground, the water doesn't run, the 
privy is overflowing and derelict and children see and hear their parents drinking and 
fonnicating, doing the only things left in a slum for the poor to enjoy. Are they not entitled to a 
new start, another chance? Or is sentiment going to keep them in a slum?" 
She identifies her opponents (i.e. those who oppose the demolition of District Six and the removal of its non-white 
inhabitants) as "sentimentalists" (by which she means "do-gooders" who do superficial things like hand out 
blankets instead of tackling the heart of the problem), "vote-seekers" (people who oppose the removal merely to 
score political points against the government), and "fat and smug landlords" (who oppose the removal to salvage 
their extortionist income). She applauds the demolition of another "Coloured slum" in the Cape, Windermere, in 
quite chilling tenms: 
"Do you remember Windermere? Do you remember bishops, archbishops, parsons, liberals and 
""l1-mearting do-gooders wailing over the desecration of this "lovely fairyland" where "happy 
little Coloured children" played in dirt and filth and provided fabulous local colour for the 
overseas Press? Where has that fairyland gone? Disappeared, thank God, under the crushing 
""ight of the bulldozer and those former unhappy slum dv.ellers now live in deoent Council 
houses - houses the government forced the Council into building." 
Here is a vision of strength, decisiveness in the face of decay and degradation. She attacks one of her political 
opponents who has objected to the zoning of District Six by accusing him of responsibility (during his time as a 
Cabinet Minister) for a number of slums, including District Six. She claims that 
"Complacency, sentiment and the fear of the Progressive supporters in his party held him and 
his party back .. .I know - I was there, a member of a council too lazy, too frightened, and with 
too many vested interests to take action over Johannesburg's African slums." 
She ends the letter with the sentiment that everyone involved in the debate on the future of District Six should 
" .. stop being sentimental. Sentiment is cheap, easy and wasteful. A blanket is a stop gap. But a 
deoent home is a bulwark against communism." 
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The key passages for the liberal press and the crcc were, surprisingly, not those on the ' success' of the 
Sophiatown removal, but those attacking the United Party and the crcc for ' spinelessness' and ' inaction'. This 
letter was published three days after a feature article on District Six written by an urban planner, and could well 
have been in response to it. I will outline the gist of the other article further below, first I will consider some of the 
responses to the Waring article. 
RESPONSES TO WARING 
There were several response from readers and the crcc following the publication of Joyce Waring's article. 
There are three articles that are worthy of consideration. 
Two of them deal with the response of the crcc, who were so alarmed by the charges of irresponsibility, 
negligence and political cov.ardice levelled against them, that they "agreed by 25 votes to six to issue a reply to 
Mrs. Waring's letter" (ar2512166). On the 2812166, an article of considerable size appeared in which a detailed 
statement of rebuttal from the crcc was printed (apparently in full) with a short introduction. The statement 
details the various efforts made by various councils, painstakingly spelling out the facts of the wrangle between the 
government and the crcc about rehabilitation and low-cost housing in Cape Town. The other response is in the 
fonn of a letter with disproportionately large headlines, from Lady Joy Packer (author and prominent Cape 
personality), titled "Coloured in a world of constant insult". It is worth quoting from at length: 
"We are all in favour of slum clearance, no matter what our politics may be, and if the 
govenunent has decided to "clean up" District Six, I cannot imagine there would have been any 
agitation against the plan. The "completely unfounded agitation" is against tile resettlement of 
Whites in what had been traditionally accepted as a Coloured area The Coloured people, who 
should be regarded as our friends and our responsibility, live in a world of diminishing security. 
Even in their homes they are vulnerable .. Culturally, they have given us the pride of our city, 
the Eoan group, with its excellent musical productions and artistic achievements, and their 
rev.ard is constant insult and steady whittling away of the rights to share White cultural 
offerings, even the ageless universal inspiration of Shakespeare in the sylvan setting of 
Maynardville .. " (ct5/3/66) 
One notable feature ofthis 'debate' (Mrs Waring does not reply, or her reply is not printed) is that no respondent 
takes up tlle comparison with Sophiatown introduced by Waring. 
The fact that her argument rests on what must really be described as a fantastic vision of the Sophiatown removal 
and its consequences, is not raised at all . The central issues are the conduct of the liberal Cape establishment 
(including the crcc and journalists) and that of the nationalist government. Again, in Packe~s letter, the 'us' 
and ' them' tenninology occurs strongly, especially in the sentiment that "the Coloured people" should "be 
regarded as our friends and our responsibility". In this text, Kipling's 'White Man's burden' is spelt out in the 
context of an appeal to tradition. Tradition is a strong theme in the discourse of the racial order in the Cape. In an 
article dated 1011169, the headline reads "District Six Coloureds are bitter but resigned - Move from traditional 
home closer" (arl0/1/69), and begins, "The grim reality for thousands of Coloured people from their traditional 
home in District Six has come inexorably closer .. " There is a clear distinction drawn between the 
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unreasonableness and resultant inhumanity and injustice of Apartheid and the 'traditional', pragmatic and 
reasonable racial order that constituted the Cape Town social order. Apartheid in this light was not construed as 
the entrenchment of archaic racial attitudes, but on the contrary, a political ideology that was umwveringly hostile 
towards the past (which of course it was). 
The position is summed up in an editorial in the Cape Argus dated 10 January 1969 which is a panegyric against 
the razing of District Six. The last section reads 
"District Six is a slum which must be cleared ... Would have been cleared a long time ago if 
the City Council had been allowed to proceed logically instead of ideologically. The 
announcement last night that the hovels will be razed and an expertly planned renewal and 
redevelopment scheme implemented comes none too soon, therefore - and it is still not too late 
to plead for a change in Group Areas schedules for this area. Let there be 'flats, duplex 
residential units and single dwelling units' . Let it ' portray harmony with the cultural-historic 
climate of the Mother City' as the Minister suggests [quotes from a statement released the 
previous evening by the Minister of Community Development]. Let there be open piazzas, and 
courtyards, and playgrounds ... And let the elite of the Coloured people live there. Let them 
build a community out of the bones of the existing District Six, create something new out of the 
old churches, mosques, narrow streets and established meeting places. Such a suburb would be 
as colourful as Madeira without its vice, as gay as Rio without its filth .. .. To build an exclusive 
Coloured suburb in place of the slum would also provide Apartheid with a showcase to the 
world. Moreover, it is time the community thought of posterity, not its pocket." (my emphasis) 
(This last statement is actually wrong - the rewning and subsequent purchase of property, etc. cost both the 
govermnent and the crcc a vast sum of money in both land appropriation and lost rates.) These paragraphs, 
ending with their appeal for what one could term' Apartheid with a hmuan face' , represent the culmination of the 
debate of the 50's on the future of District Six, the last paragraph in particular suggests a form of social 
engineering familiar to students of Apartileid. As most of the inhabitants of District Six could for all intents and 
purposes not be regarded as part of "the elite of the Ccloured people" (these, if we are to understand the word in 
class terms, had, according to Rive and others, done their best to move out of District Six), and so the editorial, 
official point of view of one of the key institutions of Cape liberalism, effectively advocates the removal of most of 
the residents of District Six as a humane alternative to Apartheid. 
The strong sense of indignation at the injustice of the wning of District Six as a white area is not focused on the 
fate of individuals but on the fate of the "Ccloureds" as a whole. The redemption (read ' demolition and mass 
removal of the majority of the population') of District Six is thus the redemption of three things; the ' Coloured' 
population via their 'elite' (in racial terms, the best that the 'Coloureds' could produce), the humanization and 
redemption of Apartheid, and the saving of the conscience of White South Africa. In another paragraph it is stated 
that 
"This plea is made in the interests offatr play, in the interests ofthe Coloured people generally, 
and in the interests of White South Africa generally." 
All this is merely to situate the ' opposition' in terms of the issues of race, urban rights and the fate of areas such as 
District Six. I will now consider the second above-mentioned article. 
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THE PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVE 
Another article printed three days before the Waring article, is entitled, "District Six Fits City Development" 
(ct21 /2166). The article is written by a 
" .. Cape Town-born urban designer, who has studied urban developments on three continents 
and has recently done research on District Six." 
Her central argument is based on a specific urban planning discourse (broadly defined as the 'ecological' 
conception of urban geography - see McCarthy and Smit, 1984) which she outlines in the first two paragraphs: 
"Witll the proclamation of District Six as a White area, a major change has been proposed in 
the use of an important part of Cape Town. As a city grows, the different aspects of its life such 
as residence, commerce or industry become associated with specific areas best suited to their 
needs. Therefore the gradual emergence of a characteristic pattern in the use of land is a 
natural urban process. As such, any artificial change in that pattern will inevitably affect the 
fuoctioning of the entire city. Consequently a change in the use is only warranted when the 
reasons for its location have lost their validity." 
The argument that follows is meticulous; District Six began as a "low-income residential area"; light industry 
grew up around it, upper and middle classes moved to the suburbs. District Six is fuoctional as a low-income area 
as its residents do not have to pay costly transport costs. Furthermore, there is no pressure for expansion of the 
CBD being exerted on District Six, on account of the Foreshore development. In terms of residential space, high-
density accommodation is developing in localities such as Sea Point, and in any case, "District Six has few of the 
attributes associated with a desitable residential envirorunent", due to the fact that it is "adjacent to residentially 
obnoxious uses" such as warehousing and industry; "major roads surround it", including the Eastern Boulevard, 
which will cut right through the middle of the district. In addition, "wind conditions are very bad and vegetation is 
virtually non-existent", and the "stigma" attached to the area "for generations will take time to eliminate", 
On the other hand, Naude argues, District Six serves its purpose of providing working-class housing admirably. 
Further: 
"As tile least desirable area, only the lowest income groups live there for lack of choice. In 
Cape Town the lowest wage earners are exclusively non-white. Development of District Six for 
White habitation will serve no purpose because areas of greater envirorunentaJ potential already 
exist. High land values due to proximity to the city would necessitate high densities .. It is 
doubtful that this number of low-income Whites could be made to move to the district where 
they would benefit neither from proximity to the industries employing primarily Coloureds, nor 
from improved envirorunental conditiotlS.lI 
She adds that dislocation of entire communities has been shown to lead to social disintegration, and, anlongst 
other things, higher crime rates. In addition, "had the land been too valuable for occupation by a sulreoonomic 
group, pressure to replace this use would have been felt" . She addresses the causes of the "slurn-ness" of District 
Six, pointing out that population density does not in itself create slums (Seapoint having a higher density than 
District Six): 
"What makes District Six a slum is the fact that high density is achieved within structures 
designed to accommodate less titan one quarter of the population. " 
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She expends some space outlining the reasons for the degeneration of District Six, such as "non-coloured 
ownership", neglect by landlords, poverty and so forth, and concludes with the sentiment that 
'There is nothing wrong with District Six that comprehensive urban renewal cannot remedy. 
The reasons for its existence have not lost their validity, if anything, they have been 
strengthened by the expansion of light industry and central activities. Urban renewal, through 
good design, can raise the density to correspond to rising land values and can thereby provide 
an expanding economy with the labour it requires." 
MAKING SENSE OF THE POLITICAL DEBATES 
In an article from the Cape Times (10/1169), a verbatim report of a statement from the Minister of Community 
Development, the Minister comments that 
"With a view to its special situation on the slopes of Table Mountain, in close proximity to the 
central city, the beautiful view and the attractive scenery, as also its original utilization in the 
early years for the purposes of a good residential area for Whites, before its gradual 
deterioration into slunlS, the best contribution which can be demanded from the area in the 
interests of community development is the establishment of economic housing of a relatively 
high standard therein .. " 
The statement is an archetypal document of Apartheid; it sets out the logic of rezoning District Six, the 
government vision for the future of the area, and the projected process oftransforrnation that it is due to undergo. 
What is relevant about the above passage is that, besides the implication that District Six is to be reconstructed for 
white habitation, the reference to its historical origins ("its original utilization in the earlier years for the purposes 
of a good residential area for Whites .. ") is identical to cornman trends in the liberal media in the 50's. In addition 
to this similarity, it has already been pointed out that there were astonishing parallels between planning discourse 
(linked to 'liberal' Councils) and the GAA, between the political-perceptual mechanisms of the liberal media and 
those necessary for the conception and implementation of the GAA. These patteITlS are not coincidental, and the 
reasons for this can be found in a careful consideration oftbe above material. 
Waring's article establishes some groundrules which are followed by the ensuing debate closely; there are two of 
note. The first of these is the array offorces: there are only two parties to the debate, namely the National Party on 
one side and everyone else on the other. 'Everyone else' has already been detailed above, ranging from the United 
Party to ' liberals' to ' landlords'. The second of these folio"", on the first and defines the nature of the debate as 
one concerning the political nature of the key political groupings. There is an echo in this typing of British 
political culture; a parody of the two-party system, of the Prime Minister in Question Time casting aspersions on 
the Opposition. Waring's strategy is to cast her opponents as, for whatever reason (misguided sentiment, political 
manipulation or cruel vested interests) without political integrity or will. This establishes most of the basic 
conditions for the representation of the political terrain in the liberal media This is confirmed by the emphases of 
the responses to Waring's letter. From then until the late 60's, prominent members of the ' opposition' are at pains 
to refute these charges, until finally in 1969 an ex-mayor was reported at length somewhat lamely emphasizing 
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that "City's District Six plan was to aid Coloured" (ct7/2169). Another notable series of reports around April 1965 
details an exchange between P. W. Botha (then Minister of Community Development) and various members of the 
United Party and the crcc along the sarne lines: one of the main stories is titled "City Council making a fool of 
itself, says Botha" (ar2J4/65). This exchange also had a slightly funtastic aura about it, as it involved Botha 
accusing the crcc of 'inaction' after he had virtually cocooned them in a v.clJ of complex regulations which 
prevented any action on their part without a decisive political initiative (which did not seem within their repertoire 
at the time). 
What then, in all this, is the significance of the Naude article? The first thing to note is tlllll it is not self-
consciously ' political' ; that is, it does not place itself politically, which increases its political significance 
markedly. It is an example, of which there are many in tlle 60's, of the public use of wban plarming. In political 
terms, its significance concerns the rational consideration of the problem of District Six, and specifically tlle 
government decision to zone it 'white'. It is interesting to note that the argument in the article does not operate 
outside the Apartheid vision; it merely suggests that it would be more useful to zone the area ' coloured' for 
reasons related to moon land use (based on the sarne race / class assumptions that characterize both planning 
discourse and media coverage of the time). 
The bigger picture, of which this article is a part, is that following the pattern of the reasoning of the Waring 
article, another feature of the political terrain is the image of a stubborn National Party acting for ' ideological' 
reasons, opposed to practically everyone else, who are united by their 'logical ' approach to the problem. There 
were two main areas in which the National Party was attacked over the zoning of District Six and its subsequent 
removal. The first was the above-mentioned action for 'purely ideological' reasons in the face of what was 'clearly 
the sensible alternative', and the second was the matter of justice, or as it was more often expressed, 'conscience'. 
Both these areas of contestation can be understood in terms of a single phenomenon, which I will term 
'projection' in analogy to a phenomenon identified first by Freud in the discourse of psychoanalysis. Before 
considering the details of this, I will briefly review the issue of ' conscience'. 
THE 'COLOURED PEOPLE' AND THE WIllTE CONSCIENCE 
To begin with, it must be noted that, in terms of the 'white city', Cape Town was the first South African city to 
isolate' Africans' in ' locations' far removed from any white residential areas. Christopher comments that 
"Cape Town at the end of the nineteenth century led the way in establishing the first formal 
location for Africans." (Christopher 1983: 146) 
This, coupled with a barrage of legislation during the Apartheid era directed against 'Africans' in the Western 
Cape, establishes that Cape Town was not a friendly city for ' Africans', and certainly not overly concerned with 
the injustices of racism as such. The horror of the Cape Town middle class of' Africans' is nicely demonstrated by 
an incident in the first half of the 20th century, when trains started to run to Langa (a black township on the Cape 
Flats) on the same railway line as the Pinelands trains. The residents of Pine lands were horrified, and the resulting 
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outcry was only stilled by the assurance given by the railway authorities that any train bound to or from Langa 
would on no account stop at the Pinelands station (see above comment on sources of information on Pinelands). 
There is no question that 'Coloureds' constituted a special case in the racial order of Cape Town. Repeatedly in 
the media coverage, District Six is referred to as the ' traditional home' of the 'Coloured people'. For instance, in 
an article titled "District Six: Big Shake-Up in Plam; For City - Proclamation a shock" (arll/2/66), the idea of a 
'traditional home' is taken one step further: 
"By proclaiming part of District Six for White ownership and occupation, the Goverrunent has 
ripped tlle heart out of tlle city's main traditional Coloured residential area In doing so, it has 
created new prospects for White expansion on the fringe of the city's central business district 
and has forced the issue of the establishment of a new core of Coloured occupation - probably 
on the Cape Flats." 
Besides the personification of races so typical of the discourse of Apartheid, the idea of a geographical base for 
'Coloured' people is so strong that a new one has to be found with the destruction of the old, akin to the Apartheid 
notion of a ' homeland' . Another article from 1969 refers to the Cape Flats, in the context of the removal of 
District Six, as the new "Coloured Heartland" (see "District Six: A Wind of Change" (ar22/1/69». In terms of the 
residents of District Six, in the liberal media tlley were almost without exception referred to as 'Coloured' ; some 
earlier articles distinguish between 'Coloured' and 'Malay', and others, particularly reports dealing witll crime, in 
the 60's begin to use the expression 'non-white'. By contemporary accounts (mainly writers and a very rare 
newspaper article) we know that the population of District Six was in fact 'mixed', but in the white consciousness 
it was 'Coloured' people who had a 'right' to the area. For instance, in one of the series articles referred to above, 
("Something That Is Worth Keeping", ct26/1I50), one of the causes of the decay of District Six is attributed to the 
fact that "landlords of houses in District Six are letting their properties to natives". This is in fact one of the central 
debates around District Six - there are a number of letters (as well as the sentiments of the Minister of Community 
Development) with titles like "District Six was White when I was bom there" (ar20/'lJ69), in which it is pointed 
out that: 
"I was born in District Six at the tum of the century .... The area which is to be proclaimed 
White was occupied by whites long before Coloured people took possession .. " 
This is half-true; there were far more 'White' people living in District Six at the tum of the century (see for 
instance, Bickford-Smith). There is a sense, emphasized in the article from 1950 referred to above, that the 
uniqueness of District Six somehow lay in its 'Coloured' racial nature, genetically intrinsic rather than a specific 
urbatl form of life or a specific social milieu. 
This racial discourse is fundamental to the notions of justice and conscience in the media coverage of District Six. 
There are various conceptualizations of 'injustice' in relation to the removals. Some conceive of an injustice to the 
'Coloured people' collectively, for instance the letter from Lady Joy Packer referred to above (in response to 
Waring's article) and the editorial from 1969 also referred to above that suggests tl13t a subum to house the 
'Coloured elite' be built on the ruins of District Six, as a just solution to the whole problem. There are other 
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references to what sociologists assert about the relocation of entire communities - another piece of 'objective 
expert knowledge'. See for instance "District Six: Big Shake-up in Plans for City" (ar11l2l66) in which it is stated 
that; 
"Dr Woltheim said the dreadful effects of mass removals had been pointed out. Sociologists, 
social workers, economists and anthropologists had warned that the uprooting of an established 
group and an attempt to resettle it elsewllere in a strange environment was certain to result in 
social chaos and economic disruption." 
Of course "the uprooting of an established group" probahly does (and probahly did) have these consequences, but 
what is significant is the objectification of the community of District Six; it is difficult to imagine Dr Wollheim 
speaking in this tone about, for instance, Constantia (an elite, at the time entirely white suburb in Cape Town). 
There are others which distinguish between 'hard-working, respectable' citizens of District Six and others; the 
injustice here is in the non-discrimination between the two. There is virtually no reference to the pure injustice 
inflicted on the individuals, regardless of race; in fact, the overwhelming sense is that the injustice consists in the 
treattnent of Ille ' Coloured' people as a whole and upsetting the "policy of racial hannonyover 100 years of full 
municipal govermnent" referred to in anotller 1966 article ("Council 'Clayed' on District Six, must take stock", 
ar27/5/66). An interest in the fate of individuals would entail subscription to some notion of urban rights, which 
would involve a political stance which was inconceivable at the time in the current context. 
Besides the letter from Lady Joy Packer, there is another letter from the day before which is more optimistic in 
tone. Joy Le Cordeur writes that 
"There are many aspects to be considered in the government's decision to remove the slums of 
District Six but in time to come it will be for the best. From many years experience oflife in the 
Cape, I can say the Coloured community have proved a resourceful and adaptable people 
showing a spirit of courage and humour under trying circumstances. Even they, as time goes 
by, will realize the wisdom of an action which at present time appears unjust. It is progress 
which advances with giant strides and wherever it has been necessary for other moves to be 
made, they have eventually settled down quite happily .. " (ar4/3/66) 
This passage is a neat corollary to the racial overtones of Ille other articles, taking the logic of a ' coloured 
personality' to its logical conclusion. Another passage of interest appears in an editorial in the Argus on the same 
day that District Six was declared a White Group Area under the GAA, which points out that 
"By reason of its location the land in District Six is valuable, valuable enough for the ordinary 
processes of economic life to have taken their course if there had never been a Group Areas 
Act. If Iltings had been left to themselves, it is likely that progress in development would have 
been made by now, for it is 16 years since the Group Areas Act was passed.. .. With the 
proclamation of District Six as a White area, its non-white inhabitants will have to be moved, 
though there will be at least a year's grace before this is done .... What is important, however, is 
that the movement will not be voluntary and gradual, as it would have been without forrna1 
legislation, but involuntary and compressed into a shorter period of time .. " (ar1112/66 - my 
emphasis) 
This passage suggests that the same result would have been brought about by 'market forces ' over a longer period, 
and thus the injustice (and inefficiency) lies in the suddenness of the move. There are various opinions in the 60's 
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about whether the land on which District Six was built was actua1ly valuable or not, and thus whether it should be 
a low-income, ' sub-econornic' area or a high-class business and residential area. In tenus of the dominant view 
expressed on the issue of justice, this was irrelevant; what was important was not to disrupt the "harmony" 
between the races, the "traditional" racial order of Cape Town. Politically, Apartheid appears in this context as a 
force of arbitrary and Wlcontrolled chaos, wreaking havoc in the complex matrix of race and class relations that 
had supposedly been a recipe for urban tranquillity for "over a century". In this context, again, Apartheid is not an 
ideclogy that 'clarifies' relations between the races, but destroys them; race relations are increasingly Wlcertain 
and unknown, and with this fading of certainty, a growing uncertainty about the social order in general. 
Opposition to the ' injustice' of Apartheid in this context was, on the whole, not opposition to a racial political 
order, but support for such an order in the face of its disruption. This point is nicely (if a little bizarrely, in the 
context) summed up in the above-mentioned letter ('''District Six was White when I was born there'" (ar20/2169»; 
the context is a reflection on the 'White' history of District Six, and the writer reflects on the 'inherent' racial 
order of the past: 
"The different [racial] groups remained different. They required no laws to teU them what 
cinema to attend, where to attend church, and in what queue they had to stand." 
THE GRAMMAR OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE LmERAL MEDIA 
I will look at two more articles in this section, which are so similar that one seems to be a paraphrase of the other. 
They ,,",re written three years apart, in 1966 when District Six was first declared white, and in 1969, when a 
comprehensive reconstruction progranWle was annoWlced by the Minister of Community Development ("City 
will lose its inner ring labour force" (arI8/2166) and "District Six: A Wind of Change" (ar2211/69» . The key 
passages are as foUows, in the earlier article: 
"In almost every city of natural growth in the world, the central business district is surroWlded 
by an inner ring of its lo,,",st income workers living in the old properties of the town." 
Or in the later article: 
"The normal pattern of urban growth involves the establishment of a central business district in 
a position favourable to all sections of the community and with an inner ring of low-income 
residential areas close to the core. II 
In both articles, Binningham is used as a comparative example. In the first article: 
"One of the most typical examples of this is Birntingham, which I visited three years ago. 
There a great influx of West Indians, Indians and Pakistanis has formed a non-White ring 
around the commercial heart in an otherwise White city. Their position there is determined by 
the fact that the inner ring fonus the oldest residential area of Birmingham, where the houses 
have begun to decline in value and have become unattractive to the higher income groups. That 
is a natural process of evolution of a city." 
And in the second, 
"Birmingham, in England, shows this pattern in an interesting way in that non-White 
inunigrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan have formed a non-White inner ring 
around the central area of what had been an all-White city. Cape Town has shown the same 
non-White inner band .. II 
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From these articles it is evident that the very granunar (in Wittgenstein's sense of "depth granunar") of "non-
White" is identical 'Alith that of "lowest-income workers" or ltlow-income residential areas". The equation of 
District Six with the working-class, and the observation that the residents were almost all non-white is a fuirly 
accurate reflection of how things were, but these articles are establishing that this was SO a priori, as part of the 
"normal" or "natural" pattern of urban development. The comparison is interesting for several reasons; by this 
analogy the non-whites making up Cape Town's own 'inner ring' are portrayed as aliens (the words "what had 
been .. II are not lost on us; in addition to which 11 000-White" immigrants in England are, for the writer, clearly 
aliens); the specific racial order of post-colonial Cape Town is shown to have universal echoes, and the 
coincidence between poverty (as opposed to structnral racial-econOlnic oppression in the context of the history of 
imperialism) and non-Whiteness is given an implicit universal tint. The idea of a "city of natural growth", or in 
the later article a "normal pattern of urban growth" is what is of interest. Here is, politically deployed, the 
objectification of urban form typical of urban planning-speak. What is being suggested is that Cape Town exhibits 
'normal' or 'natural' urban form, if the Nationalist government would only let it alone; this includes a 'natural ' , 
' traditional' or 'normal ' racial order, not expounded ideologically as in the case of Apartheid, but inherently part 
of the language, and thus invisible as a political attitude. Politically, of course, this mode of thought entirely 
depoliticizes the notion of urban fornl altogether - either the ' natural' form of the city is ' interfered with ' for 
'political ' reasons, which leads to civil disruption, disharmony and injustice, or it is left to develop 'normally' . 
This ' normality' comprises a matrix of expectations, duties and conventions that comprises the basis for notions of 
justice and injustice in terlllS of a racial-class social-urban order. To illustrate this incisively, I quote a passage 
from a polemical article by Dr Oscar Wollheim, entitled "District Six: A Sorry Decision" (arI2l2l69), which 
indicates very clearly the distinction between moral outrage and authentic political thinking The context is of 
some note; Dr Wollheim was one of the most outspoken ('outspoken' in the English sense) opponents of the 
rezoning of District Six, calling it "an act of piracy". He ends his attack on the Apartheid ideologues with the 
paragraph 
"A group [by which he means 'Coloured people'] which we have bullied into acquiescence and 
upon which we are dependent for almost every privilege and comfort we enjoy, is broken up 
with all the terrible consequences of social disruption, and is expected to throw down new roots 
in inhospitable areas where we ourselves would never dream of living" 
The construction of the notion of injustice is clear; "we" (preswnably the white middle and upper classes) owe 
tlthem" more dignity and respect than to force "them" to live somewhere "where \\e ourselves would never dream 
of living". "We" owe it because "we are dependent [on "tllem"] for almost every privilege and comfort that we 
enjoy". This last phrase is the sentiment of a man of integrity toward those who are unfortunate enough to have 
been born not amongst his fellow-masters, but amongst his servants. 
THE IDEA OF PROJECfION AS A POLITICAL DEVICE 
I will attempt to clarii» the problem of the complexity of the racial discourse surrounding the urban order of Cape 
Town, both traditionally and in ternls of Apartheid, by analogy to the concept of projection, a concept borrowed 
from the discourse of psychoanalysis (though with a Hegelian history). Projection was first proposed by Freud, and 
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elaborated on by, amongpt others, ~ect-relations theorists such as Melanie Klein, and Jung and his follo""rs. For 
Freud, projection is a primitive form of psychic defence against contradictory aspects of consciousness. Object 
relations theorists developed the concept in a more sophisticated way, particularly Melanie Klein, who employed 
the concept extensively to model the early stages of the psychological development of the child. Examples of 
projection would be that of an aggressive person, unable to consciously accept their own aggressiveness, who will 
tend to project aggression onto the world or close associates, and experience the world as an aggressive place; or 
in a sexual context, a possessive person unable to deal with the nature of their own possessiveness will project this 
possessiveness onto their sexual partner, and experience their partner's behaviour as possessive. Jung elaborated 
the notion of the shadow, whereby the self-understanding of a person is embodied in the persona, whereas the 
dark qualities which the person denies are part of themselves also, are expressed in the shadow, which is projected 
onto the world, which is then experienced as an evil place. A typical example of a shadow projection is that of a 
detective or policeman, who has a strong criminal tendency. The tendency cannot be controlled consciously, and 
is banished from the conscious mind. 
The policeman then sees his own shadow, his antithesis, unconscious part of himself, in the criminals he pursues. 
He unconsciously keeps in check his own criminal tendency by projecting it into the world and pursuing it there in 
the shape of a real criminal, who is the recipient of the shadow projection (Jung was fond of commenting that 
psychological complexes that ""re not dealt with consciously will confront one as Fate in the world). For our 
purposes, the important aspects of the projection concept are as follows. Firstly, that it is a defence mechanism, a 
way of dealing with a contradictory sitnation. Secondly, that it involves the projection of interoal qualities onto 
entities in the world, or onto the world itself, parts of the self and actions of the self are experienced as the deeds of 
others, the outcome of Nature or Fate. The condition of projection is a way of seeing, a way in which information 
is given meaning; particular meaning is attached to specific symbolic foTIOS. Lastly, the result of the projection is 
an integrated persona, a consistent, non-contradictory notion of the self, the condition necessary for the 
subjectivity of action and belief. Ho""ver, the objects of a projection are then not experienced as other beings, but 
as repressed parts of the self, and are thus not ever really known in their capacity of others. 
I will use the concept of projection analogously to illuminate the structure of the representation of the political 
terrain of the contestation over District Six explored above, which will provide the missing dimensions to the 
characterization of the 'politics of the ordinary'. Having done so, the political significance of the media coverage 
of District Six will have been adequately established. To do this it is necessary to draw a precise analogy bet'M'len 
the image of the psyche and that of a political culture, which I do in terms of capacity. In the same sense that a 
specific psyche has a certain capacity to deal with certain contingent sitnations, a political culture, by definition, is 
a collection of specific capacities to engage with the world in a political manner, to deal with certain contingencies 
The two interrelated projections that are expressive of the representation of the political terrain discussed above 
involve the status and genealogy of the urban order, and the nature and political status of Apartheid. In the first, 
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the wban order is experienced as being 'natural', whereas it is in fact a complex political reality, an outcome of 
specific histories; if there are authors of the South African wban environment in the 1960's, these are the South 
African white middle and upper classes, but specifically the former, in addition to a complex history of colonial 
and imperial govermnent and various forms of opposition and resistance. In short, ~ is culture is experienced 
as nature; the collective acts of a specific class are experienced by them as autonomous processes in the world The 
second is more complex. Apartheid is experienced as racism, racial inequality, "ideological rather than logical", 
irrational; there is no doubt that it was all of these things, but the opponents of Apartheid, insofar as they are 
represented by the liberal media of the 60's, construct a particular image of Apartheid, the structure of which can 
be understood only in terms of the Jungian concept of the 'shadow. Several authors, notably Barnett and Pinnock, 
have pointed to a paradoxical position of the crcc, who, in favour of the demolishing of District Six in the 40's, 
by the 60's found itself outraged at the prospect. The same has been noted by other authors in connection with the 
razing of Sophiatown and the United Party-dominated Johannesburg City Council (Van Tonder 1993). Besides 
being the product of an enormously complex political history, this pattern in the removals of two ' slums' housing 
vibrant wban enltures is symbolic: all the mechanisms, the elements of political thinking, the modes of perceiving 
urban spece, were put in place by these councils and newspapers and reacted to with horror when the political 
consequences begun to play themselves out. A clearer example is contained in the article referred to above by Dr 
Wollheim ("District Six: A Sorry Decision" (arI2l2l69)). He characterizes Apartheid, as many did in other 
articles of the time (not incorrectly) as follows: 
'The Apartheid philosophers have for years been !tying hard to sell the idea that separate 
development does not mean that any group is superior or inferior to any other group. Mr 
Coetzee has in one little sentence destroyed that argument and shown up the National Party in 
its true colours. Whites are superior to coloured people and must have Ule best areas for their 
use. It 
And yet at the end of his article, he characterizes Ule ' Coloureds' as follows: 
"A group .... upon whom we are dependent for almost every privilege and comfort we enjoy .. " 
Thereby implying either that "we" are superior, or that scme monstrous injustice has been perpetrated by alJ sides 
for years. By the tone of U,e rest of the article, and others, we can safely conclude the former. This is not a mere 
contradiction, and I am not attempting to cast aspersions on the sincerity of Dr Wollheim; it is indicative of a 
much more interesting phenomenon. 
Expressed in the language of the projection analogy, it is evidence of a specific response to a social-political 
situation, on three levels. First, wiU, regard to the situation of a swiftly transfonning urbanizing society, Apartheid 
has at times been described by urban geographers as a political response to urbanization. For instance, David 
Smith states that 
"Very sinlply, urbanization under Apartheid, no matter how carefully the state contrived to 
control it, has undennined Apartheid itself, bringing South African society and its cities to the 
brink of sigTlificant if still uncertain change. Since the doctrine of Apartheid as legislated racial 
separation was introduced following the National Party's assumption of power in 1948, it has 
been inextricably bound up with urbanization." (Smith 1992:1) 
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Smith emphasizes the centrality of the urban factor in Apartheid, as \\.ell as the role of urbanization in fomenting 
its ultimate collapse. Underneath the realm of ideology and political discourse comprising the 1940's to the 1980's 
f10\\.ed a stronger current, namely the unprecedented and continuous pressure exerted on the established urlJan 
order by mass urbanization. The transfonnation brought about by urbanization must be understood not as a 
limited cbange in the location of residential space, but a fundamental transfonnation of the social-political 
landscape of South African society, as can be testified by the diverse and unprecedented fonns of life that 
developed in South African cities in the 20th century. Smith quotes a passage from a novel of Nadine Gordinler, 
describing a 'township' (probably Sophiatown, with which she was very filmi1iar): 
''These restless broken streets where definitions fail .... The enonnous backYard of the whole 
white city, where categories and functions lose their ordination and logic .. " (quoted in Smith 
1992: I) 
The dominant features of the new urban environment \\.ere literally uncharacterizable; definitions had failed, 
categories and functions had "lost their ordination", and all of these factors contributed to a situation in which 
traditional political practices and culture \\.ere helpless. The questions sunounding the fonus of urban life became 
the central political issues of the day, around which virtually all Apartheid policy was defined, from the bantustan 
policies to group areas. Mabin af!inns that 
"Despite the amount of deliberation that the Smuts (United Party) government gave to urban 
issues in a spirit of reconstruction at the end of the war, the state took few positive actions, 
while overcrowding and infornlal residence developed apace. 10 some respects Apartheid was a 
(racist) response to previous failure to develop coherent urbanization policy." (Mabin 1992: 17) 
10 the tilce of what constituted a political crisis, the political bloc represented by the United Party crumbled, and its 
place was taken by the increasingly totalitarian and unworldly politics of Apartheid 10 tenus of urban form, 
Mabin, in the same essay, cautions that 
''The tendency for urban scholars to dismiss South African urbanization as an aberration has a 
strong following. To most casua1 observers, Apartheid shaped the countrys peculiar fonn of 
urbanism. Its uniqueness arises from the result of the mapping of white political po\\.er onto the 
country. This standard view contains considerable dangers. Politically, the result is to 
emphasize ideology and the state (at the expense of economics and daily life) as the primary 
spheres of struggle agaiost the oppressive order. lotellectually, the consequences include an 
aversion to probing the real material conditions and social character of urbanization." (Mabin 
1992:13) 
What Mabin is able to see, as an urban geographer capable of a sensibility for the politics of space less common 
amongst political theorists, is the crucial point in the analysis of the media coverage of District Six; that it is a 
commonplace, particularly in liberal historiography, that Apartheid 'subverted' the ' nornw' course of 
development of the South African urban environment. This has been clearly established as a dominant viewpoint 
in the media coverage of District Six in the 60's. What needs to be considered are the consequences of 
understanding Apartheid itself as a response to processes of socio-economic transfonnation manifest as 
urlJanization and urban transfonnation. 
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One of the notable consequences is that the political culture represented by the media coverage of District Six 
ought to be perceived as a reaction to both the political crisis of the United Party and Apartheid, in the context of 
the more general (and ultimately stronger) current of social transformation transforming the South African urban 
order. 
The representation of the political terrain in the context of the removal of District Six considered above displays a 
specific structure in terms of this political culture. The political contest that has District Six as its focus is deemed 
to be a struggle between the 'political ' or 'ideological' manipulation of urban form, and letting the 'natural' forms 
of urban development (MUch are supposedly the same worldwide) take their course. The political choice in urban 
terms as represented by the liberal media W<IS between 'normality' and 'Apartheid' . In fact, 'Apartheid' as 
represented by the liberal media, W<IS a projection of all the latent racial tendencies in the political culture of the 
english middle class, and 'normality' W<IS a mythologization of the racial urban order into a Cape 'tradition' . 
Apartheid W<IS thus experienced as a force that threatened to destroy this 'normal ' (racial-class) urban order. As I 
hope I have shown, during this period, and probably before, South African urban development W<IS neither 
'normal' nor ' abnormal' . The liberal media thus mapped out a political terrain that W<IS suspended between the 
unreality of Apartheid politics and the unreality of a reified, mythologized urban order. 
This representation W<IS a reaction to an unprecedented political situation, and a reaction ag;:rinst the only political 
force ofreal significance in terms of po"",r that emerged from this situation, namely the Nationalist government. 
Thus the political culture of MUch it W<IS a part W<IS in fact reactionary (in the original sense of the word). In 
terms of urban politics, both Apartheid and this political culture "",re in fact a form of anti-politics, MUch 
depoliticized the urban space; it is only really with the emergence of the UDF, with its civic associations and 
squatter movements in the 80's that an authentic urban politics became possible. 
Another key feature MUch makes the notion of projection so po"",rfuI is the establishment of normality. In tbe 
first half of this thesis, the link between objectivity and politics W<IS established, via the concept of 'world'. The 
sense of normality, MUch is so pervasive in the liberal media at this time, W<IS created and sustained by the twin 
projections outlined above. The sense of 'objectivity' gained from the high profile of urban planning, W<IS 
sustained politically by the projection of the hasic irrationality and illogicality of the final aims of planning-type 
discourses (MUch are in other contexts resolved politically in a specific urban political order) onto Apartheid, thus 
creating a centre of apparent calm logical rationality from which to make political jUdgements. In fact, the politics 
of the ordinary W<IS, in political terms, parasitical on the politics of the Nationalist goverrunent.. 
THE FINAL SOLUTION 
In order to illustrate a few of these contentions, I refer to a full page spread published toward the end of the 60's 
titled "A New District Six - With Love" (18/1/69). The article is striking and bold; the title is 2 cm tall, in bold 
capitals; the introductory paragraphs in big type take up half the page, and the article is accompanied by a big 
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map. All the features that I have described as being typical of the politics of the ordinruy are contained in to some 
extent in this article. I quote part of the opening paragraph: 
"Someone once said that history has landed South Africa with two big debts which would have 
to be paid if this countly was going to enjoy a prosperous and happy future. The first was a 
republic which english-speaking South Africans owed the Afrikaner. The second was a fair 
deal which the Whites owed the Coloureds. The first debt has been paid, if grudgingly. The 
second debt has not. The forced removal of 6000-odd Coloured families from District Six 
which has always been their home, will increase that debt inuneasurably. It will also add to the 
load of guilt and disgrace which every White person in tins countly bears, whether he admits it 
or not. The removal of these 36,000 souls will be on Cape Town's conscience for a long time. 
The loss will be mutual. Cape Town will become an entirely different city, a duller, poorer city 
without its essential character, deprived of the zest and hunlOur tllJIl the people of District Six 
have it\iected into its streets like oxygen into blood." 
First, in the scale of 'debts', non-white non-coloured people are not mentioned; District Six has become the place 
which has always been the home of the Coloured people; the 'essential character' of Cape Town is to be found in 
District Six; 'Cape Town' personified implies White Cape Town. What the writer suggests after this paragraph, is 
that District Six be demolished as planned, but that half of it be developed for 'Coloureds' and half for white 
habitation. The rest of the article is devoted to the practicalities of such a scheme. The scheme as a whole is 
presented as an alternative to Apartheid, but it has all its features, except the one small detail of relocating the 
whole coloured population to the Cape Flats. This is the crucial distinction between a ' rational' and an ' irrational' 
Apartheid, which is essentially the difference between Apartheid and the politics of the ordinruy. All tile things 
that have come to be associated with Apartheid are present in the 'rational ' version too, namely the entrenched 
racial definitions, utopian social engineering and the associated techIlicist approaches to "social problems". 
What is at issue here is not whether Apartheid should be implemented or not, but the manner in winch it should 
be implemented. The fact that in any case the Apartheid ideologues never had any intention of ever changing their 
minds (p. W. Botha even went so far as to label the mild protests of the liberal press as "hysterical screanling") is 
also important for two reasons. First, on account of the obvious uselessness of what the liberal press regarded as 
"opposition", and second, related, the repeated astonishment voiced by members of the liberal press and 
opposition politicians that the Nationalist govenunent was not vulnerable to the use of reason. There was a good 
reason for this; the political terrain in which the reasoning took place was a complex self-generated mythology; 
reason was literally a ritual, a parody of some other politics. The difference between this type of politics and that 
which came afterwards can be seen in the development of forms of protest against zoning in District Six (see 
Soudien 1990), which only became effective when a UDF-like political culture began to emerge in the area 
surrounding wl1J!l was District Six. 
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CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
What has been concluded so far is that the media coverage of District Six can be understood, brought into relief, 
by the conceptualization of a specific political culture which I have called the politics of the ordinary. In the first 
section of the thesis, I beg;lJ1 with a conception of communication, and news in particular, foUowing Carey, as 
ritual, and ended with a conception of news as a communicative form constituting a form of political judgement, 
and as such, a new; practice constituting a specific political culture. I want now to return at the end of this 
analysis to Careys notion of communication, and news, as ritual. 
THE PERPETUATION OF A POLITICAL CULTURE 
Carey remarks that 
"A ritual view of communication is directed not towards the extension of messages in space but 
towards the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the 
representation of shared beliefs." (Carey 1989:18 - my emphasis) 
The inner connection between the conception of news as ritual and news as a form of political judgement is this; 
the "maintenance of society in time". Thus through a continual process of interpretation and fumiJiarization, a 
specific political culture and thus a specific means by which the world is understood, are sustained. In the sarne 
way that fuith is sustained through ritual, a specific political culture is sustained through a specific media practice. 
The sustaining of a specific political culture is tantamount to the sustaining of the world, as it is through such a 
political culture that the continuity of the world (which rests on the process of making sense of it) is sustained. 
The political significance of the media coverage of District Six is thus not to be found in a notion of causality, or a 
specific ' effect', but in this phenomenon of sustaining a specific political culture. It must be emphasized that the 
culture is not sustained by news practices alone; the newspapers are merely part of a complex web of relations, but 
a very important part, for it is there that the practice becomes visible; their public articulation is synonymous with 
their continuous affirmation by the "public". As such it must be understood in the context of the development of 
the complex politics of the South African ruling class during the 50's and the 60's. In this sense, a study of the 
media during this period reveals specific aspects of this complex relationship; the media practices are symptomatic 
of this complexity. 
There are two points of significance that emerge from the symptoms of that complexity. First of aU, as weU as 
other forms of belief, the perpetuation of the mythologies of the politics of the ordinary has its source in the 
specific new; practices of the liberal press. Politically, this is an important result; mythological conceptions of 
'Europe' and 'culture' were not, as is commonly supposed in orthodox historiography of Apartheid, propag;lled 
and perpetuated contrary to the ' self-evident' truths of the world, but by the actual examination of the world itself 
in the form of new;, in the cold and rational light of objective reporting. This in part explains the perpetuation of 
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the mythologies central to the politics of Apartheid. Secondly, a specific political position, specific political 
response to a situation does not follow cognitively from the situation in question, but constitutes an imaginative 
achievement. Resistance politics is not an automatic nesponse to oppression, but an imaginative and sophisticated 
response; conceiving of a situation as oppressive is part of this response. 
THE PECULIAR SILENCE ON DISTRICf SIX 
One of the most pecnliar featnres of the history of the razing of District Six is that there was not more political 
opposition from the community of Cape Town as a whole. The opposition that there was, was singularly 
ineffectual (Soudien 1990). There are two reasons for this. The first is, as far as liberal opposition went, the usual 
fallacy of liberal politics, namely a misplaced belief in the power of speech, linked to a misplaced belief in the 
fundamental rationality of political processes and political actors. The second, more significant reason, is to be 
found in the political cultnre of the ordinary. Although it is not possible to establish a direct causal link between 
the political cultnre characteristic of the liberal media, and the actual political life of the city, it seems plausible to 
assume such a link; this seems to be confirmed by the political behaviour of what 1 will term the political classes 
of Cape Town (which at the time comprised mainly the white middle-class english community). 
Without an authentic urban imagination, an authentic urban politics is not possible. An authentic urban 
imagination, politically speaking, would have been a possible creative response to the socio-political conditions of 
the 1950's and 1960's; the development of such a form of political judgement was the precondition for a true 
valuation of the urban environment, and in the absence of such valuation, the significance of what was taking 
place in the 60's could not be properly established. The non-response to tlle razing of District Six can be partly 
attributed to one of the features of the politics of the ordinary, namely the redemption of a sense of normality by a 
complex mechartism which I have termed 'projection'. This was a parody of real politics; in the midst of this 
normality the Nationalist govermnent was removing 'coloured' voters from the national and municipal voters ' 
roles, tortnring, jailing and executing political opponents, and using parliament to emasculate local authorities. 
The fact that the liberal media were still lamely offering bizarre planning schemes to the public, in the stated hope 
that such schemes would change the govemmenfs mind on the removal of District Six, is evidence of the 
unreality of this political cultnre. This unreality could only be sustained by institutions which constantly 
interpreted and reinterpreted the world in tllese terms, which points to the unique importance of media institutions 
in the history of Apartheid. What still has to be understood is the complex relationship between this political 
culture and Apartlleid. 
APARTHEID AND THE WHITE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS 
I cannot make more than a few observations here, as this thesis does not deal adequately with the complexity of 
this issue to explore it in proper detail . Apartlleid has most often been conceived as being primarily of Afrikaner 
provenance, having its source and inspiration in Afrikaner Nationalism; some authors have gone so far as to 
characterize Apartlleid as an "Afrikaner civil religion" (see for instance Moodie 1975). This has a rather odd 
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effect in that it splits into two to what to aU intents and purposes constituted the ruling class for at least the forty 
years or so during which Apartheid lasted, raising the question as to the political role of non-Afrikaner white 
people during this period. Politically of course, this is a paradox, which has always heen explained, particularly 
by english liberal historians, in questionahle terms such as the greater number of afrikaners among<! the white 
electorate, or the weighting of rural constituencies. This is not an explanation; it explains nothing of why, if the 
so-called english-speaking South Africans were opposed to Apartheid, they were incapable of comprising a 
powerful political bloc, which they were not after the demise of the United Party, either in terms of their own 
identity (defined in class terms as well) or on the basis of some other identity. 
Nee-Marxist explanations have done admirably in providing grounds to regard the ruling class as a unified 
political entity, and to have highlighted ways in which Apartheid has its roots and nourishment primarily in 
english mining and industrial capital (see for instance Bozzoli 1981), but the actual political relationship in terms 
of which the english middle class both comprised part of the ruling class, as well as both kept a moral distance 
and occupied a politically powerless position, has not heen explored in detail. I have suggested here, that in the 
limited context of District Six, insofur as the politics of the ordinary was representative of the ' political classes' of 
Cape Town, this moral distance and political powerlessness were intimately related; that the condition on which 
the moral distance was established implied that a properly political response to Apartheid was not possible or even 
desired. What is sometimes forgotten is that Apartheid is a contested concept itself; the notion of Apartheid 
espoused by UDF activists in the 80's was quite different from that espoused by the liberal press in the 60's. This 
difference is not a matter of semantics or the subtle distinction in definitions indulged in by historians, but the 
basis for a radical difference in politics. Apartheid for the activists of the UDF was a concrete daily reality, a 
system of power that confronted them in the form of economic and racial oppression, detention, torture and often, 
death. In terms of the politics of the ordinary, 'Apartheid' was a projection, a chimera, an unreality, indicative of a 
specific aspect of the complex political reality of the South African ruling class during the 50's and 60's. 
The actual content of the political culture characteristic of the media coverage suggests that the reality of white 
domination in the 1950's and 1960's is fur more complex than supposed; the conflict between' Apartheid' and 
opponents of the liberal media conception of • Apartheid' can be conceived as a conflict between the proponents of 
a traditional racial urban order, and a political reaction to the perceived disintegration of this order in the urban 
enviromnent. In a sense, the introduction of formal race legislation such as the Population Registration Act, was a 
forceful recognition that traditional racial categories sustaining the political order of the urban envirorunent were 
under threat; it seems that the vibrant and cosmopolitan urban cultures of Sophiatown and District Six were 
evidence of this threat. In this light, the politics of the 'opponents' of Apartheid as represented by the liberal 
media, appear very conservative, very reactive, without vision or political insight. In retrospect, the liberal media 
contributed little to the fostering of a democratic political culture in South Africa, as fur as the material of this 
study is concerned. 
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In conclusion, the method for the analysis of news that has been developed here has provided many insights such 
as the ones outlined above. However this study has a number of weaknesses, tlle chief one being that no clear 
connection has been established between the political culture characteristic of the media coverage in question, and 
specific political groupings in South African society during the specified period. Links have been postulated, but 
not clearly demonstrated. This is partly due to the actual questions under consideration, for, as I have outlined 
above, there are considerable difficulties with the notion that a newspaper espouses a specific political position. 
This is a contradiction which cannot be resolved without a far more detailed analysis of ruling-class politics 
during the period stated. What is however clear, is that the representation of the racial oppression that 
characterized South African life for the last 40 years or so, by the term Apartheid, is far more complex than 
traditionally supposed. A proper understanding of the politics of those years, and those preceding them, would 
require a detailed exploration of the actual use of the term Apartheid as part of a political understanding of 
political conditions of the time. In this light, the politics of the white ruling class during this period are a lot more 
opaque and complex than they have appeared up to now. 
no 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Archival Material: 
Newsclippings from the Argus and the Cape Times, both daily English-language newspapers published in Cape 
Town, contained in the South African LibraI)' newspaper cuttings collection under "District Six" 
Secondary Sources: 
Arendt, H. 1993. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. London: Penguin 
Arendt, H. 1989. The Human Condition. London: University of Chicago 
Aristotle 1948. The Politics 0/ Aristotle, translated with notes by Ernest Barker. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Barnett, N. 1993. "Race, Housing and Town Planning in Cape Town c.192()'1940 with special reference to 
District Six." UnpublishedMA Thesis, University of Cape Town 
Benhabib, S. 1994. Situating the Self Cambridge: Polity 
Benhabib, S. 1990. "Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Po""r of Narrative", Social Research, 57,1:167-196 
Benhabib, S. 1988. "Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought", Political Theory, 
16,1:29-51 
Benjamin, W. 1989. "rheses on the Philosophy of History", In Bonner, S. and Kellner, D. (eds.) Critical Theory 
and Society: a reader. London: Routledge 
Bickford-Sntith, V. 1989. "A 'special tradition of multi-racialism'? Segregation in Cape Town in the late 
nineteenth and early tv.entieth centuries", In Janles, W. and Simons, M. (eds.) The Angry Divide - social and 
economic history a/the Western Cape. Cape Town: David Phillip 
Bickford-Sntith, V. 1990. "The Origins and Early History of District Six to 1910", ln Jeppie, S. and Soudien, C. 
(eds.) The Struggle/or District Six, Past and Present. Cape Town: Buchu Books 
Bozzoli, B. 1981. The Political Nature 0/ a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890-1933. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Brecht, B. 1982. The Caucasian Chalk Circle. London: Methuen 
Bruno, G. 1993. "Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner", In Sharre!, C.(ed.) Crisis Cinema, The 
Apocalyptic Idea in Pastmodern Narrative Film, PostModernPositions v.6. Washington: Maisonneuve Press 
Canovan, M. 1992. Hannah Arendt: a reinterpretation 0/ her political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Carey, J. 1989. Communication as Culture: e.<sl(Ys on media and society. London: Unwin Hyman 
Christopher, A 1983 "From Flint to So""to: reflections on the colonial origins of the apartheid city", area, 
15,2: 145-149 
Connolly, W. 1983. The Terms a/Political Discourse. Oxford Martin Robertson 
Crick, B. 1962.1n De/ence 0/ Politics. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson 
111 
D'Entreves, M. 1994. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London: Routledge 
Danford, J. 1978. Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: a reexamination of the foundations of social science. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Disch, L. 1993. "More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah 
Arendt", Political Theory 21 ,4:655-694 
Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. 1986. Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeutics. Brighton: Harvester 
Press 
Eco, U. 1987. 7)'avels in Hypen'eality. London: Picador 
Fromm, E. 1979. To Have or To Be? London:Abacus 
Haberrnas, J. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society. Cambridge: Polity 
Hanfling, O. 1989. Willgenslein's Later Philosophy. London: Macmillan 
Heller, A and Feher, F. 1988. The Postmodem Political Condition. Cambridge:Polity 
Heller, A 1991a. "The Conoept of The Political Revisited", In Held, D. (ed.) Political Theory Today. Cambridge: 
Polity 
Heller, A. 1991b. "Sociology as the Defetishization of Modernity" In Heller, A and Feher, F. The Grandeur and 
Twilight of Radical Universalism. New Brunswick Transaction 
James, W. and Simons, M. (eds.) 1989. The Angry Divide - social and economic history of the Western Cape. 
Cape Town: DavidPhil1ip 
Jeppie, S. and Soudien, C. (eds.) 1990. The Struggle for District Six, Past and Present. Cape Town: Buchu Books 
Kenny, A 1993. Wit/genstein. London: Penguin 
Leftwich, A 1983. Redefining Politics: people, resources and power. London: Methuen 
Luban, D. 1983. "Explaining Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Theory of Theory", Social Research, 50,1 :215-247 
Lukes, S. 1974. Power. London: Macmillan 
Mabin, A 1992. "Dispossession, exploitation and struggle: an historical overview of South African wbanization", 
In Smith, D. (ed.) The Apartheid City and Beyond. London: Routledge 
Mabin, A 1990. ""Doom at one stroke of the pen" : Planning and Group Areas, c. 1935-1955." Paper presented at 
the University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 6-10 February 1990 
McCarthy, J. and Smit, D. 1984. South African City: Theory in Analysis and Planning. Cape Town: Juta 
McQuail, D. 1983. Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. London: Sage 
Millet, K. 1971. Sexual Politics. London: Rupert Hart-Davis 
Mollison, B. 1991. Introduction to Permaculture. Tylagum: Tagari Publishers 
112 
Monk, R- 1990. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. London: Vintage 
Moodie, T.D. 1975. The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion. Berkley: 
University of California 
Pinnock, D. 1989. "Ideology and urban planning Blueprints of a garrison city", In James, W. and Simons, M. 
(eds.) The Angry Divide - social and economic history of the Western Cape. Cape Town: David Phillip 
Pitkin, H. 1993. Wit/genstein and Justice. Berkley: University of California 
Rive, R- 1990. "District Six: Fact and Fiction", In Jeppie, S. and Soudien, C. (eds.) The Struggle for District Six, 
Past and Present. Cape Town: Buchu Books 
Said, E. 1987. Orientalism. London: Penguin 
Seigel, J. 1990. "Avoiding the Subject: A Foucauldian Itinerary", Journal of the History of Ideas, 51,2: 273-299 
Simons, J. 1995. Foucault and the political. London: Routledge 
Srnith, D. (ed) 1992. The Apartheid City and Beyond. London: Routledge 
Sontag, S. 1994. Against Interpretation. London: Vintage 
Soudien, C. 1990. "District Six: From Protest to Protest", In Jeppie, S. and Soudien, C. (eds.) The Struggle for 
District Six, Past and Present. Cape Town: Buchu Books 
Swanson, M. 1977. "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 
1900-1909", Journal of African History, 18,3:387-410 
Tomaselli, K., Tomaselli, R- and Muller, J. 1987. Narrating Ihe Crisis: Hegemony and Ihe South African Press. 
Johannesburg Richard Lyon 
Van Tonder, D. 1993. '''First win the vtar, then clear the slums': The Genesis of the Western Areas Removal 
Scheme, 1940-1949", In Bonner, P., Delius, P. and Posel, D. (eds.) Aporlheid's Genesis 1935-1962. 
Johannesburg University of the Witwatersrand Press 
Vollrath, E. 1977. "Hannah Arendt and the Method of Political Thinking", Social Research, 44: 160-182 
Williams, R- 1976. Keywords. London: Fontana 
Wittgenstein, L. 1988. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford Basil Blaclawll 
113 
